


Around The Lvov-Warsaw School

edited by Anna Drabarek



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Introduction

Anna Drabarek

Philosophy lives in potential questions, for nothing is more astonishing than what appears obvious. Such approach is the source of philosophy and a stimulant which keeps it alive in the culture. A discussion on philosophical problems may never be closed, therefore, as its open-ended status – resulting from the strength of questions seeking ever new articulations, never satisfied with any of the answers which have already been provided, refusing to accept their categorical claims on truth – leads to an open-ended process of always asking new questions. Thus, it is not possible in philosophy to take a privileged approach either with respect to the subject of study, or to the various ways in which it is explored. It is a mistake to treat the past of philosophy as something that belongs to history and may now only be contemplated. It is also a mistake to treat its past only in terms of memory. The philosophical approach makes it necessary to treat the past in a way as the present, or as an actual coexistence of what was and what is. The prospective character of philosophical tradition is too rarely perceived in how old philosophical systems and projects brim with potential. We should be careful, for philosophy, alive in possible questions, often proposes new ways of articulating the human experience. It becomes dead and defunct, however, once it starts to look more like an antique shop, or is merely the object of apologetic endeavours.

The open-ended status of this work and the problems involved, as well as the possibility of subsequent additions and supplementations, is revealed, for instance, in the polemic discussion with the Lvov-Warsaw School, recognized in the history of both Polish and world philosophy. This thought has been an inspiration for a book entitled “Contemporary Polemics Around the Lvov-Warsaw School”. Even though in 1997, an interesting study was pub-

lished by Professor Jan Woleński, entitled “The Lvov-Warsaw School in Polemics”, the author wrote in the introduction: “I have not, in principle, included in these considerations the period after World War II, unless for good reasons – such as when later works shed some new light on disputes which had begun earlier, or when the discussion was interesting on its own account. This principle has resulted in leaving out the polemics between Marxism and the Lvov-Warsaw School, as well as those polemics, even external ones, which were concerned with axiological questions [...]. I have also left out a number of various issues, mostly concerned with the philosophy of natural sciences and logics, as it was not possible to present technical issues in a brief discussion”¹.

Our book is an attempt at discussing at least part of the issues left out from Professor Jan Woleński’s study. There is one more valuable comment found in his book which has allowed the authors to arrange the problems presented here: “[...] polemics may be external or internal. A polemic which is external to a particular philosophical current involves the representatives of various orientations; an internal polemic involves the representatives of the same school. External polemics are understandable in themselves as an expression of the disputable nature of philosophical conclusions. Internal polemics are less natural, but particularly interesting in that they prove a particular orientation is capable of developing on its own”². In line with the division proposed by Professor Jan Woleński, three articles in this book are external polemics, and one may be considered an internal one.

Information on the Lvov-Warsaw school and its representatives is not sufficiently widespread today, it may therefore be worthwhile providing a brief summary here. In 1895, when Kazimierz Twardowski was appointed professor at John Casimir University in Lvov, he was 29 years old. He resolved to develop a new way of doing philosophy³. The change, he believed, was to begin from analysing philosophical problems with the use of strictly scientific research methods. He also proposed that the boundaries of scientific inquiries in phi-

¹ J. Woleński (1997). *Szkoła Lwowsko-Warszawska w polemikach*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe SCHOLAR, p. 8.

² *Ibidem*, p. 7.

³ Cf. H. Skolimowski (1967). *Polish Analytical Philosophy*, London: Routledge; J. Woleński (1985). *Filozoficzna szkoła lwowsko-warszawska*. Warszawa: PWN; A. Drabarek (2004). *Etyka umiaru. Ideał człowieka i jego szczęście w poglądach filozofów ze Szkoły Lwowsko-Warszawskiej*. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek.

losophy should be delineated in accordance with the postulate of clarity and validity of claims. Twardowski wanted philosophy to be comprehensible, and properly substantiated. A new opening in Polish philosophy, he believed, needed to begin with its being taught in high schools at an appropriate level. Lectures in philosophy at university level were to be preceded by preparatory work in high schools, by introducing students to scientific methods used in empirical sciences. These postulates, aimed at fostering a rebirth of philosophy in Poland, were supplemented by Twardowski with one more endeavour, based on the proposal that practical philosophy does not only involve the solution of theoretical problems, but is also a way to achieving moral perfection, wisdom, independence and self-control. This difficult task was accomplished thanks to Twardowski's educational and organizational talents. In 1897, which was his third year as the head of the Faculty of Philosophy, he founded the first Philosophical College in Poland, and in 1901 held the first class in experimental psychology with Polish students.

Kazimierz Twardowski cooperated closely with the Philosophy Club at the Academic Reading Room in Lvov. In 1904, he initiated the foundation of the Polish Philosophical Association, which included philosophers not only from Lvov but from other academic centres in Poland during the partitions as well. In addition to all these projects and initiatives, in 1911 Twardowski launched "Ruch Filozoficzny" ("Philosophical Movement"), a periodical based in Lvov, which made him independent from "Przegląd Filozoficzny" ("Philosophical Review") published in Warsaw. Twardowski worked as a teacher, edited the periodical he founded, delivered lectures, translated philosophical works into Polish, including H. Veihinger's "The Philosophy of Nietzsche", and, together with Jan Łukasiewicz, D. Hume's "An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding". He also inspired Władysław Witwicki to translate Plato's dialogues into Polish⁴. In the academic years 1900–1901 and 1904–1905, Kazimierz Twardowski was the Dean of the Philosophy Department at Lvov University. In 1914–1915, he was appointed the University's Vice-Chancellor⁵. At that time, World War I broke out and Lvov was occupied by the Russian army. Twardowski was in Poronin then, and, unable to go back to Lvov, decided to go to Vienna. It was there, as reported by his

⁴ Cf. A. Drabarek (2004). *Etyka umiaru... Op. cit.*, p. 27.

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 28.

students⁶, that he began to organize help for Polish students temporarily staying in Vienna who wanted to continue their studies. He provided them with financial assistance, and, in cooperation with the Vienna University, enabled them to continue their studies and take examinations. In the summer of 1915, he returned to Lvov and, despite the reluctance of central government authorities, made sure academic classes and lectures could begin again. The two following years of his term as Vice-Chancellor (1915–1916 and 1916–1917) were an incessant and victorious struggle to maintain the Polish character of the Lvov University. In spite of the vicinity of the front line and the limitations imposed by wartime, Twardowski made sure that academic work at the University continued.

In studies concerning Kazimierz Twardowski and his disciples, they are discussed in terms of two generations⁷. The first one included W. Witwicki, J. Łukasiewicz, K. Ajdukiewicz, S. Błachowski, S. Baley, W. Borowski, T. Czeżowski, T. Kotarbiński, D. Gromska, S. Igel, M. Kreutz, S. Leśniewski, K. Sośnicki, Z. Zawirski, B. Bandrowski, M. Gębarowicz, L. Jaxa-Bykowski, M. Kridl, J. Kuryłowicz, and others. “Apart from those listed above, there were also thinkers influenced by Twardowski more by the style of his research work than as his students. They included: W. Tatarkiewicz, K. Gnasiniec, J. Kleiner, Z. Łempicki, O. Ortwin, W. Szumowski, B. Nawroczyński, M. Tretter. The second generation of Twardowski’s disciples included: W. Auerbach, E. Blausteinowa, L. Blaustein, I. Dąmbska, M. Kokoszyńska, S. Łuszczewska-Rohmanowa, H. Mehlberg, Z. Schmierer, H. Słoniewska, S. Swieżawski, T. Witwicki, and others. The developed into independent scholars already during the interwar period and like their older colleagues, conducted their research mostly in the fields of philosophy, logics and psychology.”⁸

The primary goal pursued by the Lvov-Warsaw School was scientific understanding based on specific findings in particular disciplines of science, leading to a scientific philosophical reflection. Consequently, the term they used was philosophical sciences, rather than philosophy. The range of sciences referred to as philosophical included psychology, the history of philoso-

⁶ Cf. T. Czeżowski (1938). Kazimierz Twardowski. *Ruch Filozoficzny*, Vol. 14, p. 10.

⁷ Cf. S. Pacuła (1966). *Filozofia analityczna formacja szkoły lwowsko-warszawskiej*. *Życie i Myśl*, No. 16; J. Woleński (1985). *Filozoficzna szkoła lwowsko-warszawska*. *Op. cit.*; S. Zamecki (1977). *Koncepcja nauki w szkole lwowsko-warszawskiej*. Wrocław-Gdańsk: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich.

⁸ A. Drabarek (2004). *Etyka umiaru...* *Op. cit.*, p. 30.

phy, ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics, the theory of cognition, logics and methodology of sciences, and detailed philosophies: of law, the state, religion. Representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School all agreed that speculation should be eliminated from philosophy and replaced with an analytical method which ensured objectivism in the judgments pronounced. Their reluctance to accept speculation in philosophy resulted from the fact that nearly all of Twardowski's students considered logic to be the methodological model to be followed in philosophy. Łukasiewicz believed that the only way out of the methodological impasse in philosophy was to use the method of mathematical logic, that is, the axiomatic-deductive method⁹.

The most important postulates of the Lvov-Warsaw School also included distinguishing between philosophy and worldview; it was a concept of independent philosophy. The attitude of caution, non-intervention even¹⁰, reflected the conviction that philosophers are at particular risk of confusing scientific problems with worldview issues. The deliberate criticism towards worldview questions adopted by philosophers from the Lvov-Warsaw School was designed to ward off the attribution of scientific appearances to metaphysical views, which in reality were to exclude reliability in science¹¹.

In the book "Contemporary Polemics Around the Lvov-Warsaw School", we present articles on logics, psychology and ethics. The first chapter *Debates on the Concept of Many-Valuedness: a Philosophical Point of View* by Mateusz Radzki, Ph. D., discusses the three-valued propositional logic constructed by Jan Łukasiewicz. The first contact of Polish students with mathematical logic was made in 1898 through a lecture delivered by Kazimierz Twardowski on new directions in logic, including the algebra of logic in Boole's and Schroder's approach. He inspired Jan Łukasiewicz, whose interests in logic went hand in hand with his interest in philosophy. This was reflected in his first book, entitled "O zasadzie sprzeczności u Arystotelesa" ("On the Principle of Contradic-

⁹ Cf. K. Ajdukiewicz (1949). *Zagadnienia i kierunki filozofii*. Warszawa: Czytelnik; T. Czeżowski (1949). *Główne zasady nauk filozoficznych*. Toruń: Wydawnictwo UMK; T. Kotarbiński (1957). O potrzebie zaniechania wyrazów filozofia, filozof, filozoficzny itp. In: id. *Wybór pism*, Vol. 1, Warszawa: J. Łukasiewicz (1961). Logistyka a filozofia. In: id. *Zagadnienia z logiki i filozofii*. Warszawa: PWN.

¹⁰ Cf. L. Kołakowski (1953). *Filozofia nieinterwencji. Myśl Filozoficzna*, No. 1, p. 7.

¹¹ The postulate of eliminating metaphysics from philosophy was at that time also proposed by philosophers from the Vienna Circle in line with the principles of logical empiricism.

tion in Aristotle”). Jan Woleński writes that “The construction of many-valued logical systems is commonly believed to have been one of the major achievements of the Warsaw School, and specifically of Łukasiewicz”¹². For Łukasiewicz himself, many-valued systems of logic had a specific philosophical meaning. Alasdair Urquhart notes that Łukasiewicz treated many-valued logic as a „tool which released the human mind from the tyranny of rigid intellectual systems”. The discovery made by Łukasiewicz was the result of many debates conducted by philosophers and logicians from the Lvov-Warsaw School. There were three primary issues discussed by the Polish philosophers and logicians of the time which significantly influenced the philosophical concept proposed by Łukasiewicz: the general theory of the object by Brentano-Twardowski-Meinong; the issue of induction and the probability calculus; and deliberations concerning determinism and indeterminism. Łukasiewicz introduced a third logical value $\frac{1}{2}$ to propositional logic, differing from the two classical values: the logical value 1 (interpreted as true) and the logical value 0 (interpreted as false). According to Łukasiewicz, $\frac{1}{2}$ refers to the nature of possible future states of affairs, and may be interpreted as possibility, contingency, etc. Interpretation of the logical value $\frac{1}{2}$ is therefore metaphysical and modal. It should be stressed, however, that the philosophical argumentation presented by Łukasiewicz refers not only to metaphysical and modal concepts and issues, but to ethical ones as well.

The main two, mutually independent postulates proposed by Łukasiewicz were: to construct a logical system capable of describing future, unrealized, but possible states of affairs, and to reject the classical law of non-contradiction (in classical logic equivalent by definition to the law of the excluded middle). The latter of these two postulates comes from the theory of objects proposed by Alexius Meinong and embraced by Łukasiewicz, which allows for the existence of the so-called “contradictory objects”, i.e. objects which have contradictory properties.

It should be stressed that while Łukasiewicz criticizes the classical formal logic derived from the traditional logic of Aristotle, he makes two basic assumptions common to a large portion of logical systems, including classical formal logic. The first of these assumptions is concerned with syntax. It says that a logical system should be constructed using axioms and rules of inference, such as the rule of substitution and the rule of detachment. The

¹² J. Woleński, *Ibidem*, p. 116.

other assumption deals with semantics, and says that a logical system should be truth-functional, i.e. the logical value of every complex formula should be a value of the truth function, whose arguments are the logical values of the components of that formula.

The chapter presents the three-valued logic of Łukasiewicz not only in philosophical terms, but in semantic (definition of five basic propositional connectives using truth tables) and syntactic (axioms and the rules of inference and definitions of propositional connectives in the system of Mordchaj Wajsberg and Roman Tuziak) ones as well. The chapter also includes comments on the extension of the concept proposed by Łukasiewicz to finitely and infinitely many-valued propositional logics satisfying certain formal criteria.

In addition, the chapter presents three philosophically motivated polemics with the concept of three-valued logic proposed by Łukasiewicz, being in fact polemics with the very idea of many-valuedness.

The first of these polemics, authored by the Swiss philosopher of science and mathematics Ferdinand Gonseth, questions the rejection by Łukasiewicz of the two basic laws of classical logic: the law of non-contradiction and the law of the excluded middle. Gonseth believes that the logical value $\frac{1}{2}$ cannot be interpreted as possibility or non-determination.

The second polemic, proposed by Urquhart, refers to philosophical doubts concerning the interpretation of the three logical values in the logic of Łukasiewicz. Urquhart presents his own interpretation, consistent with the philosophical postulates of Łukasiewicz, and concludes that the three-valued logic of Łukasiewicz is not a formal tool capable of describing future states of affairs. Moreover, Urquhart adds that the logic of „possibilities” as proposed by Łukasiewicz may not be truth-functional – he asserts that the logical construction suggested by Łukasiewicz is wrong.

Similarly, the third polemic by the Polish philosopher and logician Tomasz Bigaj, apparently demonstrates that the logic of Łukasiewicz is not consistent with the philosophical concept of future states of affairs. Bigaj claims that the philosophical concept proposed by Łukasiewicz is founded on an assumption which leads to conclusions contradictory to his logic, e.g. to the acceptance of all tautologies of classical logic, including those which are rejected in the three-valued logic he proposed.

The second chapter, also by Mateusz Radzki, Ph.D., entitled *Debates on the Concept of Many-Valuedness: a Mathematical Point of View*, presents the

mathematical (metalogical) criteria for the evaluation of the formal properties of many-valued propositional logics. With the use of mathematical tools, it is possible to compare different many-valued logics, find the formal properties they share and those which make them significantly different. Many-valued propositional logics may thus be considered not only from the philosophical, but from the mathematical point of view as well.

The chapter discusses first of all the relationship between the idea of many-valuedness and the rejection or acceptance of two basic and philosophically relevant laws of classical logic: the law of non-contradiction and the law of the excluded middle. It also includes a discussion of such metalogical concepts as “standard logic” (a concept introduced by John B. Rosser and Atwell R. Turquette), “normal logic”, and “strongly uniform logic”.

It turns out that metalogical tools may be used in polemics against the notion of many-valuedness. The chapter presents a polemic by the Polish logician and philosopher Roman Suszko, possibly one of the more important polemics of the kind written on the subject.

Using nothing but mathematical tools (referring to the division of logical values into two mutually-exclusive sets: the set of designated values and the set of non-designated values, and introducing the concept of “logical valuations”), he demonstrates that from the metalogical point of view, the third logical value $\frac{1}{2}$ is redundant. He also asserts that $\frac{1}{2}$ has no philosophical meaning: ultimately all many-valued propositional logics are logically two-valued, and all logical values other than the two classical ones, i.e. 1 and 0, are, Suszko believes, but superfluous “algebraic correlates” which may be specifically reduced to 1 or 0.

The question that appears, however, is whether it can be legitimately claimed that mathematical tools used to consider the idea of many-valuedness lead to philosophically relevant conclusions. In other words, do mathematical tools have any specific philosophical meaning at all? In order to answer this question, it needs to be established what, in fact, makes the differences between many-valued propositional logics philosophically relevant.

It appears to be philosophically relevant whether a particular many-valued propositional logic rejects or accepts as tautologies the law of non-contradiction and/or the law of the excluded middle. These have been the two fundamental laws of classical logic, beginning from the traditional logic of Aristotle through to contemporary classical formal logic (the classical propositional calculus and the classical predicate calculus). Thus, the rejection or

acceptance of the formulas $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$ and/or $p \vee \sim p$ as the tautologies of particular many-valued propositional logics makes differences between these logics philosophically relevant.

This assumption leads to another one: if mathematical (metalogical) tools are indeed philosophically relevant, they should reveal such formal properties of many-valued propositional logics which determine the rejection or acceptance of the formulas $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$ and/or $p \vee \sim p$ as their tautologies.

In the presented chapter, the formal properties of many-valued propositional logics are considered both in terms of syntax and semantics. The former properties include, for example, having specific (identical as in the three-valued propositional logic of Łukasiewicz) axioms and rules of inference; the latter, on the other hand, include the property of being a “standard logic”, a “normal logic”, or a “strongly uniform logic”.

The three-valued logic of Łukasiewicz, in which the formulas $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$ and $p \vee \sim p$ are not tautologies, is a standard, normal, and strongly uniform logic. Since every three-valued propositional logic (though, obviously, not every many-valued propositional logic) is strongly uniform, and not all three-valued propositional logics reject the formulas $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$ and $p \vee \sim p$ as tautologies, it is clear that the property of being a strongly uniform logic does not determine the rejection or acceptance of the formulas $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$ and $p \vee \sim p$ as the tautologies of these logics.

In order to decide whether the other formal properties considered in this chapter determine the rejection or acceptance of the formulas $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$ and $p \vee \sim p$ as tautologies, it must be established whether there is a many-valued propositional logic which has these properties and in which the formulas $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$ and $p \vee \sim p$ are tautologies.

The chapter presents an example of a three-valued propositional logic in which the sets of axioms and rules of inference are identical, respectively, to the sets of axioms and rules of inference in the three-valued propositional logic of Łukasiewicz. That logic is also a standard and normal logic; moreover, the formulas $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$ and $p \vee \sim p$ are its tautologies. Thus, there exists a many-valued propositional logic which shares its basic formal (syntactic and semantic) properties with the three-valued propositional logic of Łukasiewicz and in which the formulas $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$ and $p \vee \sim p$ are tautologies.

Consequently, such formal properties as having particular axioms and rules of inference, being a standard logic, being a normal logic, and being

a strongly uniform logic do not determine the rejection or acceptance of the formulas $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$ and $p \vee \sim p$ as tautologies. In other words, these properties are not conditions sufficient to reject or accept these formulas as tautologies, which, naturally, does not mean they may not be conditions necessary for their rejection or acceptance.

It nevertheless appears that since they do not lead to philosophically relevant conclusions, it may be assumed that such properties in themselves are not philosophically relevant. Thus, mathematical (metalogical) tools which reveal them do not have any philosophical relevance.

This conclusion weakens the argumentation presented by Suszko. One may, of course, argue that the thesis proposed by Suszko is philosophically relevant, unlike the formal properties discussed. And yet, just like being a standard and normal logic from the philosophical point of view does not make a many-valued propositional logic significantly “more” classical or, conversely, “less” classical, it may be assumed that also the possibility of defining two-valued logical valuations in every many-valued propositional logic does not make every such logic a broadly-conceived classical one.

The third chapter, authored by Wioletta Dziarnowska, Ph.D., is entitled: *Can Mental Experiences of Another Person Be Known, and How? The Views of Kazimierz Twardowski vs. the Concept of Roman Ingarden and Selected Representatives of Contemporary Cognitive Sciences.*

The psychological views represented in the Lvov-Warsaw School of philosophy by its founder Kazimierz Twardowski, as well as Władysław Witwicki, Stefan Baley, Stefan Błachowski and Mieczysław Kreutz are considered so significant due to the fact it was through them that Polish psychology could have gained recognition worldwide. Even though that did not happen¹³, the concepts proposed by the above-mentioned representatives of the School are believed to have laid the foundations for contemporary humanist psychology in Poland, particularly due to its strong inspiration with the ideas of Franz Brentano’s descriptive psychology¹⁴. Teresa Rzepa mentions three factors which make the School’s psychological propositions so unique: the way the subject of psychology is defined, the postulated research methods,

¹³ The probable reason why the Lvov-Warsaw School was not recognized internationally was the fact that works by its representatives were not translated into English, and that no synthesis of their views was proposed.

¹⁴ Cf. T. Rzepa (1997). *Psychologia w szkole lwowsko-warszawskiej*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, p. 7, 22.

and the theoretical attempts at explaining psychological processes and human behaviour¹⁵. She discusses, among others, the way Kazimierz Twardowski understood the subject of psychology. That subject was mental life, which he believed to consist of the following units¹⁶:

- mental activities, such as having sensory experiences, remembering them, thinking, judging, comparing, abstracting, feeling pleasure or pain;
- the products of these activities, such as images, concepts, judgments, thoughts, intentions, pleasure, pain, fear;
- mental facts, i.e. specific wholes created from mental products and the correlated relevant mental functions;
- mental dispositions (faculties, dispositions, abilities) which create hypothetical conditions for the appearance of particular mental facts, i.e. sensitivity, memory, imagination, intelligence, character.

In addition, the chapter also discusses the research methods of psychology postulated by Twardowski, including introspection as the basic study method, and observation based on memory, reconstruction of mental life and psychological experiment as a method supporting the formulation and explanation of psychological laws.

It also presents the evolution of Twardowski's views on the so-called psychologism¹⁷, which shows that in the beginning of his scientific work, Twardowski took an extreme approach and considered descriptive psychology and its methods to be superior to those adopted in philosophy and other sciences. With the development of his concept of mentality, even though he still viewed psychology as having a distinguished position compared to other disciplines of science, he referred to the independence of the subject of psychology and epistemology, the former including mental activities, and the latter rules of thinking which were the basis for judging the truth value of their products.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 14–53.

¹⁶ K. Twardowski (1992). O psychologii, jej przedmiocie, zadaniach, metodzie, stosunku do innych nauk i o jej rozwoju. In: id. *Wybór pism psychologicznych i pedagogicznych*. Warszawa: WSiP, pp. 243–245.

¹⁷ The view most prevalent in philosophy at the end of the 19th century, saying that scientific substantiation of philosophical propositions may only be provided by an analysis of the related mental experiences, rather than any set of metaphysical assumptions adopted by a particular philosopher.

The author also discusses Twardowski's views concerning the method and limits of knowing the subjectivity of other beings, and shows, using the argumentation of Roman Ingarden, the reasons of his inaccurate and mistaken description of that disposition. The author believes that it is important to explain Twardowski's views concerning the possibility of knowing the mental states of another person for two reasons:

1. His goal was to define a comprehensive spectrum of mental activities, it is therefore necessary, considering the lack of any detailed analyses by interpreters of his thought, to specify how he understood that special disposition;
2. He emphasized the need to take knowledge of the mental life of others into account in order to achieve an adequate understanding of mental life and the formulation and explanation of mental laws, due to the imperfections of introspection as the psychologist's basic research tool.

In the history of philosophical thought before Kazimierz Twardowski, and during his times as well, the question concerning the possibilities, forms and boundaries of knowing the mental states of another person was provided with several different answers. Roman Ingarden sums up the most broadly discussed concepts concerning knowledge of the mental states of others as follows¹⁸:

- the mentality of another person can be known to us *per analogiam*, as we recognize the correlation between our own mental states and the states of our body, realize that our own body is similar to that of another person, and conclude that if certain physical changes occur in their body which are known to us, then they must be experiencing the underlying inner states as well;
- according to the so-called associative concept, by perceiving the bodily state of another person, we associate that state with an image of a similar state in our own body, which provokes in us a further association with a multitude of kinaesthetic impressions together with the experiences by which they are usually accompanied;
- in the so-called imitation theory, as we perceive changes in the body of another person, we unintentionally begin to imitate them, even only in our thoughts, which evokes a certain experience in us. That experience

¹⁸ R. Ingarden (1971). O poznawaniu cudzych stanów psychicznych. In: id. *U podstaw teorii poznania*. Warszawa: PWN, pp. 410–412.

is associated, however, with the change that occurred in another person's body and is therefore treated as revealed in their gestures or facial expressions;

- in yet another concept, the so-called empathic theory, there is a mechanism of projecting certain mental experiences we have created on the basis of the behaviour of another person's body into that body.

Is it possible to know the mental states of another person, and if so, how is it accomplished? This problem appears in various contexts in the works of Kazimierz Twardowski dealing with psychology. He did not see the issue as separate from other psychological problems, or treat it as an independent object of study, and yet his opinion in this regard seems to be quite explicit.

Most of what Twardowski said about the possibility of knowing the mental states of another person is concerned with the sphere of mental facts, e.g. "a psychologist cannot enter another human being and experience facts from his or her mental life"¹⁹, or "every mental fact is only available to the awareness of the person in whom it occurs"²⁰. This results from the fact that mental states represent, in his opinion, the basic units of mentality, as they are the ones which are the subject of inner experience, or introspection. Other mental units are the effect of analysis, abstraction and observation based on memory and reconstruction of mental life based on its various external, physically expressed forms²¹. Elsewhere Twardowski says, however: "A psychologist [...] cannot perceive even the smallest portion of the mental life of other beings"²², which shows he applies the issue of knowing a different subjectivity to all manifestations of mental life.

An analysis of Twardowski's deliberations suggests he makes the following assumptions:

- knowing the mentality of another person is not based on the experience or perception of particular manifestations of that mentality;
- the mentality of other beings is not available to direct cognition;
- elements of other person's mentality do not become part of the mental life of the observer;

¹⁹ K. Twardowski (1992). O metodzie psychologii. Przyczynek do metodologii porównawczej badań naukowych. In: id. *Wybór pism psychologicznych i pedagogicznych*. Warszawa: WSiP, p. 210.

²⁰ K. Twardowski (1992). O psychologii, jej przedmiocie... *Op. cit.*, p. 258.

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 244.

²² K. Twardowski (1992). O metodzie psychologii... *Op. cit.*, p. 210.

- knowledge of another person’s mentality does not, therefore, consist in its particular expression being manifested at the source;
- knowledge of subjective phenomena experienced by other beings is not a separate, additional cognitive activity, differing from the experiences of inner and external life described by Twardowski;
- no reference is made between such type of knowledge and the ways in which this cognitive faculty is understood in philosophical tradition as identified above based on Roman Ingarden’s suggestions, or any other original underlying mechanism.

Does this mean the mental life of other beings is *de facto* excluded in Twardowski’s view from the spectrum of the objects of psychological study? It is controversial that despite clearly defined limits to knowing the mentality of another person, it nevertheless remains a necessary element of psychological inquiry, mainly due to the cognitive limitations of introspection, which only allows the psychologist to investigate a narrow scope of his own subjectivity, and is additionally burdened as a method with selectiveness and ambiguity resulting from the momentary existence of particular mental facts. The only way to know a different subjectivity is, in Twardowski’s opinion, through indirect cognition based on the analysis of the available external manifestations of another person’s mental life: “In order to break out of the vicious circle of one’s own mental life and comprehend it as a whole, one must reconstruct the mental life of other beings based on its external manifestations and products”²³. Such manifestations include: intentional and unintentional activities and bodily functions occurring together with mental facts (e.g. the pulse, complex bodily reactions, linguistic utterances); the products of individual or collective mental life (e.g. communication and language, customs, traditions, beliefs, social constructs). The understanding of the mentality of another person they make possible consists in reconstruction similar to that performed by a historian²⁴. Based on a particular external manifestation, an attempt is made at identifying the mental grounds on which that manifestation is founded, just like the analysis of a particular historical situation guides the historian towards its hidden reasons found in another historical situation, or the complex human motives and other factors it reveals. Twardowski points out that the pertinence of the analogy

²³ K. Twardowski (1992). O metodzie psychologii... *Op. cit.*, p. 212.

²⁴ *Ibidem* p. 211.

between the research of a historian and that of a psychologist exploring the subjectivity of another person is confirmed by the fact that external manifestations of mental life are often referred to as mental documents, just like in the case of the typical research material studied by a historian²⁵.

The adequacy of the reconstruction of another person's mental life and its extensiveness depends on the degree of similarity between that life and the researcher's own subjectivity available to him or her through introspection; the greater the similarity, the more safely can the psychologist rely on knowledge derived from inner experience, and the less is it necessary for him or her to refer to the reconstructive method²⁶. Another way is the experimental method, which allows the psychologist, Twardowski believes, to freely evoke desired mental facts and their external manifestations, and perform a reconstruction of another person's mental life based on such repeated material²⁷.

Twardowski's writings suggest that he took the view existing since the times of John Locke, saying that there are only two forms of cognitive activity – sensory (external experience, external observation) concerning external objects, and reflective (insight, introspection) concerned with the subject's own mental facts. According to the analysis outlined above, understanding a different subjectivity does not represent any particular form of observation, and its knowledge is based on external, physical manifestations.

The author cites Roman Ingarden who says that there are no grounds to assume that only two types of experience exist which capture their objects directly²⁸. Such proposition does not take into account differences in the possible understanding of directness. Already in the case of the two types considered by Twardowski, certain differences appear – external observation does not provide us with such certainty about the existence of its object as insight, even though the philosopher believes both have the attribute of directness. Thus, even in the case of knowing the mental states of another

²⁵ *Ibidem*.

²⁶ „Indeed, studying the mental life of other beings based on its external manifestations, we reconstruct that mental life in accordance with the knowledge of our own mental life we have acquired through introspection”, *Ibidem*, p. 215.

²⁷ *Cf. Ibidem*.

²⁸ R. Ingarden (1971). O poznawaniu cudzych stanów psychicznych. *Op. cit.*, p. 423.

person, the directness of that knowledge still needs to be considered. To cite the argumentation proposed by Ingarden, this is demonstrated by the fact that the attention of the knowing subject is not directed at the external manifestation of a mental fact – facial expression, tone of voice, body posture, etc., – but at the mental fact itself, as a “certain non-sensory phenomenon of something mental”²⁹. It is given to us as something that can be observed, and not as something that is presented in our imagination or thought, and “externally” rather than through reflection; thus, it does not become part of the experience of the observing subject, but is separate from him.

This becomes even more apparent as we consider the seemingly analogical situation of identifying the hidden reasons for the phenomena we perceive, e.g. when seeing smoke coming out of the chimney we assume there is fire in the fireplace. That fire is not given to us through observation, directly, but is the result of drawing conclusions. In the case of knowing another person’s mental facts, we can see them directly, and often it is not until later that we realize their physical manifestation, such as a gesture or a facial expression.

Such approach, different from that proposed by Twardowski, in which knowledge of the mental facts of other being is considered a special type of observation, with its specific properties, is also consistent with everyday practice, where in contacts with other living creatures we momentarily obtain knowledge about their various mental states. This makes us, according to Ingarden, “fully convinced that another human being exists as a bodily and spiritual being, and not only as a material object”³⁰.

The article also presents the basic assumptions of two concepts related to the recognition of the mental states of others proposed within the framework of the contemporary discipline of cognitive sciences. It may be presumed that Roman Ingarden’s supposition concerning the existence of a separate type of experience offering direct access to manifestations of the mental life of other beings finds its confirmation and explanation in two separate concepts – that of the psychologist and neuroscientist Simon Baron-Cohen, the so-called mindreading concept³¹, and those put forward by

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 422.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 420.

³¹ S. Baron-Cohen (1995). *Mindblindness. An Essay of Autism and Theory of Mind*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

neuroscientists Giacomo Rizzolatti and Corrado Sinigaglia, which the author refers to as reflection theory (based on the properties of a distinguished group of neurons, the so-called mirror neurons)³². Even though the concepts differ with regard to the understanding of the actual mechanism of recognizing the mentality of another person and point to different neuronal backgrounds of that disposition, there are certain assumptions which they both have in common:

- there is a specific cognitive activity which makes us attribute inner mental life to other beings;
- it allows us to correctly recognize the mental experiences of others, the types of these experiences, and to an extent also their contents;
- this ability allows us to link mental facts with the behaviour of living creatures and their other experiences;
- in result of that knowledge, the knowing subject may modify his or her own behaviour;
- the knowing subject assumes, even though this assumption is made unconsciously, that other similar living creatures are equipped with an analogous disposition.

In both approaches, which may be considered a development of Roman Ingarden's pioneering ideas, conclusions concerning the nature and limits of knowing the mental life of others presented by Kazimierz Twardowski are contradicted. Such cognition is seen as a spontaneously triggered and automatically operating mechanism which provides us with a direct experience of the mentality of others.

The fourth chapter, by Wiktor Wolman, Ph.D., is entitled *The Category of Person. The Dispute Over the Moral Norm Between the Lvov-Warsaw School and the Lublin School*. It discusses some of the main problems considered in the Polish philosophy of the 20th century, and presents an analysis of the views of the Lvov-Warsaw School and the Neo-Thomism of the Lublin School, as well as the differences and contradictions between them. Both the Lvov-Warsaw School and the Neo-Thomist school represented by the Lublin School investigated a number of various philosophical issues, which resulted in a great diversity of the concepts proposed by their disciples. In the school of Kazimierz Twardowski, the majority were concerned with logic and the

³² G. Rizzolatti, C. Sinigaglia (2008). *Mirrors In the brain. How our minds share actions and emotions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

methodology of sciences – for example J. Łukasiewicz, A. Tarski, S. Leśniewski. The School also included, however, a large group of thinkers interested in social and ethical issues, such as T. Kotarbiński or W. Witwicki. Despite this thematic bipolarity, they all shared a common foundation – the belief in the rationality, logicity and naturalness of the world and man.

One example of such bipolarity of ethical views is visible in the concept of scientific ethics proposed by Kazimierz Twardowski, and the concept of the reliable guardian developed by Tadeusz Kotarbiński. The former begins with the distinction between individual and social ethics. Twardowski believed that each is founded on different propositions and different substantiations of morality. For example, individual ethics considers only obligations towards oneself to be morally valuable, while in social ethics moral value is attributed to obligations towards others. One of the important problems studied by the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School was the issue of substantiation in ethics. Twardowski discussed the main types of ethics and moral systems in a series of articles. The chapter presents the classifications and divisions concerned with ethical issues, such as the division of ethics into rational and irrational, and into teleological and ateleological ones. Ethics which Twardowski refers to as rational are those whose substantiation is based on a rational view of man and the reality that surrounds him. Irrational ethics, on the other hand, are substantiated with supernatural factors. Another very important division refers to teleological ethics, in which morality is motivated by a certain goal or good, on the one hand, and ateleological, or formal ethics on the other.

For Twardowski, the most creative and modern kind of ethics was that which was independent. He believed independent ethics was a science, as in its substantiations it did not refer to any other sciences, in particular to metaphysics. The basic tasks of ethics include investigation into conditions in which it is possible to minimize conflicts of interest. Therefore, it is the task of independent ethics to find a common denominator for different values, while identifying shared, convergent interests. In laying the foundations of independent ethics, Kotarbiński creatively developed the views presented by Twardowski. Ethics should be independent on three planes. First, it should be independent from religion. Kotarbiński did not say that religious values should be negated entirely, even though he proposed that the external source of morality, divine providence, should be rejected. For him, the ultimate instance was to be every man who acted morally and resolved in his conscience

whether a particular action is good or bad. Secondly, ethics should be independent from worldviews and social systems. According to Kotarbiński, contemporary reality claims the right to determine moral values and impose the only right interpretation. He therefore postulates that ethics should be independent so that everyone can judge moral value for themselves. The third plane involves judgments and opinions contrary to one's conscience. It is a particularly relevant problem, having become a charge against the Thomism of the Lublin School. The conviction, shared both by Twardowski and Kotarbiński, about the teleological nature of Christian ethics was a very important argument for rejecting it as a moral system. The basic dispute focused around the source of value in the world. The Lublin School asserted that the world was good because it was created by God. Consequently, philosophers from that School formulated their main moral principles based on the divine element. They included Karol Wojtyła and Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec. We should also mention Polish existential Thomists, O. Jacek Woroniecki and Stefan Swieżawski, who believed that man had natural, immanent value and a pre-disposition towards morality.

Of particular interest compared to the concept of independent ethics proposed by Twardowski and Kotarbiński is the concept of man's nature and personal being in the views of Krąpiec. According to Krąpiec, man is a personal being, because he is manifested both materially and non-materially. Krąpiec says man "transcends to the outside", which simply means that he identifies with the surrounding reality. Man is an "I", an existence that is supplemented with the experience of consciousness. Only the "I" is given to us directly; everything else, that which is "mine", is given externally and indirectly. That which is "mine", the Lublin School philosopher says, belongs to personal existence only when the "I" recognizes himself within it. This belief leads him to the conclusion that "I" has priority over "mine". He says that man as a person is first of all a self-existing and self-determining being. There are certain points which lack clarity in his approach, however. The first is related to having a soul, which entails questions about the self-knowledge of the soul. For if the soul is primary and is not an element of this world, how can it find itself in something external? Krąpiec provides an answer to this question, but fails to offer a substantiation, despite claiming that the soul is the principle of the "I", and it is the soul that organizes both matter and inner experiences. Another question concerns the relationship between the ultimate moral principle, or love, and dignity manifested through ac-

tions taken in accordance with one's own nature and freedom, that is, actions which are autonomous. How can the commandment of loving another, including the absolute, be reconciled with autonomy? Is love that is a command still love, or is it merely a forced action motivated by fear of punishment? Krąpiec tries to address these doubts, as for him the commandment of love is immanent to human nature.

Adequate anthropology, as it was understood by John Paul II, is another object of analysis in the context of independent ethics. In adequate anthropology, both biblical, theological and philosophical anthropology find a meeting place. Only when both philosophical, theological and biblical considerations are taken into account, can the proper, personal nature of man be perceived. While the first two are not controversial, the third element, biblical considerations, are not acceptable to all representatives of the Thomist school of thought. For John Paul II, biblicality is simply the divine plan revealed to man in the Holy Scripture. God created man and prepared a task for him, and provided instructions in the Bible. Only when it is correctly read, will the full nature of man be revealed, which the Pope believed to be the call to love.

These basic differences lead to the conclusion that the dispute over the category of person is based on metaphysical and epistemological assumptions. This chapter, however, endeavours to substantiate the thesis about certain shared anthropological assumptions of the Lvov-Warsaw and Lublin Schools, while at the same time presenting their differing ethical interpretations based on ontological and axiological tenets.

The fundamental controversy between the Lvov-Warsaw and the Lublin School was concerned with differences in the interpretation of the nature of reality. Philosophers from the Lvov-Warsaw School asserted that the world was axiologically neutral, while those from the Lublin School assumed that every being was good and beautiful. That discrepancy resulted in different statuses attributed to man in their anthropological concepts. Both Schools, however, acknowledged the exceptional nature of human existence.

The fifth chapter in this book discusses *The Ethical Concepts of Marian Przełęcki*. Its author, Halina Postek, Ph.D., is interested in the work of one of Tadeusz Kotarbiński's direct disciples, Marian Przełęcki. In her text, she deliberates on whether Przełęcki may be considered the last representative of the Lvov-Warsaw School, as some scholars, including Jacek Juliusz Jadacki, have suggested, or whether he was rather an individual philosopher,

linked to the School only through the teacher – disciple relationship. To what extent are the views held by Przełęcki contrary to those held by the School, thus representing an internal polemic with its work, and to what extent are they only a development of certain ideas, not contradicting those expressed by the School's representatives?

The criteria of affiliation with the School applied by the historians of philosophy are not uniform: representatives of the School are deemed to include the disciples of Twardowski and those of his disciples (thus Przełęcki, as a disciple of Kotarbiński's, who was directly related to Twardowski, would be seen as an heir to the Lvov-Warsaw School); and sometimes an additional criterion is applied – that views held by the School should be shared as well. It is quite difficult, however, to identify views shared by Twardowski and his disciples. Those usually mentioned include: the analytical method of doing philosophy, and anti-irrationalism, understood as acceptance of only such assertions as can be intersubjectively verified and communicated. In the area of ethics, with which the chapter is concerned, they additionally include absolutism and intuitionism, and a clear distinction of normative from descriptive ethics, with the latter being given the status of a science. Most philosophers from the School believed that it was possible to use rational arguments when discussing values. The neutrality of philosophy they postulated with respect to worldview issues entailed the refusal to engage in any religious or political disputes, and the recommendation to avoid speculative issues – revealing an unwillingness towards any metaphysical propositions.

Apart from that last issue, Przełęcki seems to hold all of the views identified as shared by the School's representatives. Like its most central philosophers (Kotarbiński, Ajdukiewicz, Czeżowski), Przełęcki believed in cognitivism, considering judgments to have cognitive content which could be attributed the value of true or false. He agreed with Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, who perceived a cognitive component in emotional experiences (calling it moral intuition) which allowed us to clearly determine the positive or negative value of the object. Individual emotional experiences, intuitions, are, just like observations, intersubjectively communicable and verifiable, thus satisfying the postulate of rationality. Consequently, the "ideal observer" hypothesis can also be applied to the knowledge of values, where the subject of emotional experiences needs to have sufficient knowledge of the object of his or her emotions and an impartial attitude to that object. Like observa-

tions, emotional experiences, intuitions, tell us something about the object of cognition, and like observational judgments, value judgments made on the basis of emotional experiences may be evaluated in terms of true or false.

Cognitivism in the philosophy of values led Przełęcki, as well as other representatives of the School, to moral absolutism which says that moral values are constant and independent of individual convictions or socio-historical circumstances. He explained differences in moral judgments by referring to subjective factors: a different hierarchy of values adopted by the judging person, imperfection of the notional system in which the judgment was formulated, failure to take into account the same ethical aspects of the situation being judged. Being an absolutist, he nevertheless defended the value of tolerance. He believed it to be grounded in the autonomy of individuals, which, following J.S. Mill, he defined as “the freedom to pursue our own good in our own way”. It is in particular concerned with the freedom of religious and philosophical views, or “allowing others to hold views and pursue projects we believe to be wrong”.

The value of an act is determined by the motives behind it. Thus, according to Przełęcki, the only proper moral motivation is altruism, which considers the good of another to be the highest value. Yet, since due to the human condition we must strive to release ourselves or others from evil or misfortune more often than we pursue their good, Przełęcki considered the will to release our neighbour from suffering to be the only goal of morally just action. The basis of altruist motivation was for him the capacity for sympathizing with the suffering of others, unlike for his teacher Kotarbiński, who believed it to be the will to avoid well-deserved contempt by the “venerable”. Aware of the difficulty in identifying a single motivation behind human actions, Przełęcki used the term “ultimate motivation”, meaning such motive of a particular act behind which there is no other, deeper motive. Such motivation may be evoked by the desire, flowing from compassion, to eliminate the object of such emotion, the suffering of a neighbour, and to take action to relieve that suffering. The group of persons with respect to whom we are bound by the postulate to relieve suffering includes, according to Przełęcki, not only our “near and dear ones”, but also anyone who is being wronged, including our enemies. Our commitment to the good of our neighbours or to easing their suffering should not have any limits, leading to the “call to self-perdition” as a consequence of living for others, carried all the way through to the end.

Marian Przełęcki believed that compassion could be learned. He promoted the idea of ethical education to introduce young people to the value of solidarity, interpersonal relationships, making them sensitive to the problems of other people. Understood this way, education should not refer to any moral ideal. Przełęcki, being an opponent of perfectionist ethics, wanted to show and develop sensitivity to the needs and suffering of others. He referred to such ethics as “independent” – from any religious or metaphysical assumptions. He realized, however, that one cannot force oneself to “love another”. True goodness, he believed, was the privilege of the chosen ones; others could only imitate them, with more or less success, and hope to become truly good one day.

Rejection of the postulate to refrain from making any metaphysical assertions and to limit ethical deliberations to meta-ethics and descriptive ethics is the key difference between the assumptions made in the School and the views held by Przełęcki. In his writings, he underscored on many occasions the importance of existential questions, which he also referred to as metaphysical. He believed they were the very essence of philosophical enquiries, and defended the concept of philosophy whose hard core was concerned with the world of values, which assigned values to reality rather than just describing it, and whose essential element consisted in value judgments. The valuation of existence was to reveal its meaning, and thus reveal to us the purpose of our existence. And that was what Przełęcki believed to be the most important task of philosophy, one that determined its existential significance. For him, the answer to the question “How to live?” was the ultimate goal of all philosophy.

Such view of philosophy differs fundamentally from both the traditional concept and that embraced in the positivist approach, closely akin to the Lvov-Warsaw School. The traditional concept considers philosophy to be a non-scientific theory of existence, offering a certain description of reality which goes beyond scientific knowledge, but is its generalization and provides its foundation. In the positivist concept, philosophy is to be reduced to a theory of science (scientific philosophy), and any issues which it cannot make room for are to be removed from philosophical deliberations.

Appreciating not only the importance, but also the need for “existential” reflection, Przełęcki tried to “transfer onto it the cognitive advantages of analytical philosophy”, in particular the postulate of recognizing the fundamental resolvability of philosophical problems, with which he linked another impera-

tive – of precise and comprehensible presentation of issues to be discussed, of their “definite meaning”. Still, he was aware that a particular type of questions makes it impossible to achieve such degree of definiteness and substantiation as in the case of problems discussed by the Lvov-Warsaw School.

The metaphysical, or existential beliefs held by Przełęcki underlie his ethics: the conviction about the tragedy of human life combined with admiration of the world’s beauty. Such attitude, which Professor Przełęcki himself referred to as “affirmation of the world”, is possible as an aesthetic and ethical judgment due to a special type of metaphysical experience called illumination.

An attitude of rebellion, disagreement with the world, except for the refusal to accept the suffering of other people, Przełęcki believed to be a form of arrogance and conceit, of seeing oneself above the whole of creation, of self-righteousness and pride. A world without injustice and suffering has never existed and it never will, and a merely conditional acceptance of reality signified for him an attitude of claims and demands.

The tragedy of human existence was manifest, Przełęcki believed, in the practical impossibility to eliminate suffering and injustice. Przełęcki did not assume an external, metaphysical meaningfulness of the world and human life. He believed, however, that every one of us could make our lives internally meaningful. Nothing can deny the value of such life, even death understood as the final end of our existence.

Przełęcki opposed any sense of particular importance assigned to oneself. He argued that no one was more important than anybody else: our own joy and suffering differ from the joy and suffering of other people only in the way they are experienced. The attitude of not putting ourselves before others had twofold consequences – treating one’s own good and that of the others as equally important entailed the demand for choices which were not obvious from the psychological point of view, but also made it possible to treat both oneself and others with understanding and awareness of one’s own limitations.

Przełęcki accepted the hypothesis that every man is capable of good deeds, even though he admitted himself that the acceptance of such thesis was more an act of faith than of knowledge. He called himself a “meliorist”, believing that a lack of empathy and the resulting lack of compassion for the suffering of other people was a sign of pathology and the result of some traumatic experiences in one’s past. He believed in the principle of mercy rather than justice; accordingly, a wrongdoer should be educated or cured rather

than punished. Such forbearing attitude to human weakness was the result of his adherence to a certain form of determinism. Przełęcki defended the conviction that even though our deeds are determined by factors we cannot control, they can be morally evaluated. Neither the sensibility nor rightness of the moral judgment of a particular action require that it be the result of a decision which is not causally determined, and results from the operation of the so-called free will. While it is possible to judge an action despite its undetermined nature, the moral attitude of condemnation, indignation or contempt for its perpetrator is not right. In these emotions Przełęcki saw elements characteristic of a more primitive stage in the development of moral life. He believed the principle of “acting towards every man as though he was capable of good deeds”, which he himself, following Kotarbiński, called the “Quaker principle”, was morally good and morally just.

Przełęcki was an advocate of Gandhi’s principle of non-violence. He believed that when defending a person against being wronged, we must also take into account the good of the wrongdoer. In our world, he claimed, this principle could be applied to nearly all “everyday” situations. He was aware that in certain special circumstances the standard of non-violence cannot be held up as the universal norm, but believed that even then we could treat the wrongdoer in accordance with the “axiom of our conscience”, or the postulate of universal love or kindness. The principle of non-violence entailed treating our opponent not only without physical violence, but also without any social sanctions, such as publicly humiliating, demeaning, ridiculing or embarrassing them.

Acceptance of one’s fate did not mean consent to injustice happening to others. Przełęcki believed that refusal to accept the suffering of other people entailed the need for social and political involvement, even though he himself was more into “contemplative life” which, unlike active life, is focused on valuable experiences rather than valuable achievements. He used to quote Iwaszkiewicz, who said: “Everyone keeps chasing after things, instead of just sitting together at the side of the road to watch the world go by”.

He summarized his ethical stance in the following words: “I am not saying this attitude is right. I only hope it is acceptable.”

Debates on the concept of many-valuedness: a philosophical point of view

Mateusz Marek Radzki

Jan Łukasiewicz, a Polish logician and philosopher, in his pioneering works on three-valued logic, published in the early 1920's, introduced the third, intermediate truth-value $\frac{1}{2}$, different from 1 (interpreted as *true*) and different from 0 (interpreted as *false*). It was the first step in constructing various systems of many-valued logic. According to Jan Woleński, "The construction of many-valued logical systems is commonly believed to have been one of the major achievements of the Warsaw School, and specifically of Łukasiewicz"¹.

It is worth emphasizing that Łukasiewicz's discovery was the result of many philosophical debates within the Lvov-Warsaw School. Grzegorz Malinowski writes: "[...] among the factors which prompted Łukasiewicz's views on logics and which persuaded him to abandon the classical perspective, one may mention the following three: 1. The discussion, within the Lvov-Warsaw School, of the general theory of objects that had been proposed by Brentano, Twardowski and Meinong; 2. Łukasiewicz's investigation into the problems of induction and the theory of probability; 3. his examination of the question of determinism, indeterminism and related problems concerning causality and modality"².

It needs to be noted that in the field of metaphysical investigations into the nature of objects, Łukasiewicz accepted the idea of contradictory objects,

¹ J. Woleński (1989). *Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School*. Synthese Library 198. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, p. 119.

² G. Malinowski (2009). A Philosophy of Many-Valued Logic. The Third Logical Value and Beyond. In: S. Lapointe et al (Eds.), *The Golden Age of Polish Philosophy*. Logic, Epistemology and the Unity of Science 16. Springer Science + Business Media, pp. 81–82.

i.e., objects that have contradictory properties; in the theory of induction and probability, Łukasiewicz developed the idea of fractional ‘logical values’ which are relative, and finally, in the theory of indeterminism and causality, Łukasiewicz established a third ‘logical value’ that is attributed to propositions describing future events³.

Therefore, the scope of philosophical investigations that are ranged by Łukasiewicz’s reasoning is quite wide. It contains both metaphysical, modal and even ethical concepts. Woleński writes that “the philosophical context of the construction of many-valued logics in Poland was linked to discussions on determinism, indeterminism, possibility, necessity, and freedom. [...] Łukasiewicz paid attention to the intuitive interpretation of many-valued logics, but with the lapse of time those logics started to live a life of their own as formal constructions”⁴.

Moreover, it seems there is a more general philosophical claim behind metaphysical and modal motivations. Alasdair Urquhart points out that “many-valued logic was not just a mathematical toy for Łukasiewicz, but rather a weapon of most fundamental importance in his fight against the mental strait-jacket of Aristotelian logic, a weapon that he classed with non-Euclidean geometry as a tool which released the human mind from the tyranny of rigid intellectual systems”⁵.

Generally speaking, philosophical debates within the Lvov-Warsaw School persuaded Łukasiewicz to reject the classical “law of contradiction” which in classical propositional logic (hereinafter PL), is expressed by tautology (i.e., a formula that uniformly takes on the truth-value 1 for all assignments of truth-values to the variables) $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$. It was the first philosophical step towards introducing a many-valued logic. Nicholas Rescher writes: “The motivation afforded by the idea of overcoming the classical ‘Law of Contradiction’ was a major impetus in the development of many-valued logics”⁶. Therefore, in the logical and philosophical development of Łukasiewicz

³ *Ibidem*, pp. 82–83.

⁴ J. Woleński (1989). *Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School*. *Op. cit.*, p. 124.

⁵ A. Urquhart (2001). Basic Many-valued Logic. In: D.M. Gabbay, F. Guenther (Eds.), *Handbook of Philosophical Logic*, 2nd Edition, Volume 2. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, p. 249.

⁶ N. Rescher (1968). Many-valued Logic. *Topics in Philosophical Logic*. Synthese Library 17. Netherlands: Springer, p. 107.

wicz's thought, the movement from philosophy towards formal logic is quite apparent.

However, it should be noted that the rejection of $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$ as a tautology of a particular logic does not necessarily lead to the acceptance of the idea of many-valuedness, and vice versa, the acceptance of the idea of many-valuedness does not necessarily lead to the rejection of $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$ as a tautology of a particular logic. The same is the case of the classical "law of the excluded middle" which in PL is expressed by the tautology $p \vee \sim p$ that is equal, in line with the definition of logical connectives, to $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$; the rejection $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$ and $p \vee \sim p$ as tautologies of many-valued propositional logics will be examined in more detail in the next chapter.

Nevertheless, the rejection of $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$ (and $p \vee \sim p$) led Łukasiewicz to abandon the classical two-valued logic, and to introduce the third truth-value $\frac{1}{2}$. This persuaded Łukasiewicz to violate the principle of bivalence, according to which every proposition is either true or false. John B. Rosser and Atwell R. Turquette write: "Ever since there was first a clear enunciation of the principle "Every proposition is either true or false", there have been those who questioned it. With the development of an axiomatic treatment of logic, it has become possible to construct systems of logic in which this principle is not valid. One way to obtain a usable set of axioms for such a purpose is to replace this principle by an alternative one such as "Every statement is true or false or tertium". One's first reaction to this might be that henceforth we no longer have the principle of *reductio ad absurdum*. Certainly, we no longer have it in the familiar form of a "tertium non datur". Instead, we have a generalized form which may be called a "quartum non datur"⁷.

According to Łukasiewicz, the truth-value $\frac{1}{2}$ has a philosophical meaning referring to the possible, or rather contingent, nature of the future states of affairs. Thus, $\frac{1}{2}$ is assigned to propositions on the future states of affairs that are neither true nor false, but which are only possibly true and possibly false (contingently true). Łukasiewicz explains: "I can assume without contradiction that my presence in Warsaw at a certain point in time next year, e.g., at noon on December 21st, is not settled at present either positively or negatively. It is therefore *possible but not necessary* that I will be present in

⁷ J.B. Rosser, A.R. Turquette (1952). *Many-valued Logics*. Amsterdam: North-Holland, p. 10.

Warsaw at the stated time. On this presupposition, the statement ‘I will be present in Warsaw at noon on December 21st next year’ is neither true nor false at the present moment. For if it were true at the present moment, my future presence in Warsaw would have to be necessary, which contradicts the above presupposition; and if it were false at the present moment, my future presence in Warsaw would have to be impossible, which again contradicts the presupposition. At present, the statement under consideration is therefore neither true nor false, and must have a third value different from 0, or false, and from 1, or true. We can indicate this by $\frac{1}{2}$: it is ‘possible’ which is assigned a third value next to ‘false’ and ‘true’⁸.

Although Łukasiewicz criticized the classical logic of Aristotle, he relied on two fundamental principles which govern almost all logical systems – from classical logic to various non-classical logics⁹. The first principle refers to the syntactic side of logic. It asserts that logic should be formulated using axioms, the rules MP (i.e. modus ponens) and SUB (i.e. the rule of substitution). According to the second principle which refers to the semantic side of logic, the values of complex propositions should be a function of the respective values of their components.

Łukasiewicz introduced truth-tables for the familiar logical connectives, i.e., \sim , \rightarrow , \vee , \wedge , \leftrightarrow . According to Rescher, one can identify five general principles which govern the semantic side of Łukasiewicz’s three-valued logic (hereinafter \mathcal{L}_3): ‘(1) There are three truth-values, 1, $\frac{1}{2}$, 0 (in the decreasing order of ‘truthfulness’); (2) The negation of a statement of given truth-values is its ‘opposite’ in truthfulness; (3) The truth-value of a conjunction is the falsest (and of a disjunction the truest) of the truth-values of its components; (4) The truth-value of ‘ $p \rightarrow q$ ’ is the same as that of ‘ $\sim p \vee q$ ’ except that the truth-value corresponding to $\frac{1}{2} \rightarrow \frac{1}{2}$ is a set at 1 (to assure that ‘ $p \rightarrow p$ ’ will invariably assume the truth-value 1); (5) The truth-value of ‘ $p \leftrightarrow q$ ’ is the same as that of ‘ $(p \rightarrow q) \wedge (q \rightarrow p)$ ’¹⁰.

⁸ J. Łukasiewicz (1967). Philosophical remarks on many-valued systems of propositional logic. In: S. McCall (Ed.), *Polish Logic 1920–1939*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 40–65.

⁹ A. Urquhart (2001). Basic Many-valued Logic. *Op. cit.*, p. 251.

¹⁰ N. Rescher (1968). Many-valued Logic. *Op. cit.*, p. 65.

Therefore, let $L_{\mathcal{L}_3}$ be a propositional language of \mathcal{L}_3 defined as the following algebra (see, for example,¹¹):

$$L_{\mathcal{L}_3} = (\text{FOR}_{\mathcal{L}_3}, \sim, \rightarrow, \vee, \wedge, \leftrightarrow),$$

where $\text{FOR}_{\mathcal{L}_3}$ is a set of wffs of $L_{\mathcal{L}_3}$ (or simply, a set of wffs of \mathcal{L}_3).

Then let $M_{\mathcal{L}_3}$ be a logical matrix for \mathcal{L}_3 , i.e.,

$$M_{\mathcal{L}_3} = (A_{\mathcal{L}_3}, \{1\}),$$

where $A_{\mathcal{L}_3} = (\{1, \frac{1}{2}, 0\}, \sim, \rightarrow, \vee, \wedge, \leftrightarrow)$.

In \mathcal{L}_3 , the logical connectives $\sim, \rightarrow, \vee, \wedge, \leftrightarrow$ are defined by the following truth-tables (in the truth-tables for $\rightarrow, \vee, \wedge, \leftrightarrow$, the truth-value of p is given in the vertical line, the truth-value of q is given in the horizontal line, and the truth-value of $p \circ q$ ($\circ = \rightarrow, \vee, \wedge, \leftrightarrow$) is given in the intersection of these lines) (see, for example,¹²):

p	$\sim p$	\rightarrow	0	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	\vee	0	$\frac{1}{2}$	1
0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	$\frac{1}{2}$	1
$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	1	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	1
1	0	1	0	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	1	1	1	1

\wedge	0	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	\leftrightarrow	0	$\frac{1}{2}$	1
0	0	0	0	0	1	$\frac{1}{2}$	0
$\frac{1}{2}$	0	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	$\frac{1}{2}$
1	0	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	1	0	$\frac{1}{2}$	1

According to Mordchaj Wajsberg¹³, taking MP and SUB, \mathcal{L}_3 is axiomatized by the following four axioms:

¹¹ R. Wójcicki (1973). Matrix Approach in Methodology of Sentential Calculi. *Studia Logica: An International Journal for Symbolic Logic*, 32, p. 7; R. Wójcicki (1988). *Theory of logical calculi. Basic theory of consequence operations*. Synthese Library 199. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 12–13.

¹² G. Malinowski (2006). *Logiki wielowartościowe*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, pp. 11–12; G. Malinowski (2006). Many-valued Logic. In: D. Jacquette (Ed.), *A Companion to Philosophical Logic*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, p. 546.

¹³ M. Wajsberg (1967). Axiomatization of the three-valued propositional calculus. In: S. McCall (Ed.), *Polish Logic 1920–1939*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 264.

$$(W1) p \rightarrow (q \rightarrow p),$$

$$(W2) (p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow ((q \rightarrow r) \rightarrow (p \rightarrow r)),$$

$$(W3) (\sim p \rightarrow \sim q) \rightarrow (q \rightarrow p),$$

$$(W4) ((p \rightarrow \sim p) \rightarrow p) \rightarrow p.$$

The remaining logical connectives are defined as follows¹⁴:

$$(DEF.1) (p \vee q) \stackrel{DEF}{\leftarrow} ((p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow q),$$

$$(DEF.2) (p \wedge q) \stackrel{DEF}{\leftarrow} \sim (\sim p \vee \sim q),$$

$$(DEF.3) (p \leftrightarrow q) \stackrel{DEF}{\leftarrow} ((p \rightarrow q) \wedge (q \rightarrow p)).$$

To have a functionally complete \mathcal{L}_3 , Jerzy Śłupecki proposed that the following two axioms be added¹⁵:

$$(W5) Tp \rightarrow \sim Tp,$$

$$(W6) \sim Tp \rightarrow Tp.$$

T is defined by the following truth-table:

p	Tp
0	$\frac{1}{2}$
$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$
1	$\frac{1}{2}$

Considering the truth-tables for the familiar logical connectives in \mathcal{L}_3 , it is easy to see that every tautology of \mathcal{L}_3 is a tautology of PL¹⁶. The content of $M_{\mathcal{L}_3}$, i.e., $E(M_{\mathcal{L}_3})$ is a set of tautologies of \mathcal{L}_3 . On the other hand, the content of M_{PL} , i.e., $E(M_{PL})$ is a set of tautologies of PL. Therefore,

$$E(M_{\mathcal{L}_3}) \subset E(M_{PL}).$$

¹⁴ G. Malinowski (2006). *Logiki wielowartościowe. Op. cit.*, p. 12.

¹⁵ J. Śłupecki (1967). The full three-valued propositional calculus. In: S. McCall (Ed.), *Polish Logic 1920–1939*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 336.

¹⁶ G. Malinowski (2006). *Logiki wielowartościowe. Op. cit.*, p. 30.

Hence, some tautologies of PL are not tautologies of \mathbb{L}_3 , for example,

$$\begin{aligned} & \sim(p \wedge \sim p), \\ & p \vee \sim p, \\ & p \rightarrow (q \vee \sim q), \\ & (p \rightarrow \sim p) \rightarrow \sim p. \end{aligned}$$

Nevertheless, in \mathbb{L}_3 , none of the tautologies of PL takes on the truth-value 0. Rescher writes: “It is readily shown that no two-valued tautology will ever take the truth-value 0 in \mathbb{L}_3 . But two-valued tautologies can take the truth-value $\frac{1}{2}$ and thus fail to be tautologous in the three-valued case – since a *tautology* must uniformly take on the truth-value 1 for all assignments of truth-values to the variables. Thus the ‘law of the excluded middle’ $p \vee \sim p$ fails in \mathbb{L}_3 , because this entire formula will take on the truth-value $\frac{1}{2}$ when ‘ p ’ does so¹⁷.”

Łukasiewicz generalized the introduced three-valued logic, and defined both finite and infinite-valued logics of a certain kind¹⁸.

The set of truth-values of Łukasiewicz’s n -valued ($n \geq 2$) logics is as follows¹⁹:

$$\mathbb{L}_n = \{0, 1/(n-1), 2/(n-1), \dots, (n-2)/(n-1), 1\}.$$

For example, the set of truth-values of Łukasiewicz’s five-valued logic is as follows:

$$\mathbb{L}_5 = \{0, 1/4, 2/4, 3/4, 1\}.$$

In the family of Łukasiewicz’s n -valued logics, the familiar logical connectives, i.e., \sim , \rightarrow , \vee , \wedge , \leftrightarrow are defined by the following arithmetical rules²⁰:

- (a) $\sim x = 1 - x$,
 $x \rightarrow y = \min(1, 1 - x + y)$,
- (b) $x \vee y = (x \rightarrow y) \rightarrow y = \max(x, y)$,
 $x \wedge y = \sim(\sim x \vee \sim y) = \min(x, y)$,
 $x \leftrightarrow y = (x \rightarrow y) \wedge (y \rightarrow x) = 1 - |x - y|$.

¹⁷ N. Rescher (1968). *Many-valued Logic. Op. cit.*, p. 66.

¹⁸ G. Malinowski (2006). *Many-valued Logic. Op. cit.*, p. 549.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 549.

²⁰ G. Malinowski (2006). *Logiki wielowartościowe. Op. cit.*, p. 29.

Let us consider the case in which $x = \frac{1}{2}$, and $y = 0$. It is then easy to see that:

- (a) $\sim \frac{1}{2} = 1 - \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{2}$,
 $\frac{1}{2} \rightarrow 0 = \min(1, 1 - \frac{1}{2} + 0) = \min(1, \frac{1}{2}) = \frac{1}{2}$,
 (b) $\frac{1}{2} \vee 0 = (\frac{1}{2} \rightarrow 0) \rightarrow 0 = \max(\frac{1}{2}, 0) = \frac{1}{2}$,
 $\frac{1}{2} \wedge 0 = \sim(\sim \frac{1}{2} \vee \sim 0) = \min(\frac{1}{2}, 0) = 0$,
 $\frac{1}{2} \leftrightarrow 0 = (\frac{1}{2} \rightarrow 0) \wedge (0 \rightarrow \frac{1}{2}) = 1 - |\frac{1}{2} - 0| = \frac{1}{2}$.

For example, in Łukasiewicz's five-valued logic, the truth-tables for \sim and \rightarrow are²¹:

p	$\sim p$	\rightarrow	0	1/4	2/4	3/4	1
0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
1/4	3/4	1/4	3/4	1	1	1	1
2/4	2/4	2/4	2/4	3/4	1	1	1
3/4	1/4	3/4	1/4	2/4	3/4	1	1
1	0	1	0	1/4	2/4	3/4	1

A quite simple and elegant system of axioms for any of Łukasiewicz's finite-valued logics was introduced by Roman Tuziak²². By means of the familiar logical connectives \sim , \rightarrow , \vee , \wedge , \leftrightarrow and the following abbreviations: $(p \rightarrow^0 q) = q$, $(p \rightarrow^{n+1} q) = (p \rightarrow (p \rightarrow^n q))$, with the rules MP and SUB, Tuziak established following twelve axioms:

- (1) $(p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow ((q \rightarrow s) \rightarrow (p \rightarrow s))$,
- (2) $p \rightarrow (q \rightarrow p)$,
- (3) $((p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow q) \rightarrow ((q \rightarrow p) \rightarrow p)$,
- (4) $(p \rightarrow^k q) \rightarrow (p \rightarrow^{k-1} q)$,
- (5) $(p \wedge q) \rightarrow p$,
- (6) $(p \wedge q) \rightarrow q$,

²¹ G. Malinowski (2006). *Many-valued Logic. Op. cit.*, p. 549.

²² R. Tuziak (1988). *An Axiomatization of the Finite-Valued Łukasiewicz Calculus. Studia Logica: An International Journal for Symbolic Logic*, 48, p. 50.

- (7) $(p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow ((p \rightarrow s) \rightarrow (p \rightarrow (q \wedge s)))$,
- (8) $p \rightarrow (p \vee q)$,
- (9) $q \rightarrow (p \vee q)$,
- (10) $(p \rightarrow s) \rightarrow ((q \rightarrow s) \rightarrow ((p \vee q) \rightarrow s))$,
- (11) $(\sim p \rightarrow \sim q) \rightarrow (q \rightarrow p)$,
- (12) $(p \leftrightarrow (p \rightarrow^{s-2} \sim p)) \rightarrow^{k-1} p$ for any $2 \leq s \leq k-1$ such that s is not a divisor of $k-1$.

Although the formal side of Łukasiewicz's logical construction is quite clear and noncontroversial, from a philosophical point of view, Łukasiewicz's many-valued logics were criticized by both philosophers and logicians.

An early philosophical critique of \mathbb{L}_3 was presented by Ferdinand Gonseth, a Swiss philosopher of science and mathematics. Malinowski explains: "Gonseth noticed [...] that the formal characterization of the connectives in Łukasiewicz's logic is not compatible with the interpretation of the third logical value Łukasiewicz had suggested, that is, it can be interpreted neither as possibility nor as indetermination. Gonseth's argument is both sound and straightforward. Consider two propositions α and $\neg\alpha$. Whenever α is undetermined, so is $\neg\alpha$, and then, according to the table of conjunctions, $\alpha \wedge \neg\alpha$ is undetermined, which contradicts the intuition, since irrespectively of the content of α , $\alpha \wedge \neg\alpha$ is false. The argument concerning Łukasiewicz's treatment of disjunction goes along the same lines, showing similar problems with the valuation of $\alpha \vee \neg\alpha$ which is not supposed to be a tautology in \mathbb{L}_3 "²³.

Gonseth's line of reasoning follows directly from philosophical intuitions according to which it is not allowed to abandon two fundamental principles of classical logic: the "law of contradiction" and the "law of the excluded middle". Is Gonseth's argumentation correct? It might be argued that one can only assert that Łukasiewicz's philosophical intuitions according to which the "law of contradiction" and the "law of the excluded middle" should be abandoned, and, on the other hand, Gonseth's philosophical intuitions are simply contradictory, and therefore, for apparent reasons, there is no simple philosophical solution which could provide a direct answer to the question of whether Łukasiewicz or Gonseth is right.

²³ G. Malinowski (2009). A Philosophy of Many-Valued Logic. The Third Logical Value and Beyond. *Op. cit.*, pp. 84–85.

Recently, Urquhart has pointed to some problems with the interpretation of Łukasiewicz's truth-values²⁴. For example, let us consider Łukasiewicz's truth-values as sets of classical truth-values, i.e., F (the *false*) and T (the *true*). Then, $0 = \{F\}$, $1 = \{T\}$, $\frac{1}{2} = \{T, F\}$.

The idea is that "each set of classical values represents the set of values that a proposition may take in the future"²⁵. Urquhart explains how the truth table for \rightarrow can be rewritten: "Now, given a 'truth-value' (i.e., a set of classical truth values) for each of φ and ψ , how do we go about computing the truth values of $\varphi \rightarrow \psi$? It might seem that the following idea should work: take a classical truth value from the set assigned to φ , a classical truth value from the set assigned to ψ , compute the value of the *classical* conditional ($\varphi \rightarrow \psi$) – the set of all values you get in this way is the truth value"²⁶. Then, the truth-tables for \sim and \rightarrow are as follows:

p	$\sim p$	\rightarrow	{F}	{T, F}	{T}
{F}	{T}	{F}	{T}	{T}	{T}
{T, F}	{T, F}	{T, F}	{T, F}	{T, F}	{T}
{T}	{F}	{T}	{F}	{T, F}	{T}

However, in the above truth-table for \rightarrow , the central entry is not consistent with Łukasiewicz's original truth-table, in which the central entry is filled with 1 (or, according to Urquhart's exposition, with {T}), not with $\frac{1}{2}$ (i.e., {T, F}).

If the central entry in the truth-table for \rightarrow were filled with $\frac{1}{2}$ (or {T, F}), $p \rightarrow p$ would not be a tautology of $\mathcal{L}_{\frac{1}{2}}$, and moreover, there would be no three-valued tautology²⁷.

Therefore, although Urquhart's interpretation is quite clear and consistent with Łukasiewicz's philosophical intuitions, it is not consistent with Łukasiewicz's truth-table for \rightarrow . Hence, Urquhart asserts that $\mathcal{L}_{\frac{1}{2}}$ does not provide a formal tool that correctly describes Łukasiewicz's idea of proposi-

²⁴ A. Urquhart (2001). Basic Many-valued Logic. *Op. cit.*, pp. 250–251.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 250.

²⁶ *Ibidem*.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 251.

tions concerning contingent future events, and moreover, he emphasizes that “The logic of the ‘possible’ in Łukasiewicz’s sense is not truth-functional”²⁸.

A quite new argument that seems to reveal more philosophical inconsistencies within Łukasiewicz’s logical and philosophical investigations is presented by Tomasz Bigaj, a Polish philosopher and logician, who asserts that L_3 is not in accordance with Łukasiewicz’s initial philosophical motivation.

Bigaj begins his line of reasoning with the assumption that seems to be acceptable on the grounds of Łukasiewicz’s philosophy. According to this assumption, every proposition on future states of affairs is either true or false, or has an undermined truth-value. Bigaj explains: “Consider, for example, the crucial assumption that sentences referring to future events can be divided into three mutually exclusive classes S_t , S_f and S_u , where S_t contains all the sentences which are already true at the time, t_0 , of their utterance (these sentences describe events positively determined at t_0), S_f contains sentences which are false at t_0 , and S_u includes all sentences which are as yet undetermined, i.e., which refer to events neither positively nor negatively determined at t_0 . It seems reasonable, and consistent with Łukasiewicz’s intuitions, to accept the following rule specifying which sentence can be counted as already true (false) at time t_0 : (1) If, under any possible future circumstances (in any realization of possible future states of affairs), a sentence α turns out to be true (false), then α belongs to the class S_t (S_f) at time t_0 ”²⁹.

Bigaj argues that the conclusion which follows from (1) cannot be accepted on the grounds of Łukasiewicz’s philosophy. He explains: “The assumption (1) has a consequence which does not agree with facts about Łukasiewicz’s three-valued logic. Namely, it follows from (1) that all classical tautologies should remain valid within a three-valued logic. That this is a consequence of (1) seems fairly obvious, but let me show this in a more detailed way. Let us consider a classical tautology at $T(p_1, \dots, p_n)$, where p_1, \dots, p_n are atomic sentences in the language of the classical propositional calculus. At time t_0 , some (possibly all) of the sentences p_1, \dots, p_n may be undetermined. We can now consider the time t at which all events described

²⁸ *Ibidem*.

²⁹ T. Bigaj (2001). Three-valued Logic, Indeterminacy and Quantum Mechanics. *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 30, p. 98.

by p_1, \dots, p_n finally come to realization. This means that at t all p_1, \dots, p_n can only have the value 1 (truth) or 0 (false). But what value will the whole compound sentence T have at time t ? In order to answer this question, we must accept another assumption [...]: (2) The valuation of a three-valued calculus, restricted to classical values, should give the same results as in classical logic. Therefore, because T is a tautology, it will be true at time t . Because this is independent of a particular realization of the sentences p_1, \dots, p_n , we must conclude on the basis of assumption (1) that T must have been true at t_0 . However, this is inconsistent with the fact that in the calculus \mathbb{L}_3 not all classical tautologies are valid (for example, the law of contradiction or the law of the excluded middle). Hence, Łukasiewicz did not fully respect his initial philosophical (semantic) motivations³⁰.

We may ask, however, if Bigaj's argumentation is correct. Bigaj is right that (1) leads to the conclusion that all tautologies of PL are preserved at an arbitrary time t_0 . However, one may argue that (1) should concern not only tautologies of PL, but also tautologies of any logic.

For example, let us consider the tautologies of PL and the tautologies of a two-valued propositional logic that is dual to PL, i.e., a logic with the following logical matrix:

$$M_{dPL} = (A_{dPL}, \{0\}),$$

where $A_{dPL} = (\{1, 0\}, \sim, \rightarrow, \vee, \wedge, \leftrightarrow)$.

dPL is a two valued-logic, however, not a classical one. All tautologies of dPL are negations of the tautologies of PL, i.e., classical contradictions. In this case, (1) leads to the conclusion that at an arbitrary time t_0 , for example, $p \vee \sim p$ is true (since the truth-value 1 is a designated truth-value in PL), and $\sim(p \vee \sim p)$ is true (since the truth-value 0 is a designated truth-value in dPL). Therefore, (1) leads to the contradiction (in the classical, on the metalogical level, understanding of the term "contradiction") that both $p \vee \sim p$ and $\sim(p \vee \sim p)$ are true.

However, one may defend (1) and argue that in the case of (1), tautologies of any logic should not be taken into consideration. Tautologies and contradictions are not contingently true (i.e., possibly true and possibly false) propositions on future events, and their truth-value does not depend

³⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 98–99.

on the realization of possible states of affairs. As Ludwig Wittgenstein emphasizes in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, tautologies and contradictions “say nothing”³¹, and “are not pictures of reality”³².

Nevertheless, even if one narrows the scope of investigation to contingent propositions on future events, it is difficult to defend (1), since it is quite clear that (1) leads to the conclusion that no proposition has an undetermined truth-value. One can assume that finally (sooner or later), all contingent propositions on future states of affairs turn out to be true or false. Therefore, at an arbitrary time t_0 , there is no undetermined proposition, i.e., no proposition that is assigned the truth-value $\frac{1}{2}$. This is a consequence that for apparent reasons is not acceptable on the grounds of Łukasiewicz’s idea of propositions on future events.

Lastly, the scientific relevance of Łukasiewicz’s invention should be considered as well. Woleński concludes: “Łukasiewicz suggested that many-valued systems of the propositional calculus and the predicate calculus should become the foundation of research in arithmetic and the set theory. Thus for Łukasiewicz many-valued logical calculi were both philosophically and mathematically relevant. Today it is clear that Łukasiewicz’s expectations have been thwarted. Many-valued logics have revolutionized neither logic, nor mathematics, nor philosophy. Even in the Lvov-Warsaw School there were significant doubts concerning the controversy over the determinist structure of the world. On the other hand, there is not the least doubt that many-valued logics have substantially enriched the repertoire of logical research, both in formal logic and in the philosophy of logic (absolutism vs. relativism). It is in this perspective that the achievements of the Warsaw School, and in the first place of Łukasiewicz, related to many-valued logics should be evaluated”³³.

One may ask, however, if Woleński’s conclusion should be fully accepted. It appears that Woleński is right when he asserts that many-valued logics have revolutionized neither logic, nor mathematics, nor philosophy. Moreover, the significance of many-valued logics is in fact narrowed to the very

³¹ L. Wittgenstein (1961). *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, theses 4.461, 4.462, 4.463, 5.43, 6.11, 6.124.

³² *Ibidem*, theses 4.462, 6.1, 6.11, 6.111.

³³ J. Woleński (1989). *Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School*. *Op. cit.*, pp. 127–128.

special field of contemporary formal logic – it is true that many-valued logics have not become the basis of research in arithmetic or the set theory.

Nevertheless, the construction of many-valued logics not only substantially enriched the repertoire of logical research, but also provided a new point of view to both classical and non-classical systems of logic. Through the comparison between classical and non-classical logics, established, for example, by means of algebraic tools (which, in a basic way, have been used in this chapter) one can reveal, for example, some interesting formal properties of various logics – both classical and non-classical ones. In the next chapter, a couple of examples of such formal properties will be examined in more detail.

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Debates on the concept of many-valuedness: a mathematical point of view

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Many-valued propositional logics and the idea of many-valuedness may be considered not only from the philosophical, but also from the mathematical point of view. Some formal constructions provide mathematical (metalogical) tools for analyzing relevant properties of many-valued propositional logics. In virtue of these tools, one can compare various logics and find some important differences between them or, conversely, certain features they share.

The same mathematical (metalogical) tools can also be used, however, to criticize the idea of many-valuedness. Probably the most relevant critique of this kind has been presented by Roman Suszko, a Polish logician and philosopher. Suszko was very critical of the many-valued logics of Łukasiewicz. In a paper presented at the Conference on the History of Logic in Cracow in 1976, he wrote: “Łukasiewicz is the chief perpetrator of a magnificent conceptual deceit which lingers on in mathematical logic to the present day”¹. Suszko maintains that from the mathematical point of view, the third truth-value is redundant.

According to Suszko², for any language L and for any logical matrix $M = (A, D)$, where D is a set of designated truth-values, one can define the set of “logical valuations”, i.e., TV_M , as follows:

$$TV_M = \{t_h : h \in \text{Hom}(L, A)\},$$

¹ R. Suszko (1977). The Fregean Axiom and Polish Mathematical Logic in the 1920's. *Studia Logica: An International Journal for Symbolic Logic* 36, No. 4, p. 377.

² *Ibidem*, pp. 377–380; G. Malinowski (2006). *Logiki wielowartościowe*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, p. 66.

where

$$t_h(\alpha) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } h(\alpha) \in D \\ 0, & \text{if } h(\alpha) \notin D \end{cases}.$$

Hence, every “logical valuation” is a zero-one function; consequently, every many-valued propositional logic is a logically two-valued one.

For \mathbb{L}_3 , expressed in terms of $\{\sim, \rightarrow\}$, one can define the set LV_3 . LV_3 is a set of all functions t , i.e.

$$t : \text{FOR} \rightarrow \{0, 1\},$$

where FOR is a set of well-formed formulas of \mathbb{L}_3 formed with \sim and \rightarrow . For any $\alpha, \beta, \gamma \in \text{FOR}$, the following conditions are satisfied:

- (0) $t(\gamma) = 0$ or $t(\sim \gamma) = 0$,
- (1) $t(\beta) = 1$ implies $t(\alpha \rightarrow \beta) = 1$,
- (2) If $t(\alpha) = 1$ and $t(\beta) = 0$ then $t(\alpha \rightarrow \beta) = 0$,
- (3) If $t(\alpha) = t(\beta)$ and $t(\sim \alpha) = t(\sim \beta)$ then $t(\alpha \rightarrow \beta) = 1$,
- (4) If $t(\alpha) = t(\beta) = 0$ and $t(\sim \alpha) \neq t(\sim \beta)$ then $t(\alpha \rightarrow \beta) = t(\sim \alpha)$,
- (5) If $t(\sim \alpha) = 0$ then $t(\sim \sim \alpha) = t(\alpha)$,
- (6) If $t(\alpha) = 1$ and $t(\beta) = 0$ then $t(\sim(\alpha \rightarrow \beta)) = t(\sim \beta)$,
- (7) If $t(\alpha) = t(\sim \alpha) = t(\beta)$ and $t(\sim \beta) = 1$ then $t(\sim(\alpha \rightarrow \beta)) = 0$.

Suszko’s argumentation is probably the most important mathematical critique of the idea of many-valuedness. Moreover, Suszko claims that it proves that the third truth-value has no philosophical meaning. Therefore, the “real” truth-values are only two – the classical ones. The other, non-classical truth-values are just the algebraic correlates of logical formulas.

Marcelo Tsuji writes that “Suszko [...] realized that Łukasiewicz’s or Post’s many-valued logics resulted from a purely *referential* phenomenon, i.e. from the fact that when we define homomorphisms between an abstract logic $L = (\mathbb{A}, Cn)$ and one of its matrices M , we can associate with an element of $A = |\mathbb{A}|$ any number of algebraic values, for these homomorphisms

³ R. Suszko, (1975). Remarks on Łukasiewicz’s three-valued logic. *Bulletin of the Section of Logic*, 4, No. 3, pp. 87–90; G. Malinowski (2006). *Logiki wielowartościowe. Op. cit.*, p. 67.

are in fact merely admissible reference assignments for A . They are, in other words, algebraic valuations of L over M ⁴.

Suszko emphasizes in his paper that “logical valuations and algebraic valuations are functions of a quite different conceptual nature. The former relate to truth and falsity, while the latter represent reference assignments. The formulas play a double semantic role, in general”⁵.

Then, Suszko asks some questions and explains: “[...] how could he [i.e., Łukasiewicz] confuse truth and falsity with what the sentences describe? How has it been possible for the humbug of many logical values to persist over the past fifty years? To many logicians the problem may seem quite simple: the whole affair consists in a shift in technical terminology. This is true, but it is not the whole truth, I think. The Polish school of logic was both philosophical and mathematical. It was a pioneer of the so-called scientific philosophy (a kind of logical empiricism), and had a good understanding of the problems of classical philosophy. On the other hand, the growing set-theoretical thinking of Polish mathematicians exerted a considerable pressure on the minds of their fellow scholars in logic. Many factors contributed to the intense intellectual movement in Polish logic at that time. Consequently, the terminology changed tendentiously in a rather unconventional way. It was certainly an abuse of words, because the semantic duplicity of formulas eventually disappeared, and now, 50 years later, we still face an illogical paradise of multiple truths and falsehoods”⁶.

Suszko maintains that mathematical (metalogical) tools lead to some salient philosophical conclusions. One may ask, however, if Suszko’s argumentation is correct. We may argue that although it is right to consider any many-valued logical system through the fundamental distinction between two sets of truth-values, i.e., the set of designated truth-values and the set of undesignated truth-values, it does not mean that non-classical truth-values different from 1 and 0 have no philosophical meaning at all.

Therefore, the question is whether one may validly assert that mathematical (metalogical) tools lead to philosophically relevant conclusions. Or,

⁴ M. Tsuji (1998). Many-Valued Logics and Suszko’s Thesis Revisited. *Studia Logica*, 60, p. 301.

⁵ R. Suszko (1977). The Fregean Axiom and Polish Mathematical Logic in the 1920’s. *Op. cit.*, p. 378.

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 379.

in other words, whether mathematical (metalogical) tools do have any philosophical meaning?

To answer this question, we must find out what, in fact, determines philosophically relevant differences between many-valued propositional logics.

In the previous chapter, it was proposed that the rejection of two fundamental laws of classical logic, i.e., the “law of contradiction” (in PL, the tautology $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$) and the “law of the excluded middle” (in PL, the tautology $p \vee \sim p$), which in PL, in accordance with the definition of logical connectives (i.e. De Morgan’s laws), are equivalent to each other, was the “major impetus in the development of many-valued logics”⁷.

However, it must be noted that the rejection of $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$ and (or) $p \vee \sim p$ as tautologies of a propositional logic does not necessarily lead to the acceptance of the idea of many-valuedness, and vice versa, the acceptance of the idea of many-valuedness does not necessarily lead to the rejection of $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$ and (or) $p \vee \sim p$ as tautologies of a propositional logic.

Charles A. Baylis, who understands the law of the excluded middle more as the principle of bivalence than $p \vee \sim p$ (however, his reasoning can also refer to $p \vee \sim p$), explains: “There has been a tendency in some quarters to regard the existence of the ‘many-valued logics’ as definite grounds for the rejection of the principle of excluded middle. Thus, for example, Professor E.T. Bell asserts that up to the time of the discovery of Łukasiewicz and Tarski: “It was still supposed that a consistent workable system of deductive reasoning must follow the Aristotelian pattern, particularly the second law as applied to statements: a statement is either true or false. If such were indeed the case, then it would seem to follow that human beings in their ‘search for truth’ could never shake off the tyranny of these laws, and in particular they must always be subject to the second law... To destroy this most obstinate of all superhuman Absolutes it would suffice to produce a workable, consistent (not self-contradictory) system of deductive reasoning in which the second law is invalid. This was done in 1930 by Łukasiewicz and Tarski.” An examination of the facts, however, reveals clearly that the existence of “many-valued logics” is quite irrelevant to the truth or falsity of

⁷ N. Rescher (1968). *Many-valued Logic. Topics in Philosophical Logic*. Synthese Library 17. Netherlands: Springer, p. 107.

the principle of excluded middle”⁸. He also emphasizes that “Whether the principle of excluded middle is true or false is a question the answer to which depends on considerations quite other than those derived from the discovery or elaboration of abstract mathematical structures. [...] Łukasiewicz is quite correct in his judgment that the many-valued systems do not dictate the rejection (or acceptance) of the principle of two-valuedness, but that, on the contrary, the acceptance or rejection of this principle is one of the determinants of the form of abstract system which will be acceptable as a logic”⁹.

Once again, let us consider a two-valued propositional logic that is dual to PL, i.e., a logic with the following logical matrix:

$$M_{dPL} = (A_{dPL}, \{0\}),$$

where $A_{dPL} = (\{1, 0\}, \sim, \rightarrow, \vee, \wedge, \leftrightarrow)$.

Therefore, every tautology of dPL takes on the truth-value 0 for all assignments of truth-values to the variables, and it is a negation of a tautology of PL, i.e., a classical contradiction.

Hence, dPL is an example of a two-valued logic that rejects $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$ and $p \vee \sim p$ as its tautologies, despite the fact that in dPL, $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$ and $p \vee \sim p$ take on the truth-value 1 for all assignments of truth-values to the variables.

On the other hand, as Rescher points out, $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$ as a tautology “holds in many systems of many-valued logic”¹⁰. Similarly, $p \vee \sim p$ is “an asserted thesis (tautology) in various such systems”¹¹.

However, although the rejection of $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$ and (or) $p \vee \sim p$ as tautologies of a propositional logic does not necessarily lead to the acceptance of the idea of many-valuedness, and vice versa, the acceptance of the idea of many-valuedness does not necessarily lead to the rejection of $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$ and (or) $p \vee \sim p$ as tautologies of a propositional logic, it is a matter of fact that for philosophical reasons, the rejection of $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$ and (or) $p \vee \sim p$ as tautologies of a propositional logic usually entails extension of the classical set of two truth-values.

⁸ Ch.A. Baylis (1936). Are Some Propositions Neither True nor False? *Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 156–157.

⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 159–160.

¹⁰ N. Rescher (1968). Many-valued Logic. *Op. cit.*, p. 108.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 112.

Therefore, one can assume that it is philosophically relevant whether or not a many-valued propositional logic rejects the law of contradiction and the law of the excluded middle that are often considered in the philosophy of logic as the “laws of thought”. As J.V. McGill explains: “Tradition usually assigns greater importance to the so-called laws of thought than to other logical principles. Since these laws could apparently not be deduced from the other principles without circularity and all deductions appeared to make use of them, their priority was considered well established. Generally, it was held that the laws of thought have no proof and need none, that as universal constitutive or transcendental principles they are self-evident”¹². On the other hand, “There have been many dissenting opinions, of course, and many impressive systems erected upon a deliberate violation of these laws. [...] The usual objections to the laws of thought that they are abstract and meaningless, that they are static and inconsistent with change, that they are psychological limitations or verbal conventions do not represent the majority opinion, which has held them to be prior to, and hence, more important than other logical principles”¹³.

Although McGill considers the “laws of thought” not only as tautological formulas $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$ and $p \vee \sim p$, but more general as some metalogical principles: the rule of the valuation of formulas and the rule of bivalence, respectively, it can be assumed that the rejection or acceptance of $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$ and (or) $p \vee \sim p$ as tautologies of certain propositional many-valued logics indicates philosophically meaningful differences between these logics.

This assumption leads to another one: if mathematical (metalogical) tools are philosophically relevant, they must reveal properties of many-valued propositional logics which determine the rejection or acceptance of $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$ and (or) $p \vee \sim p$ as tautologies of these logics.

Let us then consider some fundamental metalogical properties of certain many-valued propositional logics as, for example, having the same definite axioms (and the same definite rules of inference), being a standard, a normal, and a strongly uniform propositional many-valued logic.

The first property is a syntactic one. It should be noted that two different many-valued propositional logics may be formalized in the same axioms

¹² V.J. McGill (1939). Concerning the Laws of Contradictions and Excluded Middle. *Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 6, No. 2, p. 196.

¹³ *Ibidem*, pp. 196–197.

expressed in terms of certain logical connectives with the same rules of inference, but with different definitions of other logical connectives. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that having the same set of axioms and the same set of rules of inference by two axiom systems of different many-valued propositional logics means that there is a significant syntactic resemblance between them.

Other three properties are semantic ones. They can be also considered as the structural features that characterize the truth-tables for logical connectives in the most familiar systems of many-valued propositional logics.

The property of being a “standard” logic refers to standard conditions established by Rosser and Turquette. They explain that “[w]hen many-valued truth functions (operators) are properly analogous to two-valued functions (operators), we will say that they satisfy ‘standard conditions’”¹⁴. The standard conditions “make finitely many-valued logics resemble the classical propositional logic. This, on a certain level of investigation, permitted the simplification, or solving of some metalogical questions, such as axiomatization and the extension to predicate logics”¹⁵.

Now, let us assume that $n \geq 2$ is a natural number and $1 \leq k < n$. Then, the set of all truth-values, i.e., E_n , is as follows:

$$E_n = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}.$$

The set of designated truth-values, i.e., D_k , is as follows:

$$D_k = \{1, 2, \dots, k\}.$$

The logical connectives satisfy standard conditions, if for any $x, y \in E_n$ and $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ the following definitions hold¹⁶:

$$\Rightarrow x \in D_k \text{ iff } x \notin D_k,$$

$$x \Rightarrow y \notin D_k \text{ iff } x \in D_k \text{ and } y \notin D_k,$$

$$x \vee y \in D_k \text{ iff } x \in D_k \text{ or } y \in D_k,$$

$$x \wedge y \in D_k \text{ iff } x \in D_k \text{ and } y \in D_k,$$

¹⁴ J.B. Rosser, A.R. Turquette (1952). *Many-valued Logics*. Amsterdam: North-Holland, p. 25.

¹⁵ G. Malinowski (2006). *Many-valued Logic*. *Op. cit.*, p. 552.

¹⁶ J.B. Rosser, A.R. Turquette (1952). *Many-valued Logics*. *Op. cit.*, pp. 25–26; G. Malinowski (2006). *Many-valued Logic*. *Op. cit.*, p. 552.

$x \Leftrightarrow y \in D_k$ iff either $x, y \in D_k$ or $x, y \notin D_k$,

$j_i(x) \in D_k$ iff $x = i$.

Therefore, every many-valued propositional logic that has standard logical connectives as primitive or definable, for example \mathcal{L}_3 , is a standard logic.

Another property is that of being a “normal” logic. Rescher explains: “The truth-table for a propositional connective that is the many-valued analogue of one of the two-valued connectives will be said to be *normal*, if it includes at least one trueanalogous truth-value T (which, however, may be designated by 0 or 1 or n or in some other way) and at least one falseanalogous truth-value F (also perhaps differently designated), and this many-valued table *agrees entirely with the standard two-valued one for the connective in C* [i.e., in PL] *when only the two truth-values T and F are involved*. A many-valued logic may be said to be *normal* (as a whole), if the truth-tables for all of its basic connectives are normal (with respect to one and the same pair of truth-valued T, F)¹⁷.

In other words, every truth-table for a logical connective in a normal many-valued propositional logic is an extension of the analogous truth-table for a logical connective in PL. It is easy to recognize that \mathcal{L}_3 is a normal logic. For example, let us consider the truth table for \rightarrow in \mathcal{L}_3 :

\rightarrow	0	$\frac{1}{2}$	1
0	1	1	1
$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	1
1	0	$\frac{1}{2}$	1

The part of this truth-table that is marked with bold 1 and 0 agrees entirely with the truth-table for \rightarrow in PL. The other part concerns only cases in which $\frac{1}{2}$ is involved.

The next property is strong uniformity. Rescher explains: “The truth-table for a propositional connective in a system of many-valued logic is *strongly uniform* (S-uniform) if it is such that whenever *the same* truth-value occurs at any two positions in a certain row (or column) (not necessarily at just the

¹⁷ N. Rescher (1968). *Many-valued Logic. Op. cit.*, pp. 78–79.

extremes), then all of the intermediate positions of this row (or column) are filled by the same entry”¹⁸. Like in the case of normal logic, a many-valued logic may be said to be *strongly uniform* (as a whole) if the truth-tables for all of its basic connectives are strongly uniform.

It is clear that all three-valued propositional logics are strongly uniform. Again let us consider the truth table for \rightarrow in \mathcal{L}_3 :

\rightarrow	0	$\frac{1}{2}$	1
0	1	1	1
$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	1
1	0	$\frac{1}{2}$	1

The positions marked with bold entries belong to rows in which the same truth-value occurs in any two positions. Then, in each row, there is only one entry left. Therefore, all of the intermediate positions of these rows are filled by the same entry.

Once again let us consider the truth table for \rightarrow in \mathcal{L}_3 :

\rightarrow	0	$\frac{1}{2}$	1
0	1	1	1
$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	1
1	0	$\frac{1}{2}$	1

The positions marked with bold entries belong to columns in which the same truth-value occurs in any two positions. Then, in each column, there is only one entry left. Therefore, all of the intermediate positions of these columns are filled by the same entry.

It is easy to see that this property belongs to all connectives in \mathcal{L}_3 . Then, \mathcal{L}_3 is a strongly uniform three-valued propositional logic. This corollary can be easily extended to all three-valued propositional logics. However, although all three-valued propositional logics are strongly uniform, it is

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 81.

clear that, for example, four-valued logics may lack this property. Therefore, it is significant whether or not strong uniformity leads to the rejection or acceptance of $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$ and (or) $p \vee \sim p$ as tautologies of many-valued propositional logics.

Now, let us consider a three-valued propositional logic L_3 whose propositional language is defined with the following algebra:

$$L_{L_3} = (\text{FOR}_{L_3}, \sim, \rightarrow, \vee, \wedge, \leftrightarrow),$$

where FOR_{L_3} is a set of wffs of L_{L_3} (or simply, a set of wffs of L_3).

Then let M_{L_3} be a logical matrix for L_3 , i.e.,

$$M_{L_3} = (A_{L_3}, \{1\}),$$

where $A_{L_3} = (\{1, \frac{1}{2}, 0\}, \sim, \rightarrow, \vee, \wedge, \leftrightarrow)$.

In L_3 , the logical connectives $\sim, \rightarrow, \vee, \wedge, \leftrightarrow$ are defined by the following truth-tables:

p	$\sim p$	\rightarrow	0	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	\vee	0	$\frac{1}{2}$	1
0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1
$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	1	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	1	1
1	0	1	0	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	1	1	1	1

\wedge	0	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	\leftrightarrow	0	$\frac{1}{2}$	1
0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
$\frac{1}{2}$	0	0	0	$\frac{1}{2}$	0	1	0
1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1

Hence, the following wffs of L_3 are examples of tautologies of L_3 that correspond to the basic tautologies of PL:

$$p \rightarrow p,$$

$$p \leftrightarrow p,$$

$$p \leftrightarrow \sim \sim p,$$

$$\sim(p \wedge \sim p),$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&(p \wedge q) \rightarrow p, \\
&(p \wedge \sim p) \rightarrow q, \\
&((p \rightarrow q) \wedge p) \rightarrow q, \\
&(p \vee \sim p), \\
&p \rightarrow (p \vee q), \\
&(p \vee q) \leftrightarrow \sim(\sim p \wedge \sim q), \\
&(p \leftrightarrow q) \leftrightarrow ((p \rightarrow q) \wedge (q \rightarrow p)), \\
&(p \leftrightarrow q) \leftrightarrow (\sim p \leftrightarrow \sim q), \\
&((p \leftrightarrow q) \wedge (p \leftrightarrow r)) \rightarrow (q \leftrightarrow r).
\end{aligned}$$

However, some basic tautologies of PL do not correspond to the tautologies of L_3 . For example, the following wffs of L_3 are not tautologies of L_3 :

$$\begin{aligned}
&(p \rightarrow \sim p) \rightarrow \sim p, \\
&(p \rightarrow q) \leftrightarrow \sim(p \wedge \sim q), \\
&((p \wedge q) \rightarrow r) \leftrightarrow ((p \wedge \sim q) \rightarrow \sim r).
\end{aligned}$$

In L_3 , the logical connectives \sim , \rightarrow are defined in the same way as in \mathfrak{L}_3 . Hence, the set of tautologies in L_3 formed solely with \sim , \rightarrow is identical with the set of tautologies in L_3 formed solely with \sim , \rightarrow .

It is easy to recognize that Wajsberg's axioms for \mathfrak{L}_3 (i.e., W(1)-W(4)) are tautologies of L_3 . If using the axioms SUB and MP one can construct all and only all thesis of \mathfrak{L}_3 that are tautologies of L_3 formed solely with \sim , \rightarrow , then using the axioms SUB and MP one can construct all and only all thesis of L_3 that are tautologies of L_3 formed solely with \sim , \rightarrow . Therefore, W(1)-W(4) can be considered as axioms for L_3 .

However, in L_3 , definitions of other logical connectives are not the same as in \mathfrak{L}_3 . In L_3 , only DEF.2 and DEF.3 hold, i.e.:

$$\begin{aligned}
&\text{(DEF.2)} \quad (p \wedge q) \overset{\text{DEF}}{\leftrightarrow} \sim(\sim p \vee \sim q), \\
&\text{(DEF.3)} \quad (p \leftrightarrow q) \overset{\text{DEF}}{\leftrightarrow} ((p \rightarrow q) \wedge (q \rightarrow p)).
\end{aligned}$$

On the other hand, in L_3 , DEF.1 does not hold, and has to be replaced by the following definition:

$$(p \vee q) \stackrel{\text{DEF}}{\leftrightarrow} (\sim(\sim p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow (\sim p \rightarrow q)).$$

The most relevant conclusion in this reasoning is that $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$ and $p \vee \sim p$ are tautologies of L_3 , and, on the other hand, they are not tautologies of L_3 . Therefore, the fact that two axiom systems of different many-valued propositional logics have the same sets of axioms (i.e. W(1)-W(4)) and the same sets of rules of inference (i.e. SUB and MP) does not lead to the rejection or acceptance of $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$ and (or) $p \vee \sim p$ as tautologies of these many-valued propositional logics.

Now, let us consider the semantic properties of L_3 .

It can be proved that L_3 is a standard many-valued propositional logic. Let $j_1, j_{1/2}, j_0$ be standard logical connectives defined by the following truth-tables:

p	$j_1 p$	$j_{1/2} p$	$j_0 p$
0	0	0	1
$\frac{1}{2}$	0	1	0
1	1	0	0

In L_3 , the logical connective j_1 is defined as follows:

$$j_1 p \stackrel{\text{DEF}}{\leftrightarrow} \sim(p \rightarrow \sim p).$$

On the other hand, j_0 is defined by:

$$j_0 p \stackrel{\text{DEF}}{\leftrightarrow} \sim(\sim p \rightarrow p).$$

The logical connective $j_{1/2}$ can be introduced by:

$$j_{1/2} \stackrel{\text{DEF}}{\leftrightarrow} (p \leftrightarrow \sim p).$$

Standard negation in L_3 , i.e. \Rightarrow , can be defined by:

$$\Rightarrow p \stackrel{\text{DEF}}{\leftrightarrow} \sim j_1 p.$$

Therefore, the truth-table for \Rightarrow is as follows:

p	$\Rightarrow p$
0	1
$\frac{1}{2}$	1
1	0

The logical connective \wedge satisfies standard conditions, and thus, is equal to standard conjunction in the presented L_3 , i.e., \wedge .

Then, standard disjunction in L_3 , i.e., \vee can be defined by:

$$(p \vee q) \xleftarrow{\text{DEF}} \Rightarrow (\Rightarrow p \wedge \Rightarrow q),$$

standard implication in L_3 , i.e., \Rightarrow – by:

$$(p \Rightarrow q) \xleftarrow{\text{DEF}} \Rightarrow (p \wedge \Rightarrow q),$$

and standard equivalence in L_3 , i.e., \Leftrightarrow – by:

$$(p \Leftrightarrow q) \xleftarrow{\text{DEF}} ((p \Rightarrow q) \wedge (q \Rightarrow p)).$$

Hence, the truth-tables for the remaining standard logical connectives in the presented L_3 are as follows:

\vee	0	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	\Rightarrow	0	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	\Leftrightarrow	0	$\frac{1}{2}$	1
0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0
$\frac{1}{2}$	0	0	1	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	1	1	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	1	0
1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1

Therefore, L_3 , like \mathcal{L}_3 , is a standard three-valued propositional logic. Then, since $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$ and $p \vee \sim p$ are tautologies of L_3 , and, on the other hand, they are not tautologies of \mathcal{L}_3 , it has been demonstrated that being a standard many-valued propositional logic does not lead to the rejection or acceptance of $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$ and (or) $p \vee \sim p$ as tautologies of many-valued propositional logics.

It is easy to recognize that L_3 , like \mathcal{L}_3 , is a normal and strongly uniform three-valued propositional logic. Then, neither being a normal nor

a strongly uniform many-valued propositional logic leads to the rejection or acceptance of $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$ and (or) $p \vee \sim p$ as tautologies of many-valued propositional logics.

We have thus proved that neither having the same definite axioms (and the same definite rules of inference) nor being a standard, nor a normal, nor a strongly uniform propositional many-valued logic entails the rejection or acceptance of $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$ and (or) $p \vee \sim p$ as tautologies of many-valued propositional logics. In other words, neither having the same definite axioms (and the same definite rules of inference) nor being a standard, nor a normal, nor a strongly uniform propositional many-valued logic is a sufficient condition for the rejection or acceptance of $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$ and (or) $p \vee \sim p$ as tautologies of many-valued propositional logics.

Since the fundamental syntactic and semantic properties considered in this chapter are not sufficient conditions for the rejection or acceptance of $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$ and (or) $p \vee \sim p$ as tautologies of many-valued propositional logics, then mathematical (metalogical) tools which reveal them are not philosophically meaningful.

However, it might be argued that although the presented line of reasoning proves that the considered properties are not sufficient conditions, it does not prove that they are not necessary conditions for the rejection or acceptance of $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$ and (or) $p \vee \sim p$ as tautologies of many-valued propositional logics. In other words, it might be true that the rejection or acceptance of $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$ and (or) $p \vee \sim p$ as tautologies of many-valued propositional logics entails that these logics have definite formal properties or, on the other hand, they do not have them.

Although this argumentation is reasonable, it has been assumed in this chapter that if mathematical (metalogical) tools are philosophically meaningful, they have to reveal properties of many-valued propositional logics which determine the rejection or acceptance of $\sim(p \wedge \sim p)$ and (or) $p \vee \sim p$ as tautologies of these logics. Providing this assumption is correct, the conclusion is correct as well: mathematical (metalogical) tools that reveal the considered formal properties are not philosophically meaningful.

Finally, one might ask how the reasoning presented above refutes Suszko's thesis? A possible answer is as follows: it shows that mathematical (metalogical) tools do not necessarily reveal formal properties that are significant from the philosophical point of view. Thus, from the fact that in every many-valued propositional logic it is possible to define two-valued logical

valuations, it does not necessarily follow, as Suszko maintains, that every many-valued propositional logic is a two-valued one, and non-classical truth-values are philosophically meaningless and redundant.

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Is it possible to know another person's mental experiences? The views of Kazimierz Twardowski and the concept of Roman Ingarden and selected representatives of contemporary cognitive sciences. Mentality as the subject of psychological studies in the thought of the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw school

Wioletta Dziarnowska

The psychological views represented in the Lvov-Warsaw School of philosophy by its founder Kazimierz Twardowski, Władysław Witwicki, Stefan Baley, Stefan Błachowski and Mieczysław Kreutz are considered so significant due to the fact it was through them that Polish psychology could have gained worldwide recognition. Even though that did not happen, the concepts proposed by the above-mentioned philosophers are believed to have laid the foundations for contemporary humanist psychology in Poland, particularly due to its strong inspiration with Franz Brentano's ideas of descriptive psychology¹. Teresa Rzepa mentions three factors which contributed to the exceptional nature of the psychological propositions of the Lvov-Warsaw School: the way the subject of psychology is defined, the postulated research methods, and the theoretical attempts at explaining psychological processes and human behaviour². In view of the subject to be discussed in this article, these issues will be presented with reference to selected proposals by Twardowski.

As regards the understanding of the subject of psychology, already in his paper entitled *Psychology vs. Physiology and Philosophy*³, Twardowski ob-

¹ See T. Rzepa (Ed.). (1997). *Psychologia w szkole lwowsko-warszawskiej*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, p. 7, 22.

² *Ibidem*, p. 22.

³ K. Twardowski (1965). *Psychologia wobec fizjologii i filozofii*. In: id. *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*. Warszawa: PWN, pp. 92–113. See also K. Twardowski (1897). *Psychology vs. Physiology and Philosophy*. In: J. Brandl, J. Woleński (Eds.). (1999),

jected to giving psychology complete independence from philosophy and treating it as yet another natural science, if not part of physiology, on the one hand, while on the other he emphasized the clearly anti-metaphysical approach to psychology which was supposed to depart from making conclusions concerning the nature of the soul, and deal with the properties and functions of particular manifestations of mental life.

According to Twardowski, considering psychology as part of physiology and treating mental phenomena as a special type of physiological processes was not legitimate in view of two essential differences between these types of phenomena. Mental phenomena – observations, reminiscences, images, thoughts, judgments, feelings, desires, beliefs or anticipations – are not located in physical space, while physiological processes can be identified by indicating the bodily parts in which they occur. These two types of phenomena differ also in the way they are accessed by the knowing mind. Physiological processes are known through external experience based on sensory cognition, while mental processes are only available directly in an inner experience, underlain by consciousness⁴.

The methodological differences between physiology and psychology represent another important reason for accepting the thesis that the two disciplines are independent of one another. The understanding of mentality, which Twardowski also referred to as subjective in view of its first-person character, with all of its shortcomings, including inaccuracy and the narrowing of the field of study down to the investigator's own mental experiences, as the basic method of psychology makes it impossible to consider this discipline as a part of science based on sensory cognition and the observational method⁵.

Another reductionist perspective in describing mental experiences, related to the claim they are a function of the brain, was criticized by the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School by referring to the twofold meaning of the term "function". The way function is understood in mathematics – as a relationship between two values, where a change in one value entails a change in the other – may be referred to the situation of correlated mental

K. Twardowski. On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy. *Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities*. Amsterdam–Atlanta, GA: Rodopi B.V., 67, pp. 41–64.

⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 88–90.

⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 92–93.

phenomena and processes in the brain. The concurrent existence of these phenomena does not, however, mean the two disciplines of science are the same. It is not so with the other meaning of the term “function”, where it refers to an action performed by someone or something. If such functionalism were proven to be true, this would entail a thesis about the equivalence of the field of study in both disciplines. According to Twardowski, one cannot say the brain performs mental activities, as many essential properties of mental life, e.g. its unity and continuity, cannot be explained with processes of the nervous system.

Twardowski emphasizes the distinction between the object of psychology and that of other disciplines of science and philosophy in his later works as well. By dividing approaches to psychology present in the history of psychological thought and in modern times into rational psychology (where, in accordance with the etymology of the name, it is understood as the science of the soul), and empirical psychology (approaches which eliminate any metaphysical inquiries into the existence and nature of the soul), he includes his program of psychology with the latter⁶. In line with the thought of W. James, Twardowski asserts that the object of such psychology is mental life as a category isolated from the whole of man’s functioning, next to his bodily life as the object of physiology and biology, and social life studied by sociology⁷.

Understood this way, mentality consists of the following units⁸:

- mental activities, such as experiencing sensory phenomena, remembering them, thinking, judging, comparing, abstracting, feeling pleasure or pain;
- the products of these activities, such as images, concepts, judgments, thoughts, intentions, pleasure, pain, fear;

⁶ K. Twardowski (1965). O psychologii, jej przedmiocie, zadaniach, metodzie, stosunku do innych nauk i o jej rozwoju. In: id. *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*. Warszawa: PWN, p. 242. Twardowski says that while psychology may be considered an empirical science in the strict meaning of the word, it is also a quasi-historical science, as it uses methods similar to those employed by historical sciences (the method of reconstruction). See id. (1910). *O metodzie psychologii. Przyczynek do metodologii porównawczej badań naukowych*. Warszawa: E. Wende i S-ka, p. 9, 12.

⁷ See id. (1965). O psychologii, jej przedmiocie, zadaniach, metodzie, stosunku do innych nauk i o jej rozwoju. In: id. *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*. Warszawa: PWN, pp. 242–243.

⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 243–245.

- mental facts, i.e. mental units which are always a combination of the product and the mental activity by which it is produced in such form occurring in mental life;
- mental dispositions, or conditions for the appearance of mental facts and their properties, i.e. sensitivity, memory, imagination, intelligence, character, etc.⁹

The attempt most representative for Twardowski's thought at a theoretical deliberation on the relationship between the mental and physical aspects of man's functioning, going deeper in his understanding of mentality through reference to its supra-individual dimension, is the concept of actions and products¹⁰. Analyzing the meaning of verbs and their corresponding nouns, e.g. to run – a run; to shout – a shout; to err – an error, the philosopher points out that while a verb describes the aspect of an occurrence that is related to action, the corresponding noun emphasizes the phenomenal aspect of that occurrence. Even though they denote different occurrences, they are genetically related to each other. The phenomenon described by the noun is the result of the action expressed by the verb, which is why Twardowski called it the product of an action. He classified actions and products into three groups: physical (e.g. to run – a run); mental and physical (e.g. to talk – a talk; here physical activity is accompanied by a mental activity which

⁹ In line with this description to mental life, Twardowski points to the division of the domain of psychology (pure psychology) into the following sub-disciplines: a) general psychology, including the psychology of mental facts, with the psychology of products and the psychology of mental activities), and psychology of mental dispositions; b) egalitarian psychology, including individual psychology (psychography) and typical psychology (higher and lower animals, the healthy and the sick, children, etc.). Apart from that classification, he distinguishes between comparative psychology which draws on various psychological disciplines, and applied psychology which employs psychological content and methods to studies and explanations of various dimensions of man's functioning. *Ibidem*, p. 247.

¹⁰ K. Twardowski (1997). O czynnościach i wytworach. Kilka uwag z pogranicza psychologii, gramatyki i logiki. In: T. Rzepa et al. (Eds.), *Psychologia w szkole lwowsko-warszawskiej*. Warszawa: PWN, pp. 109–141. The fact that the distinction between actions and products is a new contribution to the understanding of mentality compared to Brentano's thought has also been pointed out by T. Rzepa in: id. (1992). Kazimierz Twardowski. In: *Słownik psychologów polskich*, pp. 198–202; T. Rzepa (1997). Psychologiczny portret Kazimierza Twardowskiego. In: R. Jadczyk, *Mistrz i jego uczniowie*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe SCHOLAR, p. 212.

modifies it and its product); and mental (e.g. to think – a thought)¹¹. Twardowski says that the most important difference between actions and their products is related to the fact the products have properties which are not present in their underlying processes¹².

This is substantiated with the following distinctions¹³. With respect to products, the philosopher identifies two categories: impermanent and permanent ones. The former include: a) products whose presence is limited to the current underlying activity; b) products which are duplicated through traditions passed over new generations and repeated activities; c) products existing potentially through dispositions towards their production. The latter, permanent ones, include: a) products which may be referred to as inherently permanent, lasting longer than the underlying activities due to being created in the physical matter (to draw – a drawing); this refers to physical products understood as a non-deliberate effect of man's activity (e.g. footprints left unintentionally), and to mental and physical products seen as the result of deliberate action (e.g. a drawing made on purpose); b) products which may be considered "derivatively" permanent, as they assume, in a way, the property of permanence from their underlying mental and physical products. In the latter group, Twardowski mentions: a) petrefacts – impermanent mental, mental and physical, or physical products which are "rooted" in a permanent product (e.g. a thought that has been written down or said out loud, or a cry recorded on a phonograph record); b) quasi-products as the effects of applying the term "product" to something that has not been created in result of a mental and physical activity (e.g. the drawing of veins on the surface of a leaf); and c) artefacts resulting from imitation or replacement of the proper products of activities generated by other persons (e.g. the mental experiences embodied in theatrical performance, or judgments thought or presented in logic, e.g. "all triangles are squares"). In the case of further types of "derivatively" permanent products, mental products become increasingly independent on their underlying activities, which is most clearly visible in the case of artefacts. This way, mentality becomes supra-individual, available to shared experience from the perspective of different knowing

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 114.

¹² See also: "There are many things we say about products which we do not say about their underlying activities". *Ibidem*, p. 120.

¹³ *Ibidem*, pp. 121–141.

subjects. The part shared in these different perspectives is a set of properties, identified through abstracting, which Twardowski calls the meaning of a mental and physical product¹⁴.

Interpreters of Twardowski's thought consider the differentiation between activities and products to be significant mainly due to its use in the dispute concerning the place and function of psychology with respect to philosophical disciplines. It was employed by the philosopher in his criticism of the so-called psychologism, a view most prevalent in the philosophy of the 19th century, which said that a scientific substantiation of philosophical propositions may only be provided by an analysis of the related mental experiences¹⁵. In his discussion of Twardowski's views in that regard, Jan Woleński suggested that methodological psychologism should be distinguished from ontological psychologism. The former was related to the unification, recommended by the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School, of the methods of psychology and philosophy, and the adoption of principles inspired by F. Brentano's descriptive psychology as a model for both of them. In this approach, an analysis of psychological and philosophical issues should be founded on the examination of the properties of mental experiences in which these categories are revealed. Ontological psychologism is tantamount to the conviction that the subject of philosophical enquiry, e.g. the values studied in ethics, or judgments as the subject of logic, are mental subjects; therefore, the areas of philosophy in which they are considered are, in fact, part of psychology. Jan Woleński points out that until 1902, Twardowski was an adherent of psychologism in both the methodological and the onto-

¹⁴ See: „[T]he difference between mental products... resulting from [a mental and physical product – W.D.] does not dare go too far; individual mental products must share some common properties. And these shared properties, that which individual mental products have in common, are what we usually consider to be the meaning of a mental and physical product... Understood this way, meaning is no longer a specific mental product, but something we arrive at through abstraction performed on specific products.” *Ibidem*, p. 136.

¹⁵ See E. Paczkowska-Łagowska (1980). *Psychika i poznanie. Epistemologia K. Twardowskiego*. Warszawa: PWN, p. 56; J. Woleński (1985). *Filozoficzna szkoła lwowsko-warszawska*. Warszawa: PWN, pp. 40–41; J. Bobryk (2001). *Twardowski. Teoria działania*. Warszawa: Prószyński i S-ka, pp. 19–23, 45–47. The evolution of Twardowski's views on psychologism has been broadly discussed in literature on the subject, I have therefore only mentioned those elements here which are considered to be the philosopher's most original contribution.

logical sense¹⁶. Later, he tried to reject ontological psychologism¹⁷, pointing to the mistaken identification of mental activities and products on which it was founded, and building, as has been described above, a concept of meaning which went beyond individual mental experiences and approached, in line with comparisons used by Twardowski himself, the ideal meaning as understood by E. Husserl, or “judgments per se” in B. Bolzano¹⁸. Elżbieta Paczkowska-Łagowska is of the opinion that the psychologism represented by Twardowski in his early works is moderate and genetic, as already there the philosopher emphasizes the distinction between subjects studied by philosophical disciplines and the underlying mental experiences, thus supposing his later attempt at overcoming psychologism.¹⁹ An actual breakthrough did not come, however, according to this interpreter of Twardowski’s thought, until his work *On Activities and Products*. The most important achievement, in the opinion of Paczkowska-Łagowska, is the concept of mental artefacts, where independence from the underlying mental activities is most clearly manifest. Substitute products, for example in the form of presented judgments, are considered in the relevant disciplines without in-

¹⁶ See also: „All subjects of philosophical studies may, to a certain degree, be reduced to manifestations of mental life... Thus, psychology provides philosophy not only with methods, but with subjects as well. If we did not have an inner experience and consequently did not know the manifestations of mental life, there would not only be no philosophy, but no logic, no theory of cognition, not even metaphysics as well!”. K. Twardowski (1965). *Psychologia wobec fizjologii i filozofii*. In: id. *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*. Warszawa: PWN, p. 109.

¹⁷ E. Paczkowska-Łagowska, referring to information contained in R. Ingarden’s discussion on the Research Work of Kazimierz Twardowski, points out that Twardowski himself associated his change of views on psychologism with his readings from E. Husserl. See E. Paczkowska-Łagowska (1963). *Z badań nad filozofią współczesną*. Warszawa: PWN, p. 58. The same source of the evolution of Twardowski’s views in that regard has also been suggested by J. Woleński. See. J. Woleński (1985). *Filozoficzna szkoła lwowsko-warszawska*. *Op. cit.*, p. 40.

¹⁸ See J. Woleński, *op. cit.*, pp. 40–42. Woleński suggests the concept of meaning presented by Twardowski does not suffice for psychologism to be overcome completely due to the ambiguous ontological status of meaning. Meaning understood as a set of properties, perceived supra-individually, representing the content of a sign as founded on certain mental activities, e.g. abstraction, still remains linked to individual mental experiences.

¹⁹ See E. Paczkowska-Łagowska (1963). *Z badań nad filozofią współczesną*. *Op. cit.*, p. 63.

voking their properties related to the underlying individual mental experiences, and ignoring the very fact relevant mental activities are performed²⁰.

Among the methods of psychology, the philosopher lists two basic methods, which are not equivalent, however, in terms of their cognitive value: the subjective and the objective method. The basic method, having higher cognitive value, is the subjective method employing introspection, or inner experience, which captures mental facts directly and immediately. Its characteristics include non-sensuality, obviousness of the existence of objects that are being known, and subjectivity due to the study being limited to the individual mental life of the psychologist²¹. The specific nature of mental facts, first of all their momentary character, makes it necessary, in order to achieve a reliable analysis of mental life and construction of mental laws, for the method to be supplemented with a reconstruction of mental phenomena performed *ex post* based on memory²². In addition, subjective psychology makes use of the so-called introspective experiment which involves free provocation of desired mental phenomena and their systematic analysis²³. The direct method, concerned with mental and physical activities and their products, provides access to knowledge about the mental life of other subjects. It is an indispensable supplement to introspection, which makes it possible to know other forms of mental attitudes towards the world on the one hand, and supplements the empirical material obtained through inner experience on the other.

Knowing the mentality of another in light of the views of Kazimierz Twardowski and proposals of Roman Ingarden

Often in conversation with other persons, especially those we are in a close relationship with, we say things like: "I can see you are bursting with joy", "You look tired", or "What is on your mind?". At other times, our know-

²⁰ See *Ibidem*, p. 77, 78. The author claims that the concept of artefacts did not allow Twardowski to fully overcome psychologism, and that it was not until his lectures on the theory of cognition that an explicit recognition of the independence of epistemology and psychology (the psychology of thought) was expressed.

²¹ K. Twardowski. *Ibidem*, pp. 256–258.

²² K. Twardowski (1910). *O metodzie psychologii...* *Op. cit.*, p. 11.

²³ K. Twardowski. *Psychologia bez przyrządów*. A photocopy from „Wiedza i postęp”, a bi-weekly on science and technology. Administrative address: A. Krzyżanowski's Bookstore. Kraków, pp. 5–7.

ledge that other people are experiencing something is not verbalized, but is a basis for how we act towards them. The similarities and differences we can identify in the way we perceive or otherwise approach a particular situation and the way it is perceived and approached by another person introduce us to new possible ways of experiencing the world. These daily experiences allows us to speculate that we have a certain cognitive ability which allows us to access the mental life of other people.

The knowledge we have about the mental sphere, the types of experiences, states, dispositions, or mental faculties comes to us through our first-person experience. Admittedly, our individual ability to identify particular mental phenomena differs depending on the person – some are very careful about what they feel, others have difficulty with such insight. Whatever the degree to which we have developed this ability, we are certain that this intangible and unlocalized sphere we call mentality exists in us.

What makes us perceive others as mental beings? What are the sources of our knowledge about what other people experience? Are there methods of accessing someone else's mental experiences which provide us with adequate knowledge about them?

The question concerning the possibility, forms and boundaries of our knowledge about the mental states of other persons had been given a number of different answers both in the history of philosophical thought before the scientific contributions of Kazimierz Twardowski and during his times. As proposed by Roman Ingarden, the most broadly disputed of these were the following concepts of knowledge about the mentality of others²⁴:

- other people's mental life is known to us through reasoning *per analogiam*, which in one approach proceeds from the recognition of a correlation between our own mental states and the states of our body (we conclude that a particular state of our body is caused by a particular mental state, which in turn produces another change in the body), through realizing a similarity between our own body and the body of another person, to concluding that if physical changes occur in another person's body which are known to us, that person is experiencing similar internal states. In another approach, such reasoning consists in the awareness of a synchronic occurrence of certain bodily reactions and mental experiences in one's own

²⁴ R. Ingarden (1971). O poznawaniu cudzych stanów psychicznych. In: id. *U podstaw teorii poznania*. Warszawa: PWN, pp. 410–412.

case, and conjecturing that a similar relationship exists in others based on information concerning changes in their bodies. Mental states and processes in such cognitive perspective are thus given to us only indirectly, and the conclusions we make about them result from indirect knowledge, thus giving us only a rough image of another person's mental life, or, in fact, only informing us of its existence;

- in another approach, the so-called associative concept, when perceiving the state of another person's body, we associate it with an image of a similar state of our body, which provokes us to further associate it with the multitude of kinaesthetic impressions and the experiences that usually accompany them. These experiences are felt as though we were dealing with actual perception of another person's states as processes, as we recognize the lack of continuity and the lack of reasons for such experiences in our own mental life. Consequently, the process of association shows us the genesis of another person's experiences, but does not reflect the specific way in which they are currently experienced by ourselves;
- in the so-called imitation theory, when we perceive changes in another person's body, we begin to imitate them, even just in our thoughts, which brings about a certain experience in us. Such experience is associated with the changes occurring in another person's body, however, and consequently treated as manifested in their gestures or facial expressions. Again, we are not accessing the mental states of another person directly. In addition, it is difficult to explain in this approach how what we experience gets interpreted as the experience of another person, and how it is possible to know the experiences of others which are completely new to us;
- in yet another concept, the so-called projection theory, there is a mechanism of projecting certain mental experiences we have created on the basis of the behaviour of another person's body into that body. The advocates of this approach often assume that at the first stage, when projecting a mental state into another person's body, we projected ourselves into it, and only by recognizing differences between these bodies do we experience also the difference in mental identities, which gives us an impression of experiencing another person's state directly.

The problem of whether and how it is possible to know the mental states of others appears in various contexts in Kazimierz Twardowski's writings on

subjects related to psychology. He did not treat the problem itself as separate from other issues in psychology and did not study it as such, but his views in that regard are nevertheless quite explicit.

In one of his first works dealing with psychological issues, “On the Content and Object of Presentations”, analyzing the functions of names as a linguistic expression of presentation, Twardowski says: “[W]hen the speaking person wants to evoke a particular mental content with the names he utters, he also lets on to the listener that he, the speaker, finds that content in himself, and presents to himself what he wants the listener to present to themselves as well”²⁵. The basis of interpersonal communication is the speaker’s belief that the interlocutor has the mental dispositions necessary to perform similar mental phenomena as those occurring in the mind of the person who utters a particular name. Thus, the philosopher concludes that our everyday functioning is accompanied by the understanding that we share mental properties with other people and that it is possible to mutually affect one another’s mental life. In his further works, Twardowski did not develop that thought, however, into a discussion of how a person arrives at such knowledge about the mental faculties of other people.

On the basis of a many assertions Twardowski made, for example: “[E]very individual can only perceive their own spiritual manifestations; everyone knows by experience only the states of their own mind”²⁶, or “It is impossible to perceive other people’s mental states”²⁷ (see also the quotations in paragraphs below), it may be concluded that he makes the following assumptions on the nature of knowing another person’s mental life:

- knowledge of another person’s mentality is not based on the experience or perception of particular units in that mentality;
- the mentality of other beings is not accessible to direct cognition.

²⁵ K. Twardowski (1997). O treści i przedmiocie... *Op. cit.*, p. 72; See id. (1977). *On the Content and Object of Presentations. A Psychological Investigation*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. See also *Ibidem*: „Sounds and other objects whose presentations are used to evoke certain related presentations in another rational being are for them, if not always, then at least usually – a sign... that such presentations occur in the awareness of the one who produces those sounds or other objects.” p. 72.

²⁶ K. Twardowski (1997). Psychologia wobec fizjologii i filozofii. In: T. Rzepa et al. (Eds.), *Psychologia w szkole lwowsko-warszawskiej*. Warszawa: PWN, p. 93.

²⁷ K. Twardowski (1965). O psychologii, jej przedmiocie, zadaniach, metodzie, stosunku do innych nauk i o jej rozwoju. In: id. *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*. Warszawa: PWN, p. 262.

Do these assertions apply to the whole of mental life, that is, to mental activities and their products, to particular links between them, the so-called mental facts, and to the general conditions for the occurrence of such facts, the so-called mental dispositions?

The validity of these assertions may certainly be applied to the sphere of mental facts, as is demonstrated in the following assertions: "A psychologist may not enter another living creature to experience facts from their mental life"²⁸, or „Every mental fact is only available to the awareness of the individual in whom it occurs"²⁹. Such emphasis on mental facts results from the fact that according to Twardowski they represented the basic mental units, being the object of inner experience, or introspection. Other mental units are the result of analysis, abstraction and observation based on memory and reconstruction of mental life on the basis of its various externally, physically expressed forms³⁰. Elsewhere the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School says, however: "A psychologist [...] cannot perceive any, even the smallest portion of the mental life of other beings"³¹, which shows Twardowski refers the question concerning the possibility of knowing a different subjectivity to all manifestations of mental life.

I will thus stress that in Twardowski's opinion, the mental facts of another being are not accessible to knowledge based on any experience of these facts which would capture them in a direct way, thus linking it to the awareness of such experience. Thus, the mental phenomena of other people are not incorporated into the mental life of the observer as source-linked experiences – an actually occurring experience of a different subjectivity. In addition, it results from the above discussion that Twardowski includes all ways in which mentality is manifest in the thesis about the lack of an experiential basis of another person's mental life.

Is the mental life of other beings in fact excluded in Twardowski's views from the objects of psychological studies? Despite the explicitly defined boundaries of knowing other people's mentality, the philosopher believes it is an indispensable element of psychological enquiries, first of all due to the

²⁸ K. Twardowski (1992). O metodzie psychologii. Przyczynek do metodologii porównawczej badań naukowych. In: id. *Wybór pism psychologicznych i pedagogicznych*. Warszawa: WSiP, p. 210.

²⁹ K. Twardowski (1965). O psychologii, jej przedmiocie... *Op. cit.*, p. 258.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 244.

³¹ K. Twardowski (1910). O metodzie psychologii... *Op. cit.*, p. 12.

cognitive limitations of introspection, which allows the psychologist to investigate only a narrow scope of his or her own subjectivity and is additionally burdened with selectiveness and ambiguity resulting from the momentary existence of particular mental facts. The only way to know a different subjectivity is, in Twardowski's opinion, through indirect knowledge based on an analysis of the available external manifestations of another person's mental life: "in order ... to break out of the vicious circle of one's own mental life and comprehend it as a whole, one must reconstruct the mental life of other beings based on its external manifestations and products".³²

Such manifestations include: intentional and unintentional activities and bodily functions occurring together with mental facts (e.g. the pulse, complex bodily reactions, linguistic utterances); the products of individual or collective mental life (e.g. communication and language, customs, traditions, beliefs, social constructs). The understanding of the mentality of another person they make possible consists in reconstruction – "Here, reconstruction directly replaces the perception of mental facts"³³ – similar to that performed by a historian.³⁴ Thus, based on a particular external manifestation an attempt is made at identifying the mental grounds on which that manifestation is founded, just like the analysis of a particular historical situation leads the historian towards its hidden reasons found in another historical situation, or the complex human motives and other factors it reveals. Twardowski points out that the pertinence of the analogy between the research of a historian and that of a psychologist who explores the subjectivity of another person is confirmed by the fact that external manifestations of mental life are often referred to as mental documents, just like in the case of the typical research material studied by a historian.³⁵

The adequacy of the reconstruction of another person's mental life³⁶ and its extensiveness depends on the degree of similarity between that life and the

³² *Ibidem*, p. 14.

³³ K. Twardowski (1965). O psychologii, jej przedmiocie... *Op. cit.*, p. 262.

³⁴ See K. Twardowski (1910). O metodzie psychologii... *Op. cit.*, p. 13.

³⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 13.

³⁶ Even though I find this concept of knowing the mentality of others to be wrong, T. Rzepa points to the significance of these fragments in Twardowski's deliberations, believing them to be the first model of communication typical of psychological study to have been explicitly expressed in Poland. She stresses that the unique nature of Twardowski's proposal is related, first of all, to the assumption that the sender in the communicative process does not have to be physically present, as communication

researcher's own subjectivity available to him or her through introspection; the greater the similarity, the more safely can the psychologist rely on knowledge derived from inner experience, and the less is it necessary for him or her to refer to the reconstructive method³⁷. Thus, the basis of a correct reconstruction of the aspects of the mental life of another subject and interpretation of its products made on its basis is the same method that is employed to the study one's own mental life – introspection and reasoning based on analogy: “For as we try to probe into the mental life of other beings, we observe certain physical phenomena (movements, words, etc.), and considering them to be an expression of certain mental symptoms, we conclude that the person manifesting such physical phenomena also experiences the related mental manifestations. How do we know, however, that physical phenomena are an expression of mental manifestations, that the presence of the former allows us to conjecture about the presence of the latter, which we cannot perceive due to their being the mental manifestations of others? Naturally, we can only know that because when perceiving certain physical symptoms in ourselves, we also introspectively perceive in us certain mental manifestations. We thus conclude by analogy that also in other individuals similar physical phenomena are accompanied by mental manifestations similar to ours. This way, the entire interpretation of signs which can be perceived with our senses towards their mental meaning – which the subjective method ultimately consists in – supposes that introspection must have been at work here”³⁸.

It results that, even though Twardowski emphasized the need to overcome psychological solipsism founded on introspection in order to contribute to our knowledge of human mentality by directing our efforts towards knowing the subjectivity of others, he did not explain how overcoming it would be possible. We do not find any explanation with respect to the other

concerns mainly the psychologist and products of the mental life of the sender. Cf.: T. Rzepa (1993). *Humanistyczne rysy polskiej psychologii międzywojennej*. In: A. Bańska, R. Derbis (Eds.), *Mysł psychologiczna w Polsce odrodzonej. Efektywność działań człowieka*. Poznań–Częstochowa: Gemini, p. 15; see also: T. Rzepa (1992). *Komunikacja w rozumieniu psychologicznym*. In: I. Kurcz, J. Bobryk (Eds.), *Akty semiotyczne, ich wytwory i mechanizmy*. Warszawa: Zakład Semiotyki Logicznej UW.

³⁷ “Indeed, when studying the mental life of other beings based on its external manifestations, we reconstruct their mental life in accordance with the knowledge of our own mental life we have acquired through introspection.” K. Twardowski (1910). *O metodzie psychologii...* *Op. cit.*, p. 17.

³⁸ K. Twardowski (1997). *Psychologia wobec fizjologii...* *Op. cit.*, p. 101.

method of knowing the mental life of others, one which was supposed to remove the hypothetical nature of the reconstructive method – the experimental method which consisted in freely evoking the desired mental facts in another person together with their external manifestations, in order to perform a more precise reconstruction of that person's mental life on such repeated material³⁹.

Twardowski's writings suggest that he took the view existing since the times of John Locke, saying that there are only two forms of cognitive activity – sensory (external experience, external observation) concerning external objects, and reflective (insight, introspection) concerned with the subject's own mental facts⁴⁰. According to the above analysis, the knowledge of different subjectivity does not represent any particular form of observation, such as would in a direct, source-linked and obvious way support our everyday experience which suggests that other people have a mental life, and that their life often goes beyond the forms of experience available to the observer.

In contrast to that approach, I agree with Roman Ingarden who said there are no grounds to assume only two types of experience exist which capture their objects directly⁴¹. Such assertion does not take into account the differences in the possible understanding of directness. Already in the case of the two types considered by Twardowski, certain differences emerge – external observation does not provide us with such certainty about the existence of its object as insight, even though the philosopher believes both have the attribute of directness. Thus, even in the case of knowing the mental states of another person, one may consider the directness of that knowledge. To cite the argumentation proposed by Ingarden, this is demonstrated by the fact that the attention of the knowing subject is not directed at the external manifestation of a mental fact – facial expression, tone of voice, bodily posture, etc., – but at the mental fact itself as a “certain non-sensory phenomenon of something mental”⁴². It is given to us as something that can be observed, and not something that is presented in our imagination or thought, and “externally” rather than through reflection; thus, it does not become part of the experience of the observing subject, but is separate from him.

³⁹ See K. Twardowski (1910). *O metodzie psychologii...* *Op. cit.*, p. 17.

⁴⁰ See also: „[S]piritual phenomena are only accessible to inner experience.” K. Twardowski (1997). *Psychologia wobec fizjologii...* *Op. cit.*, p. 92.

⁴¹ R. Ingarden (1971). *O poznawaniu cudzych...* *Op. cit.*, p. 423.

⁴² *Ibidem*, p. 422.

This becomes even more apparent as we consider the seemingly analogical situation of identifying the hidden reasons for the phenomena we perceive, e.g. when seeing smoke coming out of the chimney we assume there is fire in the fireplace. That fire is not given to us through observation, directly, but is the result of our drawing conclusions. In the case of knowing another person's mental facts, we can see them directly, and often it is not until later that we become aware of their physical manifestation, such as a gesture or a facial expression⁴³.

Ingarden emphasizes the existence of a special type of relationship between mental phenomena and their bodily manifestations: "The close relationship between the two is not equalled by any other types of symptoms"⁴⁴. The bodily symptoms which perform the function of factors expressing that which is mental, while being perceived by the senses, become transparent in a way, as their subject is focused on their expressive function, and thus perceives their expression, the mental phenomenon, first.

The scope of other people's mental phenomena accessible to our perception and the degree to which we can accurately identify them depends, first of all, on the disposition of the knowing subject who, whether consciously or not, may become "insensitive" to the other person's condition or modify its perception e.g. due to his or her own feelings towards that person. Another important factor is the degree of the other person's openness and their willingness and ability to express their inner states. Ingarden thus concludes that "not all conscious experiences are available in their expression to another person's eyewitness perception"⁴⁵.

Such approach, different from that proposed by Twardowski, in which knowledge of the mental facts of other beings is considered a special type of observation, with its specific properties, is also consistent with everyday practice, where in contacts with other living creatures we momentarily obtain knowledge about their various mental states. This makes us, according to Ingarden, "fully convinced that another human being exists as a bodily and spiritual being, and not only as a material object"⁴⁶.

⁴³ *Ibidem*, p. 422 See also: „[T]he sensory perception (e.g. of another person's face) is just the foundation, indispensable, but also insufficient, of perceiving another person's mental state." *Ibidem*, p. 423.

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 422.

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 424–426.

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 420.

The differences in the properties of knowing other people's mental states present in the proposals of R. Ingarden and K. Twardowski have been illustrated in the table below:

The properties of knowing other people's mental states as proposed by Roman Ingarden	The properties of knowing other people's mental states as proposed by Kazimierz Twardowski
<p>direct</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – founded on the experience of another person's mentality with the awareness of that experience 	<p>indirect</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – analysis of the external manifestations of another person's mentality (reconstruction and interpretation using introspection and reasoning by analogy)
<p>eyewitness</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – another subject is physically present in the process of knowing their subjectivity together with the bodily manifestations of that which is mental 	<p>non-eyewitness</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – another subject does not need to be physically present in the process of knowing their mental life
<p>eye-witness</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – the experience of the mentality of another person becomes an element of the current experience of the subject-observer, even though its content represents a separate, external object 	<p>non eye-witness</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – the knowledge of another person's mentality is not accompanied by an actualization of any related special mental experiences; at the most, one's own similar experiences are recalled
<p>high level of certainty concerning the object's existence</p>	<p>low level of certainty concerning the object's existence</p>

The mindreading concept and the mirror mechanism hypothesis as contemporary attempts at describing ways in which one can know the minds of others in the framework of cognitive science.

Contemporary studies on processes responsible for our recognition of other beings as minds, or beings equipped with an inner environment made up of perceptions, desires, convictions, intentions, aspirations, images, etc., are an important current in the enquiries pursued by social neuroscience, a direction of studies which developed within cognitive science in the 1990s. Social neuroscience, just like its mother discipline of cognitive science, is an interdisciplinary research program dominated today by various domains of sciences concerning the brain (e.g. cognitive and behavioural neuroscience, neurobiology, neuropsychology) and traditional disciplines studying the bio-

logical and social conditioning of the functioning of living creatures (e.g. cognitive, social, developmental, evolutionary psychology, psychiatry, anthropology, primatology, evolutionary biology, sociology)⁴⁷. In view of such extensive research sources, solutions proposed by social neuroscience concerning various aspects of social cognition often include a description of the evolutionary roots of a particular disposition, an analysis of similarities and differences in that disposition among various biological species, identification of modifications occurring during human ontogenesis, and neuro-anatomical areas involved in its performance.

Among the cognitivist proposals concerning the capacity for identification of other people's inner states, the two I have chosen for the purposes of this article – Simon Baron-Cohen's mindreading concept⁴⁸, and Giacomo Rizzolatti's and Corrado Sinigaglia's hypothesis of mirror mechanism⁴⁹ – are of particular interest as they confirm the intuitions related to the properties of that capacity presented by Ingarden. The novelty of their contribution consists in pointing out that our capacity for attributing mental states to other beings, e.g. perception, convictions, intentions, or presentations, is founded on unconscious, automatic brain processes which enable us to integrate information about another individual obtained through perception with the knowledge encoded in the cognitive system, concerning the relationships between the image of another person we observe (their facial expressions, gestures, simple movements, social or linguistic behaviour) and the non-observable mental reasons behind it. In result of that integration, the brain creates representations of another individual as a being who has particular inner experiences – as I will show further on, for both of these concepts this is a repertoire of

⁴⁷ A detailed discussion of both the historical background of that specialization within cognitive science, and of the ways it is construed by its representatives, together with an analysis of meta-theoretical assumptions made in that sub-discipline of cognitive science can be found in: P. Przybysz (2014). *O poznawaniu innych umysłów. Wokół kognitywistycznych badań nad poznaniem społecznym*. Poznań: Bogucki Wydawnictwo Naukowe, pp. 26–42.

⁴⁸ S. Baron-Cohen (1995). *Mindblindness. An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind*. Cambridge: MIT Press; See also S. Baron-Cohen, H. Ring (1994). A Model of the Mindreading System: Neuropsychological and Neurobiological Perspectives. In: Ch. Lewis, S. Mitchell (Eds.), *Children's Early Understanding of Mind*. Hove: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, pp. 183–207.

⁴⁹ G. Rizzolatti, C. Sinigaglia (2008). *Mirrors In the Brain. How Our Minds Share Actions and Emotions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

representations with different degrees of complexity – that is, a being who performs a movement towards a specific goal, sees a particular object, hears certain sounds, follows his or her desire to achieve a goal or obtain something they believe to be important, believes that a certain state of affairs has occurred, makes assertions about common experiences, etc.

Thus, both concepts share the assumption that the processes which underlie our knowledge about the internal environment of another individual represent a highly-specialized part of the cognitive system, dedicated to special tasks resulting from the existence of a living creature in a social environment. Baron-Cohen says that this supports “such important things as social understanding, predicting behaviours, social interactions and communication”⁵⁰. This is similar to Ingarden’s suggestion that the capacity for knowing other people’s mental experiences should be perceived as separate and independent from the two traditionally identified in the history of philosophy: inner knowledge – of one’s own mental states, and external knowledge – concerned with objects of the external world known through the senses. In addition, in the cognitivist approach the reason for that specialization is explained with the need to quickly and accurately identify the intentions and goals of one’s partners in social relationships. In the case of Baron-Cohen’s proposal concerning the so-called mindreading system, that specialization is performed at the level of neurocognitive mechanisms; in the case of the mirror mechanism presented by Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, we are dealing with specialization at the level of cells.

In Simon Baron-Cohen’s approach, the ability to know other people’s mental states, which he refers to as the mindreading system, has been developed through natural selection and is therefore a certain set of interrelated mechanisms common to all people, inherited from our evolutionary ancestors⁵¹. The tasks of these mechanisms are as follows:

1. to interpret information about other individuals and their behaviour as being the result of certain mental states they experience;
2. to create representations of other people’s experiential perspective;
3. to create a theory of the mind as a being that is both supra-individual and different in terms of perspective from the world of physical objects.

⁵⁰ See S. Baron-Cohen (1995). *Mindblindness. An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind*. *Op. cit.*, p. 30.

⁵¹ See *ibidem*, Chapter 2.

The mindreading system consists of four components: the intentionality detector, the eye-direction detector, the shared-attention mechanism and the mind theory mechanism⁵². These mechanisms appear at various stages of individual development, are located in different parts of the brain and rely on a different organizational structure of information concerning other people's behaviour and its relationship with mental determinants. The intentionality detector, operating on the basis of perception data coming from various sensory channels, is responsible for the interpretation of the movement of living creatures registered e.g. when it deals with self-propelled motion in the basic categories of the volitional states of goals and desires. The eye-direction detector uses visual data to attribute to other beings the perceptive state of seeing particular objects in the vicinity on the basis of eye or eye-like stimuli and their direction. The shared-attention mechanism uses mainly visual information in order to establish the compliance of the perceptive states of the observer and the observed, and to interpret eye direction in the category of volitional states. The mind theory mechanism performs its complex cognitive operations related to the identification of epistemic states in other people, such as thoughts, convictions or judgments, by analyzing their behaviour and its context, and integrating that knowledge with data from the other modules.

All of these operations are performed automatically without the participation of conscious processes, but their result is the ability to distinguish the world of facts and the world of their subjective perception, the external world and the inner world of the mind. He believes the first manifestations of this dichotomous ontology can be observed in "pretend scenarios" children produce while playing, in sensitivity to deception, or the understanding that other people may hold different views on the same subject⁵³.

Together with the external expressions of the ability to know the mental experiences of others, the inner environment of a participant in social situations is equipped with a repertoire of relationships linking the behaviour of other individuals to that of his or her own and to their mental determinants which create a certain theory of the mind. Neurocognitive mechanisms which appear at the earliest stages in human development (0–9 months) – the inten-

⁵² See *ibidem*, pp. 31–58.

⁵³ S. Baron-Cohen (2000). Theory of Mind and Autism. A Fifteen Year Review. In: S. Baron-Cohen, H. Tager-Flusberg, D.J. Cohen (Eds.), *Understanding Other Minds. Perspectives From Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 5.

tionality detector and the eye-direction detector equip the child's mind with dyadic representations, such as [Agent – wants/has goal – the food] or [Agent – is looking at – the clock]; the shared-attention mechanism (9–18 months) creates representations of triadic relationships which take into account the experiential perspectives of both subjects concerned with the same object, which can be symbolically expressed as [Agent/I – wants/has goal/sees – (Agent/I – wants/has goal/sees)]. The theory of mind mechanism (at about 48 months, and developing throughout the entire life) is related to the representation of epistemic states and consists in building second degree representations (meta-representations) which identify the state of the knowledge of the observed subject concerning a particular situation and that subject's attitude to it, with simultaneous activation of first degree representations containing the observer's state of knowledge: [Agent – Attitude – "Proposition"]. In result, the subject is able to recognize the occurrence of inner experiences, such as images, convictions or judgments, even if they do not correspond to the real form of events and the subject's own judgment.

The hypothesis of mirror mechanism as the basis for our attitude to other people's inner states is related to discoveries concerning the properties of a certain group of neurons, the so-called mirror neurons⁵⁴. It appears that this group of cells is activated in the brains of studied individuals during the performance of a certain action, but also when such action is performed by another individual, and the studied individual is only watching the other perform it. Based on the behavioural symptoms of certain mental states – e.g. a particular bodily movement, facial expression, tone of voice, or a sound, this mechanism triggers experiences in the observer's mind which are analogous to those which underlie the activities of the individual being observed. It can be assumed that the system of mirror neurons performs three tasks:

1. creates the initial conditions for the performance of one's own activities;
2. creates representations of these activities;
3. uses such representations to simulate what occurs in the minds of other individuals during the performance of similar tasks.

Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia believe that the functions of mirror neurons are related to the immediate understanding of actions being observed, in

⁵⁴ See G. Rizzolatti, C. Sinigaglia (2008). The Functional Role of the Parieto-Frontal Mirror Circuit: Interpretations and Misunderstanding. *Nature Reviews Neuroscience*, 11, pp. 264–274.

particular to determination of intentions behind actions involving movement⁵⁵. In the repertoire of such actions in the context of studies into the human mirror system, three types are identified whose observation activates mirror cells. These are: the so-called transitive actions, i.e. movements related to manipulation of objects, e.g. catching, grabbing or turning; non-transitive actions, e.g. movements involved in communication, such as waving one's hand, or pointing movements – stretching out the hand; and mimed motor activities. Observation of all of these types of behaviour activates mirror cells⁵⁶. It has also been determined that their activity occurs only and exclusively – as far as the mirror neurons are concerned – if an intentional action is registered; the cells remain “insensitive” if the individual only perceives an object. This confirms the assumption made in this paragraph that such cognitivist model of knowing the minds of others supports Ingarden's description of that ability as being independent from the traditionally recognized cognitive skills – introspection and sensory perception, from which it differs by the type of directness.

In result of the activation of mirror circuits, the general patterns and schemes of motor behaviours, encoded in the mind and usually activated when intended actions are being performed, are activated with respect to actions observed in others⁵⁷. These activated patterns of movement may be conceived as a type of embodied representations of another person's states identified by the researchers. Knowledge contained in that representation goes beyond information perceived about another individual. During its acquisition, as one's own actions were being performed, the type of movement modality, the time and pace of action was recorded. In addition, thanks to control processes checking compliance with the intended result, that action became correlated with a specific goal. As we observe other people's actions, they appear to us already inherently directed at that result. Such mechanism involves certain limitations, however, as far as the possibility to represent other people's states is concerned, as it is only limited to those which fit the repertoire of movement behaviours displayed by the observing individual.

⁵⁵ See *ibidem*, p. 97.

⁵⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 81.

⁵⁷ See G. Rizzolatti, L. Fogassi, V. Gallese (2006). Zwierciadła umysłu. *Świat Nauki*, 12, 38–45.

The degree to which the mirror mechanism provides grounds for the evocation of mental experiences in one's own mind which are analogous to those experienced in the mind of the individual being observed is yet to be determined. As mentioned above, Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia assert that when movements are being observed, we are dealing with activation of an internal motor representation which takes into account the links within a complex sequence of movements with the goal of that behaviour as a whole⁵⁸. The case is similar when we observe in another person basic impressions and emotions to which our system of mirror neurons reacts as well⁵⁹. Such representations appear instantly and are triggered automatically in response to movement, sensory or emotional stimuli, and it is assumed that they participate in the creation of cognitive representations of other people's mental experiences⁶⁰. A clearly original outcome in the case of the mirror mechanism, which allows us to understand the nature of our knowledge about the mental states of other people in a more precise way, is that it equips our representations of other people's minds with experiential, subjectively experienced aspects, which helps us internalize and introduces us to other people's states to a greater degree.

Knowing the unobservable – the way of reasoning and interpretation, or unconscious inferences and simulations?

In the perspective of Twardowski's views presented in this article, the only way to know another mentality is through a careful, reasonable analysis of its external expressions, the so-called indirect method based on one's own introspective experience. Such analysis only provides us with an approximate picture of what is or was happening in another person's mind. The founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School himself recognized the limitations of that method, resulting from the impossibility of eliminating knowledge about mental experiences and relationships between them we acquire by

⁵⁸ See G. Rizzolatti, C. Sinigaglia (2008). *The Functional Role... Op. cit.*, p. 97.

⁵⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 173–193.

⁶⁰ I have written about selected cognitivist approaches to knowledge about other people's minds, including the mindreading concept and the mirror mechanism, in: Wioletta Dziarnowska (2012). *Sposoby poznawania innych umysłów*. In: M. Miłkowski, R. Poczobut (Eds.), *Przewodnik po filozofii umysłu*. Kraków: Wydawnictwo WAM, pp. 495–533.

self-observation from our understanding of other people's minds. As Ingarden pointed out, the immediate direction of our mind in the situation of recognizing the mental states of other individuals applies not to external expressions but to inner, unobservable mental experiences. He asserts that such disposition may not be conceived as a combination of external and inner knowledge, additionally supported by conscious, reasonable analyses, contrary to what Twardowski believed. Especially that the practice of everyday interpersonal relationships shows that such type of cognition comes to us without effort and with considerable accuracy.

The concept of Baron-Cohen describes certain basic cognitive skills necessary to understand the way in which we conclude that others experience particular mental states. Combining both the evolutionary and the developmental perspective, it helps explain the innate type of cognition universal to the human species and its ontogenetic variability related to the individual store of social experiences which make up the theory of mind mechanism. Rizzolatti's and Sinigaglia's mirror system also points to certain rudimentary capacities for knowing other people's minds, based on instant transformation of observed information about the state of another individual into an inner representation – a simulation of what it is like to perform a certain movement, sense something, or experience an emotion. As can be seen in the views of the representatives of cognitivism I have presented here, the understanding of another individual through a representation of his or her unobservable internal states is a natural (based on neuronal mechanisms), universal to human beings (as our evolutionary heritage), and unconscious (involving operations performed by the brain automatically) cognitive ability. Even though the nature of that “understanding” is not entirely clear at this stage of research, and the proposed theoretical solutions have yet to be consolidated, it is beyond doubt that with this special function such phenomena as facial expression, gestures, changes in bodily posture, etc. in other people are coded by the cognitive system not in categories related to the physical aspects of these “images” of another individual, e.g. as an arrangement of colour spots or contours, but as specific intentions to act, particular perceptive or emotional experiences, or as propositional states and other experiences traditionally associated with mentality. This is in line with the concept of knowing other people's subjectivity proposed by Ingarden, who described it as a kind of direct and immediate perception. While Ingarden did not present any mechanism enabling such perception, the cognitivist concepts discussed above help us towards an un-

derstanding of how such perception is realized, and how, despite our inability to capture it with our senses, we can still have an approximate inner presentation of another person's mentality.

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The category of person. The dispute over the moral norm between the Lvov-Warsaw school and the catholic school of Lublin

Wiktor Wolman

At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, a multilayered and multidimensional scientific revolution took place. In many sciences and disciplines of science, intensive development occurred around the central theme of man. Both empirical sciences, social sciences and humanities attempted to demonstrate man's uniqueness. In philosophical sciences as well, the category of man-person became a very important theme.

An original view of man and the anthropological theory can be reconstructed today based on the views of philosophers from the Lvov-Warsaw School. Before the fundamental understanding of the category of person in that School is presented, it is first necessary to discuss the main meta-philosophical and meta-ethical assumptions of its founder and his most outstanding disciples. It will also be important to outline the general ethical theory of the School's founder, Kazimierz Twardowski, and two of his disciples who studied social and moral issues – Tadeusz Czeżowski and Tadeusz Kotarbiński.

The Lvov-Warsaw School was a very diverse and multifaceted philosophical formation. It had its extremely analytical pole, represented, among others, by Jan Łukasiewicz and Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, and its empirical and social pole, represented for example by Tadeusz Kotarbiński and Maria Ossowska. Such great diversity of views and themes makes it very difficult to present a synthesis and describe views held by the School as a whole. It is much easier to discuss the views of its individual representatives, as the initial period, particularly the views of the School's founder and his first disciples, can be interpreted quite faithfully.

According to Jacek Jadacki, the programme of the Lvov-Warsaw School was initially founded on the two philosophical traditions which coexisted in Poland at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries¹. The first of these, referred to as the Vilnius-Lvov tradition, was represented by Anioł Dowgrid. He was a professor at Vilnius University, whose philosophical thought was based on British empiricism, mainly Thomas Reid. The other was the Krakow-Warsaw tradition represented by Feliks Jaroński, a professor at Krakow University. Its orientation was prevalently on German philosophy, particularly that based on Immanuel Kant's system, with a clear logical and methodological inclination in the study of philosophical problems.

According to Jadacki, Twardowski was the right person at the right time and the right place, and that allowed him to develop his philosophical views. When he came back from his scholarship to Poland, he encountered a very strong neo-scholastic movement, represented by Marian Morawski, a disciple of F. Jaroński, on the one hand, and neo-positivism represented by Aleksander Raciborski, a disciple of Dowgrid, growing in strength on the other. That situation offered him an opportunity to introduce his methodological and philosophical concepts, which combined elements of both of these philosophical orientations. One should also bear in mind that Twardowski himself had been significantly influenced by his teacher, Franz Brentano, who was convinced the fundamental assumptions of both of these philosophical currents could be reconciled.

The authors of a monograph on Polish philosophy in the interwar period, Krzysztof Bochenek, Leszek Gawor, Anna Jedynak and Jerzy Kojkoł, postulate that the philosophy of the Lvov-Warsaw School should be interpreted in two directions². The School was interested in philosophical and axiological problems on the one hand, and in logical and methodological issues on the other. The genesis of Twardowski's School has been accurately captured by Ryszard Jadczyk who says that difficulties in the interpretation of views held by the Lvov-Warsaw School result from the very project its founder intended to implement³. On the one hand, Twardowski's critical

¹ Cf. J. Jadacki (1998). *Orientacje i doktryny filozoficzne. Z dziejów myśli polskiej*. Warszawa: Wydział Filozofii i Socjologii UW, p. 73.

² Cf. K. Bochenek, L. Gawor, A. Jedynak, J. Kojkoł (2013). *Filozofia polska okresu międzywojennego. Zarys problematyki*. Gdynia: Wydawnictwo Akademickie AMW, p. 15.

³ Cf. R. Jadczyk (1995). *Powstanie filozofii analitycznej w Polsce*. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, pp. 16–29.

philosophy was to be maximalist and rely on certain classical philosophical concepts, while on the other he wanted it to be minimalist in terms of the scientific, analytical character of its enquiries and analyses.

Jadacki asserts that in order for a group of philosophers/scholars to be called a “school”, a number of conditions need to be satisfied⁴. He lists self-identification, location, genealogy and ideology. Generally speaking, self-identification consisted in open and public identification with a particular formation. Location referred not only to spatial, but also temporal presence. Temporal location meant the ability to identify shared views and assumptions not only of the direct disciples of Twardowski, but of the following generations as well. It differs from genealogy in that the latter consists in the possibility of finding different theories and views, often the result of polemics, among subsequent generations of students. The most important and the most interesting condition is the fourth one.

Shared ideology may be presented on two planes⁵. The first plane consisted in ideals and attitudes K. Twardowski wanted to develop and pass on to his disciples. One of them was the ideal of a scientist, with three postulates: clarity and precision of assertions; attention to the formal and material value of argumentation; and elimination of pseudo-problems from the discourse. The ideal of a teacher was limited to erudition and fellowship. The requirement of erudition was intended to prevent his disciples from becoming isolated only in their disciplines, and required that they were familiar with problems studied by philosophy at large as well as all the related issues and enquiries. And the requirement of fellowship consisted in activating everyone and in the ban on rejecting offers of cooperation from anyone who was interested in a particular problem. The third, social ideal, was based on belief in the socially relevant intellectual and moral mission of philosophy.

⁴ Cf. J. Jadacki (1998). *Orientacje i doktryny filozoficzne... Op. cit.*, p. 75.

⁵ I cannot fully agree with J. Jadacki. For him, self-identification is related to a sense of belonging to the Lvov-Warsaw School. Location is both temporal (November 15, 1895, the day Twardowski arrived in Lvov, is believed to mark the School's beginning) and territorial (encompassing the entire territory of Poland). The genealogical dimension is identified by Jadacki with the influence of Twardowski on his disciples through his propagation of the scientific, educational and pro-social attitude. I believe in these three cases we should talk more of a shared ideology than a genealogical relationship. Genealogy, in turn, should be seen in a broader context, as a combination of shared ideology, self-identification with the main postulates put forward by the School, and the temporal and spatial location with Twardowski's disciples.

The other ideological plane consisted in the views shared by philosophers gathered around Twardowski. The most important of their beliefs include: minimalism, constructivism, methodological intuitionism, psychological intentionalism, rationalism, epistemological realism, and ethical intellectualism.

All of the elements mentioned above can be found in the views and works of Twardowski and his disciples, it is therefore reasonable that the term "Lvov-Warsaw School" should be used in this context. What, however, were the main ideas embraced by Twardowski's followers? A general outline will provide an introduction to the main anthropological assumptions made by the School. Their views will be presented in three main areas: logic and methodology, ontology and epistemology, and morality and ethics.

In the case of logical and methodological issues, most of Twardowski's followers agreed on four principles: autonomy of logics, mathematisation, semantisation, and extensionalisation⁶. It can generally be said that logics in Twardowski's School was treated autonomously in that its followers wanted to identify and remove any metaphysical assumptions from it. Mathematisation, semantisation and extensionalisation were all included in the general assumption about the analyticality of science. Analyticality – according to Jadacki – had relativist features, as they believed that analyticality could be defined. The greatest difficulty was not to identify and define it, but to show and substantiate its criterion. For the Lvov-Warsaw School, the relativism of analyticality boiled down to language or experience. It should be stressed that this did not stand in opposition to the most important methodological assumption about the rationalist character of knowledge.

According to J. Jadacki, the claim about the rationalist status of knowledge was not founded on belief in any inherent, dogmatic or axiomatic rationalism of knowledge as knowledge, but the belief that knowledge and that which is scientific could be verified⁷. Thus, scientific knowledge should be interpersonally verifiable, realistic, holistic and hypothetical. The difficulty in such understanding of knowledge and science focused mainly on determining what was rational and identifying the criterion of rationality.

A great majority of Twardowski's disciples agreed that it was necessary to verify knowledge, and to ensure that conclusions are holistic and hypo-

⁶ Cf. J. Jadacki (1998). *Orientacje i doktryny filozoficzne...* *Op. cit.*, p. 76.

⁷ Cf. *Ibidem*, p. 79.

thetical. They differed, however, in their interpretation of the object of science itself and the conditions and criteria for conclusions to be deemed verifiable. For example, Alfred Tarski asserted that scientific knowledge referred to real models, while Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz believed it was only concerned with phenomenal beings.

Generally, philosophy, or indeed meta-philosophy, in the Lvov-Warsaw School was characterized by scientism, anti-irrationalism, anti-maximalism, constructivism and linguisticism⁸. Scientism was the belief that philosophy was a science, and not a set of beliefs or worldviews. Neither was it a view established based on culture and tradition providing answers to eschatological and existential questions. Anti-irrationalism referred to the conviction that any assertion made in philosophy may be questioned and analyzed. Anti-maximalism was simply a postulate of maximum caution in investigations. Constructivism and linguisticism were a general conviction about the need to apply analytical and linguistic methods in studying reality and man.

They also held similar views on ontological and epistemological questions. Philosophers from the Lvov-Warsaw School were generally inclined towards realism and moderate determinism⁹. With regard to epistemology, the School followed a mild form of conventionalism which stood for independence of objects from cognitive acts, and acceptance of the classic definition of truth¹⁰.

The main ideas of the Lvov-Warsaw School outlined above should help us understand the principal ethical and anthropological views of its most outstanding representatives. This will allow us to identify the main planes of controversies and polemics with other philosophers and other Schools. I will first present the views of Twardowski, as being the founder and mentor of the School, he exerted the greatest influence on his disciples.

The most significant obstacle Twardowski encountered when constructing his ethical theory was the category of truth¹¹. In most papers and interpretations he points out that his basic dilemma was to substantiate the ethical criterion. And yet, as Ryszard Wiśniewski has been right to point out, the difficulty Twardowski strove to overcome was greater than just substan-

⁸ Cf. *Ibidem*, p. 82.

⁹ Cf. *Ibidem*, p. 84.

¹⁰ Cf. *Ibidem*, p. 85.

¹¹ R. Wiśniewski (1999). *Dyskusje metaetyczne w kręgu i wokół Szkoły Lwowsko-Warszawskiej*. Toruń: Wydawnictwo UMK, p. 109.

tiation of the ethical criterion itself. “Looking at it from a distance, and in light of knowledge about the meta-ethics of Twardowski’s successors, we may conclude that the empirical domain of aspirations (the world of valuating experience) creates, in light of his views, the material field of ethics (the axiological theory) which is subjected to normative formation and ordering (the deontological theory). The ethical criterion is thus supplied by the principal norms. The problem, however, is how to discover and substantiate them – which was the recurring dilemma in Twardowski’s lectures”¹². It may thus be assumed that for Twardowski, the existence of objective truths was beyond dispute. The problem for him was their substantiation. As an epistemologist, he was an objectivist and an absolutist, and he explained the lack of a sufficient criterion for considering a truth to be certain with the lack of sufficient reasons to accept it.

Consequently, Wiśniewski was right to point out the epistemological problem in the project of building a scientific ethics. He asks: “Is the ethical criterion the same as the criterion of ethical truth?”¹³. Anna Drabarek lists several main ethical issues investigated by Twardowski¹⁴.

The first one is the scope of ethics, that is, its division into individual and social ethics. Twardowski referred to the former as egoistic, and to the latter as altruistic. The second issue was the source of morality, which may be external, or authoritative, and internal, or autonomous. Twardowski believed in autonomous ethics, claiming that only such ethics could be the basis of scientific ethics. The third issue was the ethical foundation, consisting in the motives and reasons behind ethical actions. The fourth was the ethical criterion, which Twardowski understood as “the criterion which should tell us what action is good and what is action is wrong, and thus, how we should act”¹⁵.

Jadczak lists seven conditions which an ethical criterion must satisfy to be considered scientific¹⁶. Firstly, it must be a general proposition; secondly, it must be presentable as a norm; thirdly, it must be applicable to all men; fourthly, it should explain different ethical views and norms; fifthly, it must

¹² *Ibidem*, pp. 109–110.

¹³ *Ibidem*, p. 111.

¹⁴ Cf. A. Drabarek (2003). Problem etyki naukowej w poglądach filozofów ze szkoły lwowsko-warszawskiej, in: *Kultura i edukacja*, No. 3–4, pp. 8–12.

¹⁵ K. Twardowski (1994). *Etyka*. Warszawa, p. 50.

¹⁶ Cf. R. Jadczak (1993). *Człowiek szukający etyki. Filozofia moralna Kazimierza Twardowskiego*. Toruń: Wydawnictwo UMK, p. 65.

explain the evolution of ethical notions; sixthly, it must account for joint actions and ethical decisions of people with differing worldviews and philosophical beliefs; and seventhly, it must be autonomous, that is, substantiated based on its own contents and not on human or divine will.

It may appear that Twardowski did not finish his concept of scientific ethics. It should be said, however, that his attempts were very significant and contributed to the search for independent ethics. For example, Karol Wojtyła, Tadeusz Styczeń or Tadeusz Ślipko emphasized the contribution and influence of Twardowski's thought on 20th century Polish philosophy on numerous occasions. Nevertheless each of them, as well as Twardowski's disciples, for instance Czeżowski and Kotarbiński, either opposed or confirmed some of his views and intuitions.

Two other ethics from the Lvov-Warsaw School were developed much more fully. The empirical ethics of Czeżowski and the independent ethics of Kotarbiński played a much greater role in shaping moral philosophy in Poland in the 20th century. One should bear in mind that equally important, aside to polemics with other schools of philosophy, were meta-ethical disputes within the Lvov-Warsaw School itself. Particularly the polemics among Czeżowski, Ossowska, Kotarbiński and contemporary interpreters presenting a new version of the views of Twardowski's followers.

In his deliberations on ethics, Czeżowski begins with division into empirical and axiomatic sciences¹⁷. According to Wiśniewski, this view can be traced back to Czeżowski's teacher, Twardowski, who distinguished between ethics built "upwards" and ethics built "downwards". Czeżowski extended these concepts to science in general, and divided sciences into axiomatic and empirical ones. Axiomatic sciences, those built "downwards", contained formal and deontic theories; those built "upwards" were hypothetical and deductive, and may be referred to as inductive sciences. Czeżowski transferred this general view also onto his deliberations on ethics¹⁸.

We may thus talk of empirical and inductive ethics in Czeżowski's concepts, pointing to supreme values and ethical principles, and of axiomatic and deductive ethics which need confirmation in practice. The question is,

¹⁷ Cf. R. Wiśniewski (1989). *Doświadczenia aksjologiczne a teorie etyczne w koncepcji Tadeusza Czeżowskiego*. Lublin, pp. 261–264.

¹⁸ Cf. R. Wiśniewski (1999). *Dyskusje metaetyczne w kręgu i wokół Szkoły Lwowsko-Warszawskiej*. *Op. cit.*, p. 114–115.

however, as Maria Ossowska pointed out, how and why it is legitimate to include non-empirical values in empirical experience¹⁹. Czeżowski does that because he believes man relies on three types of self-evidence in cognition²⁰. Sensory self-evidence, though being subjective and limited in time and space, supplies truths about the reality that surrounds us. There is also introspective self-evidence, in which man experiences himself and which can be captured through reflection and intuition in a self-evident way. And finally, apodictic (analytical) self-evidence does not refer to reality directly, but is at work as we interpret theories and laws in empirical sciences. Consequently, Czeżowski believed, the object of scientific knowledge consists in external observations, inner experiences or notions developed on its basis and applied in a scientific description of reality.

In his reply to Ossowska's criticism, Czeżowski introduces the category of "axiological empiricism" as the basis for axiological and moral experience²¹. Axiological empiricism is not a new mode of cognitive knowledge, or a new cognitive skill, but perception of another side of reality. He also believes that axiological sciences investigating this type of empiricism, as well as the axiological experience itself, have a structure analogous to that of empirical sciences in that they generally rely on observation, description and explanation.

It appears, however, that the relationship between axiological and empirical experience is deeper in Czeżowski than a simple analogy. Wiśniewski points to a number of fundamental points of convergence between these experiences²². Firstly, beliefs and judgments, just like facts and observations, require a cognitive motivation on the part of the subject. Wiśniewski was right to disregard spontaneous sensations in his reflection on this problem, as Czeżowski did not consider them particularly important in the process of generating scientific knowledge. Thus, scientific cognitive efforts are directed and planned, and consequently motivated. Secondly, it is necessary that attention is focused on the studied object. Both in empirical and axiological studies, a certain degree of concentration is required. Wiśniewski also points out that every judgment, just like every empirical description, is individual

¹⁹ Cf. M. Ossowska (1966). *Podstawy nauki o moralności*. Warszawa: PWN, pp. 122–125.

²⁰ Cf. R. Wiśniewski (1989). *Doświadczenia aksjologiczne a teorie etyczne w koncepcji Tadeusza Czeżowskiego*. *Op. cit.*, p. 263.

²¹ Cf. *Ibidem*, pp. 264–265.

²² Cf. *Ibidem*, pp. 269–276.

at the initial stage, as it is concerned with individual facts. Another common element is the experience of value. Adam Jonkisz explains it as the perception by the experiencing subject that a particular object is valuable²³. This occurs when the subject takes into account in his cognitive efforts and judgment that a parameter or property of an object is not emotionally indifferent to him or her. This may evoke admiration, delight, or aversion.

Monika Torczyńska has made an apt comment on the subject of values in Czeżowski which emphasizes the very significant role of evaluation in axiological experience. Torczyńska believes that value in his system is not a property, but an intellectually and empirically verified evaluation of the fact an object has a certain property²⁴. Consequently, properties attributed to an object, if they evoke an axiological experience and recur in a sufficient number of cases, should be called the value criterion.

The fifth point common to the axiological and empirical experience alike identified by Wiśniewski in Czeżowski's thought is non-reducibility of evaluation to description. A description can be retrieved and verified, but an evaluation can never be modified, and it is always anchored in the temporal and spatial past of experience. Evaluation may only be recalled, while description can be modified. Which brings us to the sixth point, i.e. the falsity or truth of evaluation. Like an empirical fact which can be described in terms of its features or properties, axiological evaluation may be analyzed in terms of its structure, using the evaluation criteria mentioned by Torczyńska.

This, of course, is only a general outline of Czeżowski's theory of empirical ethics. It does, however, include those of the most essential elements of his theory which have been most frequently criticized by other philosophers. Not only by other philosophical schools, but also by other members of the Lvov-Warsaw School. Ossowska, for example, who has already been mentioned here, accuses Czeżowski of not having made a sufficiently reliable distinction between axiological judgments ('good is...') from empirical judgments ('hard is...')²⁵. She believes the mistake consists in failure to take into account the different nature of stimuli in both experiences. In empirical

²³ Cf. A. Jonkisz (2007). *Pojęcie wartości w koncepcji metaetycznej Tadeusza Czeżowskiego. Studia z filozofii polskiej, Vol. 2*, pp. 28–36.

²⁴ Cf. M. Torczyńska (2013). *Wartość, dobro, szczęście, w koncepcji Tadeusza Czeżowskiego. Konteksty współczesne. Kultura i wartości, No. 4*, p. 96.

²⁵ Cf. R. Wiśniewski (1989). *Doświadczenia aksjologiczne a teorie etyczne w koncepcji Tadeusza Czeżowskiego. Op. cit.*, p. 274.

knowledge, they are permanent, reproducible, objective and intersubjective; in axiological knowledge, they are individual, subjective and non-reproducible. It is worth noting that Czeżowski tried to address Ossowska's criticism, saying that she confused the basic types of propositions and judgments. According to him, judgments concerning evaluation are diametrically different from assertions concerning a state of affairs. The former ones are modal propositions and as such may be one of the foundations of science.

Another criticism of Czeżowski's views has been proposed by Jonkisz²⁶. He believes that the reason of incoherence in Czeżowski's views is the imprecise definition of the notion of value. He mentions at least three ways in which values may be referred to. The first is in propositions in which good is attributed to individual actions; the second is in judgments about a certain type of action (e.g. lying is wrong); and the third is in judging value on the basis of a particular state of affairs or facts. It seems fair to emphasize that T. Czeżowski did not finish constructing his ethical theory, and the terms he used are but analyses of the same problem seen from different perspectives.

Now that an outline of empirical ethics and polemics within the Lvov-Warsaw School itself has been presented, we may now discuss the polemics between that and the Lublin School. Wiśniewski has rightly pointed out that the views held by Czeżowski were challenged first of all by Karol Wojtyła²⁷. This resulted from his conviction that ethical issues were not sufficiently systemized, and his attempts at their scientification. In order to understand the criticism proposed by Wojtyła and other Thomists gathered around him, it will be useful first to outline the core of his ethics.

Jan Galarowicz says that the point of departure in Wojtyła's deliberations on the nature of man is anthropological, ethical and existential²⁸. He also points out to a very significant fact which seems marginalized in the interpretation of his ethical views.

In his opinion, Wojtyła's anthropology has two sources – a historical and social one, and a psychological and personal one²⁹. The latter resulted

²⁶ Cf. A. Jonkisz (2007). *Pojęcie wartości w koncepcji metaetycznej Tadeusza Czeżowskiego*. *Op. cit.*, p. 28.

²⁷ Cf. R. Wiśniewski (1999). *Dyskusje metaetyczne w kręgu i wokół Szkoły Lwowsko-Warszawskiej*. *Op. cit.*, pp. 126–127.

²⁸ Cf. J. Galarowicz (2000). *Człowiek jest osobą*. Kęty: Antyk, pp. 13–33.

²⁹ Many researchers seem to have failed to take into account the biography, particularly the early years of K. Wojtyła, and its influence on the views of John Paul II.

mostly from the experiences of young Wojtyła and his sense of man's loneliness in the world.

Moreover, one must not disregard the huge influence of the mysticism of St. John of the Cross on his views, as it appears to have provided the existential foundations for the anthropology of John Paul II. And the key term he took from the mysticism of St. John of the Cross is the notion of experience and intimacy.

According to Inga Mizdrak, the mystical experience in the interpretation of Wojtyła is a real experience in which man feels a "psychological and emotional nakedness"³⁰. Rocco Buttiglione says, on the other hand, that mystical experience in Wojtyła is a certain "self-transcendence", reaching beyond one's cognitive, intellectual and emotional faculties³¹. Wojtyła himself understood „self-transcendence” as follows: „It is most clearly manifest (the experience of God-Person) in a mystical experience, where the faculties of the human soul are silenced, as though suspended, and supernatural life continues in its proper acts of knowing and loving. [...] For it is easy to recognize that it follows as though a different course, that it is resolved in a different form than in the acts of natural knowledge and pursuit”³².

Karol Wojtyła distinguishes two types of experience³³. The first one is the external experience, which is sensory and objectifying. Wojtyła says that it is a natural, biological experience which is inherently related to empirical sciences. The other type of experience is internal. According to Jan Galarowicz, it has three different dimensions³⁴. The first one is the psychological dimension of human existence. The second is the religious and mystical dimension, concerned with the desire to know and be intimate with the abso-

Both his personal traumas, including the death of his parents, the interwar period and the Second World War with all its tragedy, affected the way he viewed the world. I agree with the thesis put forward by Jan Galarowicz who says that the circumstances of Karol Wojtyła's life shaped his existential views.

³⁰ Cf. I. Mizdrak (2014). *Ku wolności i samospełnieniu. Zarys antropologii filozoficznej Karola Wojtyły*. Kraków: Uniwersytet Papieski, pp. 48–50.

³¹ Cf. R. Buttiglione (2010). *Mysł Karola Wojtyły*. Transl. J. Merecki. Lublin: KUL, pp. 82–93.

³² K. Wojtyła (2000). O humanizmie św. Jana od Krzyża. In: id. *Świętego Jana od Krzyża nauka o wierze*. Lublin, p. 242.

³³ Cf. K. Wojtyła (1985). *Osoba i czyn*. Kraków: Polskie Towarzystwo Teologiczne, pp. 5–24.

³⁴ Cf. J. Galarowicz (2000). *Człowiek jest osobą*. *Op. cit.*, p. 17.

lute – God, and mystical experiences. The third dimension is the experience of another man.

The third dimension, the closeness of another person, is not limited to an external perception of human existence, or to analogy of mental experiences. Moreover, Wojtyła believed that this dimension was not limited to that specific function of awareness which consists in “pre-understanding”, or understanding established through culture, tradition, or language. For Wojtyła, who was under the influence of St. John of the Cross, the experience of person consists in “unification through similarity”³⁵. Being a person, I can experience another person – Wojtyła says – only when our activities are similar and commensurate. Man does not perceive the world of nature as a person, as he will never be similar to it, but only resemble it by analogy in the physical sphere.

Similarity is manifest through substantiality, which is the activity of man-person. Wojtyła sets off from the classical, Boethian definition of person which refers to an individual substance of a rational nature. He introduces a clear distinction, however, in the interpretation of “rationality”³⁶, and refers to ontic subjectivity (rationality) and experiential subjectivity (rationality). The former is a synonym for the action of a physical (not only human) being in the world.

Experiential subjectivity, on the other hand, consists not only in the awareness and self-awareness of action. He introduces a personal aspect to self-awareness, one that refers to mystical experience, the system of values, and revelation. Only a person can in their self-awareness judge the value of an act in the context of values perceived in a mystical experience with God or through revelation. This is where Wojtyła introduces the ethical and moral aspect into the structure of man.

Man, as a personal being, is revealed as an integral substance whose uniqueness can be observed only in action³⁷. Galarowicz points to several elements of an act as this special way in which a person is manifest³⁸. Firstly, the act always bears the mark of the one who performs it, i.e. reflects their system of values, perception of the world, and their worldview. An act is an immanent part of the actor. Secondly, an act is a multilayered emanation of

³⁵ Cf. K. Wojtyła (2000). *O humanizmie św. Jana od Krzyża. Op. cit.*, pp. 234–237.

³⁶ Cf. J. Galarowicz (2000). *Człowiek jest osobą. Op. cit.*, pp. 50–51.

³⁷ Cf. K. Wojtyła (1985). *Osoba i czyn. Op. cit.*, p. 27.

³⁸ Cf. J. Galarowicz (2000). *Człowiek jest osobą. Op. cit.*, pp. 102–106.

the person. It has a somatic, mental, spiritual and moral dimension. Thirdly, an act is a fact. It can be known to others, and it is objective, which means it can be analyzed from the external perspective of the actor. Fourthly, an act can be experienced and reflected upon, and its consequences may be analyzed. And fifthly, an act contains the reasons which explain it. An act which belongs to and manifests the person results solely from the fact of their being a person, and not from any reference to the world around us³⁹.

The above outline of Wojtyła's anthropology helps us decipher the term "adequate anthropology" which he wanted to construct. According to Marian Grabowski, the term "adequate refers to two aspects"⁴⁰. Firstly, Wojtyła proposes an adequate view of man in anthropological enquiries, one that is comprehensive. That is why he postulates an anthropology founded not only on philosophical premises, but on biblical and theological ones as well. It is difficult to see why Grabowski only took into account the philosophical premises and left out the ethical ones. One can hardly treat them as one in Wojtyła's thought.

The biblical foundation is based on the conviction that the Holy Scripture, particularly the Book of Genesis, contains fundamental descriptions of human nature⁴¹. The first people, who did not depend on culture or the reality around them, had the nature of persons. It was only their acts and decisions that blurred their natural personal existence. Therefore, Wojtyła proposes that biblical examples and descriptions of human nature found in the Holy Scripture should be taken into account. The theological dimension, in turn, should take into account the natural tendency and need for being in contact with God. Wojtyła believes that man can only become a person in relation to a personal God, who is his source of morality.

The second interpretation of adequacy in the anthropology of Wojtyła proposed by Grabowski is the postulate that the reflection should take into account "that which is essentially human"⁴². It is a special type of experience, already mentioned above, in which man remains alone, but is not lonely. It is in that experience, and only in it, that man opens himself up, leaving

³⁹ Cf. K. Wojtyła (1985). *Osoba i czyn. Op. cit.*, pp. 122–131.

⁴⁰ Cf. M. Grabowski (2004). W stronę antropologii adekwatnej. In: M. Grabowski, *O antropologii Jana Pawła II*, Toruń: Wydawnictwo UMK, pp. 16–17.

⁴¹ Cf. W. Starnowski (2014). Znaczenie terminu 'osoba' w myśli Jana Pawła II. In: A. Różyło, Fr. M Sztaba, *Człowiek w refleksji Karola Wojtyły – Jana Pawła II. Wybrane aspekty adekwatnej antropologii*. Lublin: KUL, p. 86.

⁴² Cf. M. Grabowski (2004). W stronę antropologii adekwatnej. *Op. cit.*, p. 17.

aside tradition or culture. And this happens not through man's reduction to the carnal, animal sphere, but first of all to the sphere of reason and morality. In this mystical experience, man finds himself as a substantial being, i.e. one that is autonomous, rational and moral.

The essence of person the way it was understood by Wojtyła differs from views represented by the Lvov-Warsaw School.

The main line of polemics between Wojtyła and the Lublin School on the one hand, and Czeżowski and the Lvov-Warsaw School on the other went in two directions. Firstly, their dispute focused on the attempt made by Czeżowski and the followers of Twardowski to scientify the moral experience. According to the Lublin School, the ethics of Czeżowski or Kotarbiński were only inductive ethics, and therefore the value of ethical theories and propositions was only probable. The ethicists from Lublin proposed that ethics and ethical views should take into account the theological dimension of man, as it was only then that absolutism and the obligatory nature of moral norms and fundamental moral principles, such as love or compassion, could be substantiated. According to personalists, if we do not take into account these theological relationships and values, ethics will only become a sphere of the natural world, which may lead to relativism.

The other point over which personalists and Twardowski's disciples disagreed was the dispute over the relationship between logic and metaphysics. The Lvov-Warsaw School emphasized logical and analytical knowledge in philosophical reflection, while the Thomist school put emphasis on metaphysical cognition. Personalists believed that when logic is preferred over metaphysics, the rift between the category of obligation and the category of existence becomes even wider. If we do not take into account the fact that man is substantial and as such represents the only source of moral norm, personalists believed, we will fall into instrumentalism in ethics.

Another very important ethical system which originated in the Lvov-Warsaw School was that proposed by Kotarbiński. His system of independent ethics has always aroused much controversy in methodological and anthropological terms, so it is important to present its main postulates first, and only then discuss the polemics around it within the Lvov-Warsaw School. Following that, we will take a look at the polemics between Kotarbiński and the Lublin School, particularly Tadeusz Styczeń.

It is a cliché to say that independent ethics is an ethics derived from premises supplied by science and free from religious, worldview or meta-

physical dogmas. The general perception of Kotarbiński's views on moral philosophy is more complex, however, as he considered contemporary ethics to be a complex and heterogeneous science. He distinguished between ethics in a narrower and a broader sense⁴³.

Ethics in the broader sense, the so called ethics *sensu largo*, was a general theory of action which included: hedonistics, praxeology and ethics *sensu stricto*. The first of these, hedonistics, describes and discusses the general theory of action aimed at achieving pleasure and happiness. Praxeology is concerned with the theory of effective, reasonable and efficient action, while ethics *sensu stricto* is a theory of action that is moral, i.e. either honourable or disgraceful. Kotarbiński refers to such ethics interchangeably as moral deontology or the theory of moral obligation⁴⁴.

Ethical judgments and criteria in each of these ethics are different⁴⁵. For hedonist ethics, judgment is made based on the juxtaposition of pleasure and pain. In praxeological ethics, the categories used in judgment are mastery and incompetence; in deontic ethics, these are honour and disgrace.

According to Wiśniewski, we may identify three fundamental meanings of independent ethics in Kotarbiński⁴⁶. First, he talks of independence from religious assumptions, which makes it a lay kind of ethics. Secondly, it is independent not only from worldview, but also from atheist philosophy and atheist worldview. And the third, particularly interesting, understanding of the independence of Kotarbiński's ethics consists in its irreplaceability. Kotarbiński points out that our conscience, or indeed our existence, cognition and judgment, cannot be replaced by any other conscience⁴⁷. And yet that irreplaceability of the subject and his conscience does not mean subjectivism⁴⁸.

⁴³ Cf. A. Brożek, J. Jadacki (2006). Minimalizm etyczny Tadeusza Kotarbińskiego. In: *Etyka*, No. 39, pp. 49–51.

⁴⁴ Cf. T. Kotarbiński (1970). Drogowskazy etyki niezależnej. In: id. *Studia z zakresu filozofii etyki i nauk społecznych*. Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, pp. 221–222.

⁴⁵ Cf. *Ibidem*, p. 221.

⁴⁶ Cf. R. Wiśniewski (1984). Jak jest możliwa etyka niezależna? *Acta Universitatis Nicolai Copernici*, No. 152. Toruń, pp. 114–117.

⁴⁷ Cf. T. Kotarbiński (1970). Zagadnienia etyki niezależnej. In: id. *Studia z zakresu filozofii etyki i nauk społecznych*. *Op. cit.*, pp. 207–221.

⁴⁸ A similar motive of the irreplaceability of the moral subject was very popular in the moral philosophy of the 20th century. It can be seen, for example, in E. Levinas' category of substitution in bearing responsibility, which clearly shows that subjectivi-

What are the sources of independent ethics, though? Czeżowski and Wiśniewski both say that the basis for independent ethics is axiological empiricism⁴⁹. On its basis, ethical observation is generalized using the method of analytical description, which results in the model of an abstract, morally good act. Czeżowski says that such model should first of all entail: goodness (in opposition to cruelty), integrity (in opposition to dishonesty), courage⁵⁰ (in opposition to cowardice), fortitude (in opposition to idleness), temperance (in opposition to indulgence). In addition, in his analysis of Kotarbiński's views Czeżowski points out a very important element which is an immanent feature of his model of reliable guardian – it is an egalitarian, not an elitist one⁵¹. Egalitarianism is manifest first of all in the fact that the reliable guardian is not the “one and only”, and everybody may become one. Secondly, the obligation of guardianship applies to everyone, including even one's enemies. And thirdly, guardianship is a symmetrical relationship.

There is a number of issues which seem to be important in Kotarbiński's concept and which should be mentioned here in order to present his views comprehensively. The idea behind this article, however, the polemics around the Lvov-Warsaw School, makes it necessary to present a synthesis of views held by his main disciples, and to show them against the background of other philosophical concepts. I would like, nevertheless, to present one more study of Kotarbiński's views which in my opinion will help introduce the ethical ideal in his system to those who are less familiar with his views.

ty is one of the most important ethical categories today. For T. Kotarbiński, however, moral obligation is symmetrical, which means everyone is equally obligated to bear responsibility, while in E. Levinas, it is asymmetrical, i.e. attributed to only one subject who is irreplaceable. Cf. E. Lévinas (2000). *Inaczej niż być lub ponad istotą*. Transl. from French by S. Mrówczyński. Warszawa: Fundacja Aletheia.

⁴⁹ Cf. T. Czeżowski (1989). O etyce niezależnej Tadeusza Kotarbińskiego. In: id. *Pisma z etyki i teorii wartości*. Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, p. 166; see also R. Wiśniewski (1984). Jak jest możliwa etyka niezależna? *Op. cit.*, pp. 120–121.

⁵⁰ T. Czeżowski uses the term „courage”, while T. Kotarbiński refers to this attitude as “bravery”. It would be interesting to analyze both terms, especially that both T. Czeżowski and T. Kotarbiński derived their views from the analytical school in which language played an important role in the cognitive and scientific process.

⁵¹ Cf. T. Czeżowski (1989). O etyce niezależnej Tadeusza Kotarbińskiego. *Op. cit.*, p. 167.

This concept has been presented by Anna Brożek and Jacek Jadacki as a synthesis of the most important elements, virtues and vices, which may serve as criteria in moral judgment⁵².

Goodness (Virtues)		Wickedness (Vices)	
Protectiveness	Helpfulness	Selfishness	Unobligingness
	Kindness		Hatred
	Mercy		Cruelty
Integrity	Dependability	Dishonesty	Unreliability
	Truthfulness		Falsity
	Fairness		Partiality
Fortitude	Self-control	Weakness	Lack of self-control
	Enterprise		Idleness
	Courage		Cowardice
Reasonability		Stupidity	

Brożek and Jadacki added two qualifications to their typology. Firstly, only the first six virtues and the first six vices are morally valuable and related to ethical norms; the last three virtues and vices are morally neutral. Secondly, they believe all virtues may be present to varying degrees.

Wiśniewski has rightly pointed out⁵³ that the project of independent ethics was particularly disliked by the other very significant philosophical centre in Poland, i.e. the Lublin School and the Catholic University of Lublin, with Styczeń leading the polemics with Kotarbiński.

For Styczeń, the independence or attempts at building an independent ethics was not problematic. “These are the reasons why I am willing to sympathize to a large degree with the thesis put forward by Czeżowski and Kotarbiński that ethics is a methodologically autonomous discipline, in that its

⁵² Cf. A. Brożek, J. Jadacki (2006). Minimalizm etyczny Tadeusza Kotarbińskiego. *Op. cit.*, p. 53.

⁵³ Cf. R. Wiśniewski (2006). Recepcja etyki Tadeusza Kotarbińskiego w Polsce. In: *Etyka*, nr 39, pp. 25–26; see also R. Wiśniewski (1984). Jak jest możliwa etyka niezależna? *Op. cit.*, p. 124.

specific propositions are legitimized in experience that is proper to its domain, i.e. independently from one's shared philosophical or religious system"⁵⁴. The reasons he mentions are related to two facts. One is the proposition that a change in worldview does not require a change in one's ethical attitude. And the other is that ethical assumptions are independent from individual experience or knowledge.

Nevertheless, in his analysis of Styczeń's views Wiśniewski concludes that he begins with the same values, but differs in their interpretation and application in ethics. T. Styczeń asserts that interpretation of ethical theses and judgments requires a particular concept of man and a general view of reality, which can be supplied by metaphysics. Moreover, T. Styczeń believes that metaphysics offers a substantiation of the ethical obligation towards others⁵⁵.

For Styczeń, a critical reflection on the methodological status of independent ethics consists in an analysis of three different ethical judgments: the obligatory, equitable and existential one⁵⁶. He asserts that Czeżowski and Kotarbiński, despite their methodological and logical orientations, did not clearly distinguish between these three types of judgment in their ethical systems⁵⁷.

With regard to obligatory judgment, Styczeń's views are similar to those of Czeżowski. They both believe that obligatory judgment is related to the substantiation of moral obligation. Styczeń says that the recognition and validity of obligation is self-evident and cannot be ignored or questioned by the subject⁵⁸. The reason is that ethical judgments are based on individual moral experience. In this point, the views of Styczeń are convergent with those of the Lvov-Warsaw School. In other words, on the one hand Styczeń refers to individual recognition of a moral state, and on the other to the recognition of that state as indeed being moral. Both of these activities endow moral experience with the attribute of obligatoriness with respect to the moral subject.

⁵⁴ T. Styczeń (1980). *Etyka niezależna?* Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, p. 63.

⁵⁵ Cf. R. Wiśniewski (2006). *Recepcja etyki Tadeusza Kotarbińskiego w Polsce. Op. cit.*, pp. 27–28.

⁵⁶ Cf. T. Styczeń (1980). *Etyka niezależna? Op. cit.*, p. 63.

⁵⁷ Cf. R. Wiśniewski (2006). *Recepcja etyki Tadeusza Kotarbińskiego w Polsce. Op. cit.*, p. 28.

⁵⁸ Cf. T. Styczeń (1980). *Etyka niezależna? Op. cit.*, p. 67.

The other type of ethical judgment, the equitable judgment, is the basis of Styczeń's criticism of independent ethics. He says that in judging ethical actions, the obligatory nature of the "affirmation" of another person is beyond dispute, while equity, manifest in the real and individual affirmation of a person, is not judged unequivocally. At this point, Styczeń believes it is necessary to supplement ethics with some kind of knowledge that would provide directions in interpreting an act as equitable.

In his opinion, ethics would be fully independent and methodologically autonomous if it relied only on anthropology, particularly philosophical anthropology. He notes, however, that contemporary anthropology is methodologically syncretic and relies on the findings of many disciplines of science, both empirical sciences and humanities⁵⁹. Consequently, T. Styczeń asserts that an ethics that pretends to being equitable, that is, to interpret moral experience in the categories of moral equitability or inequitability, it must take into account an external, non-ethical, anthropological paradigm⁶⁰.

The last type is the existential judgment, which is the "is" type of judgment. It appears that it is in this aspect that Styczeń believes the most important difference between ethics with an adjective (e.g. Christian ethics) and independent ethics (e.g. independent ethics) consists in⁶¹. Existential ethical judgment affirms the existence of the very act of being a person. If we make an a priori assumption about the existence of an unreal reason for a morally just act, we would also have to agree with the proposition that moral obligation is unreal. Thus, the lack of a real justification of equitability results in the removal of ethical obligation, and consequently in concluding that ethics is not normative, as Twardowski's followers claimed.

It should be stressed that Styczeń was not against the idea of independent ethics. He only criticized the possibility of building an ethics that would be entirely independent from philosophy, mainly from anthropology. He recognized that ethical knowledge cannot be completely detached from the world and worldview, or from the eschatological and theological element.

⁵⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 77–78.

⁶⁰ It is difficult, however, to conclude from his views whether the anthropological paradigm should be non-ethical or meta-ethical. T. Styczeń does talk about the philosophical and anthropological foundation of the equitability of moral acts, his comments are not sufficiently precise, however.

⁶¹ Cf. T. Styczeń (1980). *Etyka niezależna? Op. cit.*, pp. 80–81.

Summing up deliberations on the person and ethical norms in the Lublin and the Lvov-Warsaw Schools, it may be concluded that they both began from the same point of departure. In both Schools, basic ethical facts were supplied by moral experience which was individual and rational. Both personalists and the followers of Twardowski perceived moral (empirical) experience as the raw material of scientific knowledge. The fundamental difference consisted in their different understanding of the criterion of moral judgment.

According to Twardowski and his disciples, an ethics which aspired to being an independent science could not refer to the findings of other sciences to substantiate its propositions. For personalists, such reference was necessary so that the dimension inherent to man could be presented in a holistic way.

It appears that the most important conclusion that can be drawn from this attempt at analyzing the dispute between the personalist school and the school founded by Twardowski is the assertion that also in their concept of person there were many assumptions they both shared. They both emphasized such properties as autonomy, awareness, self-consciousness, rationality, individuality and subjectivity. They only differed in the anthropological superstructure above these properties, which provided the axiological and praxeological explanation. It may thus be concluded that the main dispute between the two Schools was in fact concerned with the ethical criterion and its substantiation.

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Contemporary Polemics Around the Lvov-Warsaw School: Marian Przełęcki

Halina Postek

The Lvov-Warsaw School, which was a group of people gathered around Kazimierz Twardowski who founded a centre of philosophical and logical thought in Lvov at the end of the 19th century, recognized both in Poland and worldwide, later developed by Twardowski's disciples also in Warsaw, was most popular in the interwar period. Before the war broke out, several dozen people gathered around the School, whose interests included mathematical logic, psychology, sociology, linguistics, the history of art, and literature. The School's influence continued after the war: by the 1950s, nearly all Polish philosophers (except Elzenberg and Ingarden) were related to the School. They included: Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Stanisław Leśniewski, Jan Łukasiewicz, Alfred Tarski, Tadeusz Czeżowski, Władysław Witwicki, Maria and Stanisław Ossowsky, Władysław Tatarkiewicz, Izydora Dąmbska.

The question I would like to ask in this article is related to Marian Przełęcki, one of the closest disciples of Tadeusz Kotarbiński. Should he be considered the last of the School's representatives¹, as has been suggested by some authors², or was he an individual philosopher, linked to the School only through the master – disciple relationship? To what extent are the views held by Przełęcki contrary to those held by the School, thus representing an internal polemic with its work, and to what extent are they only a development of certain ideas, not contradicting those put forward by the School's

¹ J. Woleński in *Logic and Philosophy in Lvov-Warsaw School*, states that the Lvov-Warsaw School is a closed chard in the history of philosophy

² J. Jadacki in the obituary notice quoted below.

representatives. In this article, I will only refer to Przełęcki's ethical views; his works on formal methodology and logic require a separate discussion.

The fact Przełęcki was thought of as related to the School can be seen in the note posted on the website of the Institute of Philosophy on 10 August 2013, one day after Professor Przełęcki passed away: "A logician and philosopher, born on 17 May 1923 in Katowice, a disciple of Tadeusz Kotarbiński and Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz – one of the most outstanding representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School."

In his article "From the Semantic Point of View (A Brief Autobiography)" published in the collection entitled "Moral Intuitions", Marian Przełęcki himself wrote: *Due to a delay caused by the last war and German occupation, I began my studies in philosophy in 1945. I followed the pre-war curriculum (then still in force), and my teachers included some of the main representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School, the dominant school of philosophy in Poland before the war: Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Janina Kotarbińska, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz and Maria Osowska. (Janina Kotarbińska supervised my master's and doctoral theses.) It was only natural, then, that I was greatly influenced by the way philosophy was practiced in that School – a kind of analytical philosophy, similar to logical empiricism but free from some of its most radical "dogmas". Even though in my further development as a scholar I departed from some of the School's ideas, I still consider myself its disciple*³.

In the paper entitled „The Rationalist Heritage of the Lvov-Warsaw School”⁴ delivered during the 6th Polish Philosophical Convention in Toruń in 1995, Przełęcki confirmed his ties with the School, but also pointed to certain differences which separated him from its representatives.

The Lvov-Warsaw School was a unique intellectual formation⁵. Its representatives did not share a common doctrine, a uniform set of worldviews. Instead, they shared a method of practicing philosophy, held the same beliefs concerning philosophy and its role in the life of man and the society⁶. Izydora Dąmbska wrote about the School: *That is why the School could produce spiritual-*

³ M. Przełęcki (2005). *Intuicje moralne*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper, p. 181.

⁴ M. Przełęcki (2002). *O rozumności i dobroci. Propozycje i morały*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper, p. 9.

⁵ J. Woleński (1986). Tadeusz Kotarbiński i szkoła lwowsko-warszawska. *Ruch Filozoficzny*, Vol. XLIII, No. 3–4, p. 243.

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 243.

*ists and materialists, nominalists and realists, logicians and psychologists, philosophers of nature and theoreticians of art. But if we went for historical comparisons, the striking thing about the Lvov School, or Twardowski's school, was its similarity to the philosophical schools of antiquity, which did not only serve as a place for the exchange of thoughts and development of theoretical concepts, but also formed the characters and left an imprint on their members' attitude to life*⁷.

The criteria of affiliation with the School applied by historians of philosophy are not uniform: representatives of the School are deemed to include the disciples of Twardowski and those of his disciples (thus Przełęcki, as a disciple of Kotarbiński's, who was directly related to Twardowski, would be seen as an heir to the Lvov-Warsaw school); sometimes, however, another criterion is applied as well – that views held by the School should be shared as well. It is quite difficult, though, to identify views expressed both by Twardowski and his disciples. Those usually mentioned include: the analytical method of doing philosophy, and anti-irrationalism, understood as acceptance of only such assertions as can be intersubjectively verified and communicated. In the area of ethics, with which this chapter is concerned, they additionally include absolutism and intuitionism⁸, and a clear distinction between normative and descriptive ethics, with the latter being given the status of a science. Despite that distinction, many of the School's philosophers were concerned with normative ethics, believing that it needed to be practiced as a certain duty to the society, as an objection against an irrational, unreliable way in which ethical discussions were held. In line with their cognitivist position, they believed that if values could be known, it was also possible to put forward rational arguments when discussing them. The postulated neutrality of philosophy with respect to worldview issues entailed refusal to engage in any religious or political disputes, and the recommendation to avoid speculative issues – revealing an unwillingness towards any metaphysical propositions.

Apart from that last issue, Przełęcki seems to hold all of the views identified as shared by the School's representatives. Like its most central philosophers (Kotarbiński, Ajdukiewicz, Czeżowski), Przełęcki believed in cogni-

⁷ I. Dąmbaska (1948). *Czterdzieści lat filozofii we Lwowie. Przegląd Filozoficzny*, XLIV, p. 17.

⁸ J. Woleński (1985). *Filozoficzna szkoła lwowsko-warszawska*. Warszawa: PWN, p. 291.

tivism, considering judgments to have cognitive content which could be attributed the value of true or false. He agreed with Ajdukiewicz, who perceived a cognitive component in emotional experiences (Przełęcki called it moral intuition) which allowed us to clearly determine the positive or negative value of the object of moral evaluation. Individual emotional experiences, intuitions, are, just like observations, intersubjectively communicable and verifiable, thus satisfying the postulate of rationality. Values could be recognized by an „ideal observer”, an impartial judge of the accuracy of our intuitions, who should have sufficient knowledge about the object of emotions and adopt an impartial attitude towards it. Like observations, emotional experiences, intuitions, tell us something about the object of cognition, and like observational judgments, value judgments made on the basis of emotional experiences may be evaluated in terms of their true or false value. Moral values are recognized in direct actions of value intuition. The intuition of value directly substantiates the evaluation of a particular act in terms of its equitability. Inductive reasoning leads us to generalizations, statements about certain regularities in the world of values⁹. Przełęcki accepts intuition as a tool in the recognition of values because “it suggests itself irresistibly”¹⁰. Moral intuition is a type of experience, but has a lower degree of intersubjectivity and reliability than scientific knowledge¹¹.

Przełęcki believed goodness to be the highest value. He wrote: *As far as I am concerned, this is the only value I would be inclined to call “moral”. It would be inconsistent, however, with the widespread way this notion is used, where the domain of morality is seen as including other types of values as well. We are thus talking of the most inherently moral value, or simply moral value in the strict sense of the word. That which goes beyond the problem of terminology here is concerned with the type of internal reaction which this type of value evokes in us. Referring to my own moral experience, I can say that it is a very particular reaction, characterized by particular strength and a particular taint of uncompromisingness – properties which are not present in my reaction to other types of values traditionally seen as belonging to morality. It is this fact that distinguishes it from all other values*¹². He wrote a pa-

⁹ B. Chwedeńczuk (2003). O filozofii Mariana Przełęckiego. *Edukacja Filozoficzna*, Vol. 36, p. 168.

¹⁰ M. Przełęcki (2002). *O rozumności i dobroci. Propozycje i morały*. *Op. cit.*, p. 123.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 156.

¹² *Ibidem*, p. 125.

per *In Defence of Goodness*¹³ – in which he argued that all attempts made by philosophers and the mass culture in order to replace goodness with another value, that of „power”, were in fact promoting an attitude of spiritual handicap. He defended “passive goodness” – the goodness of people who were weak, but believed the ideal was “active goodness”, which he defined as the result of sufficiently strong goodness, and believed to be the outcome of love towards one’s neighbours.

Cognitivism in the philosophy of values led Przełęcki, as well as other representatives of the School, to moral absolutism which says that moral values are constant and independent of individual convictions, social or historical circumstances. He explained differences in moral judgments by referring to subjective factors: a different hierarchy of values adopted by the judging person, imperfection of the notional system in which the judgment was formulated, failure to take into account the same ethical aspects of the situation being judged.

He combined his absolutist position with the recognition of situational ethics, which made the application of norms dependent on the circumstances. Moral intuition, Przełęcki believed, only led us to elementary – individual and specific – moral judgments, and could thus be applied only in specific situations. Our intuitions are right with respect to events which occur in particular circumstances; any generalization of our moral judgment entails the risk of error. We may see a certain inconsistency here – Przełęcki perceived the value of goodness through intuitive knowledge, and yet it was only “realized” in particular situations, but did not depend on them.

Being an absolutist, he defended the value of tolerance. He believed it to be grounded in the autonomy of individuals, which, following John Stuart Mill, he defined as “the freedom to pursue our own good in our own way”. It is in particular concerned with the freedom of religious and philosophical views, or *allowing others to hold views and pursue projects we believe to be wrong*¹⁴.

In his texts on Plato, Przełęcki argued that it is permissible for a solution to be imposed on others if we are convinced it will be to their benefit: *The assumption about the objectivity of values allows us in the case of valuating experienc-*

¹³ M. Przełęcki (2005). *Intuicje moralne*. Op. cit., p. 144.

¹⁴ M. Przełęcki (2011). O wyrozumiałości i wolności. Tolerancja jako wartość. In: A. Brożek, J. Jadacki, M. Przełęcki, *W poszukiwaniu najwyższych wartości*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper, p. 76.

es to say that we enjoy something “rightly” or “wrongly”. Thus, if my friend and I enjoy different things, one of us is enjoying them “wrongly”. And we can hardly be tolerant if we care about the comprehensive good of our friend. The easiest way to tolerance is through indifference; love, in principle, is intolerant¹⁵. The only limitation for our actions in this regard is the principle of non-violence.

The value of an act is determined by the motives behind it. Thus, according to Przełęcki, the only proper moral motivation is altruism, which considers the good of another to be the highest value. Yet, since due to the human condition we must strive to release ourselves or others from evil or misfortune more often than we pursue their good, Przełęcki considered the will to release our neighbour from suffering to be the only goal of morally just action. He believed all other motives were wrong, even if they led to the same result as actions motivated by altruistic reasons. He criticized the attitude of perfectionism in morality for making its goal the achievement of one’s own personal perfection rather than helping others, and thus being motivated by egotism.

The basis of altruist motivation was for him the capacity for sympathizing with the suffering of others. Aware of the difficulty in identifying a single motivation behind human actions, Przełęcki used the term “ultimate motivation”, meaning such motive of a particular act behind which there is no other, deeper motive¹⁶. Such motivation may be evoked by the desire, flowing from compassion, to eliminate the object of such emotion, the suffering of a neighbour, and to take action to relieve that suffering. The group of persons with respect to whom we are bound by the postulate to relieve suffering includes, according to Przełęcki, not only our “near and dear ones”, but also anyone who is being wronged, including our enemies (he wrote a text printed during martial law in Poland under the telltale title: “The Adversary, One Just Like Us”). Our commitment to the good of our neighbours or to easing their suffering should not have any limits, leading to the “call to self-perdition” as a consequence of living for others, carried all the way through to the end.

Surprisingly for a philosopher tied to the Lvov-Warsaw School, he put forward some unusually radical proposals. Przełęcki believed that save for

¹⁵ M. Przełęcki (2000). *Lektury platońskie*. Warszawa: Wydział Socjologii i Filozofii UW, p. 60.

¹⁶ M. Przełęcki (2005). *Intuicje moralne*. *Op. cit.*, p. 46.

a few “saints”, no one could feel satisfied with having fulfilled all of their moral obligations, no one should think their conscience is “clear”. As long as there are people suffering around us, we must never stop trying to release them from their affliction. Thus, there are no boundaries for moral obligations, we can never say we have done enough. He substantiated the postulate of sacrificing oneself for others, leading to self-perdition, with the equal importance of the interests of all people, and consequently the non-distinguished position of my own person. My good is not more important than anyone else’s good, so when faced with the choice of a greater good (or lesser evil) I should not follow my egotistic motives, but choose the greater good (or lesser evil) irrespective of whether that good is mine or somebody else’s.

Marian Przełęcki believed that compassion, indispensable in order for actions motivated by moral reasons to be taken, could be learned. He postulated ethical education, introducing young people to the value of solidarity, interpersonal relationships, making them sensitive to the problems of other people. Understood this way, education should not refer to any moral ideal (Przełęcki was an opponent of perfectionist ethics), but show and develop sensitivity to the needs and suffering of others. He referred to such ethics as “independent” – from any religious or metaphysical assumptions. He realized, however, that one cannot force oneself to “love another”: *There is something cruel in that one cannot make oneself truly good*¹⁷. True goodness, he believed, was the privilege of the chosen ones; others could only imitate them, with more or less success, and hope to become truly good one day. This is yet another paradox which results from Przełęcki’s assumptions – in fact, we do not have much to say in whether or not we will be able to realize the moral postulates we believe in. His determinist view of the human nature could not but lead him to such conclusion.

The key difference between the assumptions made in the School and the views held by Przełęcki was his rejection of the postulate to refrain from making any metaphysical assertions.

*The traumatic experiences of that time, challenging the worldview we had held so far, brought to the foreground of philosophic enquiry the problems we could refer to as “the meaning of life” problems – the meaning of the world, man, and history*¹⁸. Przełęcki often emphasized in his various texts the importance of

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 165.

¹⁸ M. Przełęcki (2002). *O rozumności i dobroci. Propozycje i moralny. Op. cit.*, p. 13.

existential reasons (which he interchangeably referred to as metaphysical ones). It was in them that he saw the essence of philosophical enquiry. He defended the concept of philosophy whose fundamental core was concerned with the world of values, which attributed values instead of just describing reality, whose essential element consisted in value judgments.¹⁹ Valuation of existence was to reveal its purpose. And that, Przełęcki believed, was philosophy's most important task which endowed it with existential significance. The question about "how to live" (which he jokingly pointed out was asked explicitly only by the heroes of Russian novels) was for him the ultimate end of all philosophy.

Such view of philosophy differs fundamentally from both the traditional concept and that embraced in the positivist concept, closely akin to the Lvov-Warsaw School. The traditional concept considers philosophy to be a non-scientific theory of existence, offering a certain description of reality which goes beyond scientific knowledge, but is its generalization and provides its foundation. In the positivist concept, philosophy is to be reduced to a theory of science (scientific philosophy), and any issues which it cannot make room for are to be removed from philosophical deliberations.

Appreciating not only the importance, but also the need for "existential" reflection, Przełęcki tried to "transfer onto it the cognitive advantages of analytical philosophy"²⁰, in particular the postulate of recognizing the fundamental resolvability of philosophical problems, with which he linked another imperative – of precise and comprehensible presentation of issues to be discussed, their "definite meaning"²¹. Still, he was aware that a particular type of questions makes it impossible to achieve such degree of definiteness and such degree of substantiation as in the case of problems taken up by the Lvov-Warsaw School.

The metaphysical, or existential beliefs held by Przełęcki underlie his ethics: the conviction about the tragedy of human life combined with admiration of the world's beauty. Przełęcki called the attitude of admiration for the reality around us the "affirmation of the world". It had its source in "the elementary existential experience": experiencing the world as one great miracle.²²

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 211.

²⁰ M. Przełęcki (2002). *O rozumności i dobroci. Propozycje i morały*. *Op. cit.*, p. 15.

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 17.

²² M. Przełęcki. (2005). *Intuicje moralne*. *Op. cit.*, p. 173.

Such aesthetic and ethical judgment was possible due to a special type of metaphysical experience called “illumination”. *I think the term „illumination” may also be applied to experience which, while not giving us an understanding of the world, allows us to see this world as a “Maya veil” which hides a “higher” reality*²³. Przełęcki distinguished acceptance of the world, life, and our fate from the attitude of the stoics, who substantiated it with the providential (rational, divine) nature of fate, and achieved it through a redefinition of the notions of good and evil: stoics believed good/evil was only that which depended on our will, and that which was beyond it was not judged in such terms. Przełęcki’s affirmation of the world also differed from the affirmation of the world resulting from Christian metaphysics, as it involved consent to the existence of evil in the universe, which for Przełęcki could not be accepted (he argued that the notion of free will, used to substantiate the existence of evil in the world, was not necessarily in conflict with the possibility of always making morally just choices; in other words, that man could have been created so that he would always freely choose good).

An attitude of rebellion, disagreement with the world, with the exception of refusal to accept the suffering of other people, Przełęcki believed to be a form of arrogance and conceit²⁴. A world without injustice and suffering has never existed and it never will, and a merely conditional acceptance of reality signified for him an attitude of claims and demands. *Thus, in our acceptance of our own fate, I first see a moral value, in the broad meaning of the word; it is a type of humility which I believe to be a value higher than [...] pride. It is moreover usually accompanied by a certain type of fortitude, which is yet another value of moral nature. [...] And in this “love of a life of suffering” I also see a certain eudaemonic value, as it is an attitude which to a certain degree protects us from feeling unhappy. [...] Finally, in the “love of a life of suffering” I have discussed here, we may find a certain “metaphysical” value as well. There are several ways in which we may try to define it. It may be the love of life as such – experiencing life as a “great miracle”. There may be a certain “mystical” experience behind it, in the broad sense of the world, an act of “illumination” I have already mentioned – an ecstatic ascent which atones for all the misery of our life*²⁵.

²³ A. Brożek, J. Jadacki, M. Przełęcki (2011). *W poszukiwaniu najwyższych wartości*. Op. cit., p. 63.

²⁴ M. Przełęcki (2005). *Intuicje moralne*. Op. cit., p. 174.

²⁵ A. Brożek, J. Jadacki, M. Przełęcki (2011). *W poszukiwaniu najwyższych wartości*. Op. cit., p. 64.

While appreciating the beauty of the world, Przełęcki saw the tragedy of human existence in the practical impossibility to eliminate suffering and injustice. *In the vision of the world that suggests itself to me, the world is not only „wonderful” – it is also „terrible” at the same time. I am struck by the enormity of evil in it – first of all the unimaginable amount of the suffering of all beings that can feel, suffering that is undeserved and which has not been atoned for. My reaction to this vision of reality is a deep, overwhelming compassion, excruciating pity for this suffering world. [...] This combination of metaphysical joy and metaphysical pain evokes deep emotion – the most overwhelming of human emotions there are*²⁶.

Przełęcki did not make any assumption about an external (metaphysical) meaningfulness of the world and human life. Like most of the philosophers associated with the School, he did not assume any metaphysical meaning of the whole of existence, while asserting that the world had an axiological sense. He believed that every one of us could make our lives internally meaningful. Our life is meaningful if it realizes some values, particularly the highest values.²⁷ Being an absolutist, he believed that those values were objective – and that they endowed our lives with objective sense. Nothing can deny the value of such life, even death understood as the final end of our existence. He agreed with Tadeusz Czeżowski who wrote: *In order to make life meaningful, it is enough to do good; a life which has passed away does not disintegrate into nothingness, but always remains a life, even if a past one, and always remains valuable*²⁸. *I would also call a life lived in accordance with these „commandments” (i.e. Kotarbiński’s advice: Love someone. Like to do something. Live seriously. Do not be a rascal) meaningful, just like Kotarbiński. This way – without assuming any overall meaning of existence, including human existence – we can endow our lives with a purpose, something we refer to as “axiological meaning”. We do this by living right, in particular morally right. It is man who brings meaning to this otherwise meaningless world*²⁹.

Marian Przełęcki opposed any sense of particular importance assigned to oneself. He argued that no one was more important than anybody else: our own joy and suffering differ from the joy and suffering of other people

²⁶ M. Przełęcki, *Ibidem*, pp. 222–223.

²⁷ M. Przełęcki, *Ibidem*, p. 271.

²⁸ T. Czeżowski (1958). *Odczyty filozoficzne*. Toruń: Towarzystwo Naukowe w Toruniu. Łódź: PWN, p. 229–235.

²⁹ A. Brożek, J. Jadacki, M. Przełęcki (2011). *W poszukiwaniu najwyższych wartości*. *Op. cit.*, p. 272.

only in the way they are experienced. The attitude of not putting ourselves before others had twofold consequences – treating one’s own good and that of the others as equally important entailed the demand for choices which were not obvious from the psychological point of view, but also made it possible to treat both oneself and others with understanding and awareness of one’s own limitations.

Przełęcki accepted the hypothesis that every man is capable of good deeds, even though he admitted himself that the acceptance of such thesis was more an act of faith than knowledge³⁰. He called himself a “meliorist”, asserting that it was in principle possible to correct human behaviour, and believed that a lack of empathy and lack of compassion for the suffering of other people it entailed, together with the resulting actions which caused suffering, was a sign of pathology and the result of some traumatic experiences in one’s past. He believed in the principle of mercy rather than justice; accordingly, a wrongdoer should be educated or treated rather than punished. Such forbearing attitude to human weakness was the result of his adherence to a certain form of determinism. It led him to the belief that even though our deeds are determined by factors we cannot control, they can be morally evaluated. Neither the sensibility nor rightness of the moral judgment of a particular action require that it be the result of a decision which is not causally determined (and was the result of the so called free will); acceptance of the determinist hypothesis does not exclude the justifiability of normative ethics. While it is possible to judge an action despite its undetermined nature, the moral attitude of condemnation, indignation or contempt for its perpetrator is not right³¹. In these emotions Przełęcki saw elements characteristic of a more primitive stage in the development of moral life. He believed the principle of “acting towards every man as though he was capable of good deeds”, which he himself, following Kotarbiński, called the “Quaker principle”, was morally good and morally just. This entailed a special attitude to the problem of compensatory justice. *What I find alien to my moral intuitions is the postulate of “compensation”. [...] The principle of equal payment and repayment includes a two-fold requirement: “repay good with good” and “repay evil with evil”. I have objections to both of these demands, for different reasons. In short, the principle of equitability is based on the assumption that the fact some*

³⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 88.

³¹ M. Przełęcki (2002). *O rozumności i dobroci. Propozycje i moralny*. Op. cit., p. 81.

good or evil is done to someone is a “disturbance” of moral balance which needs to be compensated – by repaying good with good and evil with evil. As for my moral intuitions, I cannot agree, first of all, that the rendering of good to someone calls for moral balance to be restored, and second of all, that the rendering of evil to someone can be morally compensated with rendering evil to the doer of that evil act. The rendering of good to someone is not a “disturbance” of moral balance in the world, but an “increase” in its moral level. [...] My objections to the other element of this principle – the postulate of “repaying evil with evil” – go much farther. In my opinion, this postulate commands us to act in a way that is morally wrong. I find the evangelical principle: “Repay evil with good” to be morally right instead. [...] No evil that has been done can be cancelled with other evil. [...] This way, we would only be adding more evil to that which has already been done. In my moral intuitions, therefore, I cannot find justification for the idea of punishment as retaliation – as evil done to the wrongdoer so that “justice is done”. I must admit that my moral sense at this point proves to be clearly lacking compared to the prevalent moral conviction (a lack, someone could say, which attests to my moral insanity). There is nothing I can do about it. [...] While abandoning the idea of punishment as retaliation – as a means to restoring the „disturbed” moral balance – I do not, of course, reject certain other concepts of punishment: as a means of preventing evil and as an educational effort [...]³².

His adoption of Gandhi’s principle of non-violence entailed a special attitude to measures taken to prevent evil (including punishment). He believed that when defending a person against being wronged, we must also take into account the good of the wrongdoer. If we intend to change his behaviour, we should renounce violence and the use of force. In our world, he claimed, this principle could be applied to nearly all “everyday” situations. He was aware that in certain special circumstances the standard of non violence cannot be held up as the universal norm, but believed that even then we could treat the wrongdoer in accordance with the “axiom of our conscience”, or the postulate of universal love or kindness³³. The principle of non-violence had to do with treating our opponent not only without physical violence (which is not always possible) but also without any social sanctions, such as “publicly humiliating, demeaning, ridiculing or embarrassing them”.

³² A. Brożek, J. Jadacki, M. Przełęcki (2011). *W poszukiwaniu najwyższych wartości*. Op. cit., pp. 44–45.

³³ M. Przełęcki (2005). *Intuicje moralne*. Op. cit., p. 155.

The methods Przełęcki approved of were all methods of persuasion – appeals to the mind and heart of the adversary³⁴.

Accepting the rule of distributive justice saying “to each according to their needs”, he found “socialism, understood one way or another” to be the most in line with his political sympathies³⁵. *Apart from compensatory justice, all of the authors discussed here refer to so-called distributive justice. [...] The question is what type of distribution corresponds best to our moral sense. [...] If I were to venture an answer closest to my moral sense, I would say the main principle of just distribution is the well-known and heatedly discussed principle “to each according to their needs”. Its implementation in social life would be most conveniently ensured by a kind of “welfare state”, which I find to be the most in line with my political sympathies³⁶.*

Acceptance of one’s fate, an essential element of Przełęcki’s attitude, did not mean consent to injustice happening to another person. He believed that refusal to accept the suffering of others entailed the need for social and political involvement. He was aware, however, that he himself was not a “social activist”, quite on the contrary – in his life, he was more of an observer. *The element of this attitude which is most fraught with consequences is its characteristic approach to politics. My questioning of the importance of political matters makes me inclined towards an apolitical approach – devoid of any interest in political matters, and, consequently, devoid of any political involvement. [...] Even though I find this attitude to be most akin to my nature, I realize that it is problematic in moral terms. Giving up any involvement in political activity also means giving up any attempts at changing social relationships for the better. Therefore, I try to stir up in myself some interest in these matters, even though [...] I cannot see them as important from the “metaphysical” or “existential” point of view³⁷.*

He was more into “contemplative life” which, unlike active life, is focused on valuable experiences rather than valuable achievements. *This experience of an old man makes me accept such hierarchy of values in which admiration and affection is preferred to satisfaction with success³⁸.* He used to quote

³⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 157.

³⁵ M. Przełęcki (2002). *O rozumności i dobroci. Propozycje i morały*. *Op. cit.*, p. 19.

³⁶ A. Brożek, J. Jadacki, M. Przełęcki (2011). *W poszukiwaniu najwyższych wartości*. *Op. cit.*, pp. 42–46.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 16.

³⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 199.

Iwaszkiewicz, who said: *Everyone keeps chasing after things, instead of just sitting together at the side of the road to watch the world go by*³⁹.

Therefore, I would say my postulate in life is a minimalist one: to live my life so that it hurts the least” – so that the least possible hurt is suffered by oneself and done to others.

In his answer to the question about the sources of his ethics, Przełęcki referred to the ethics of the Lvov-Warsaw School, the ethics of Gandhi, and – first of all – the New Testament. One of the most widely known collections of his essays on ethics was entitled *The Christianity of Unbelievers*. In the introduction, he explained: *The thing is that, while not being a believer, I find the very essence of the moral ideal in the words of the Gospel*⁴⁰. He considered that moral ideal to be a project that was independent from any metaphysical assumptions – while adopting a certain interpretation of the moral teachings of Christ, he did not adopt the assumptions of Christian metaphysics. He claimed that traditional Christian metaphysics went beyond the scope of premises available to an agnostic he believed himself to be. The only intuition he shared with a believing Christian was the sense of the fathomless nature of the world: *In those moments, when the veil of everyday routine and habit is lifted, I can sense the world is unfathomable, that it goes beyond my powers of comprehension as a whole; the existence – of the world, people, myself – is an eternal riddle, both frightening and delightful*⁴¹. And yet, while he shared that feeling, Przełęcki did not share the belief, common to all religions, that the world was purposeful. *The position of an agnostic does not provide grounds for such mental attitudes as trust in fate, or acceptance of one’s existence. Neither does it lead to contrary attitudes, however – grievances against fate, hatred of the world, rebellion against existence*⁴². Having rejected Christian metaphysics, Przełęcki focused on what he considered to be the essence of Christianity – ethics. He understood it in the traditional way, as he put it – as the ethics of the love of one’s neighbours. He defended such interpretation of the postulate of doing good in which good as an objective value was not good because it was considered by someone to be so. He thus allowed for situations in

³⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁰ M. Przełęcki (2005). *Intuicje moralne*. *Op. cit.*, p. 131.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, p. 134.

⁴² *Ibidem*, p. 135.

which we impose on our neighbour our understanding of what is good for them, not always meeting their expectations.

The most important element of Christian ethics for Przełęcki was the postulate of “living for others”. He interpreted it in a maximalist way, and did not believe it could be replaced with a less radical appeal to refrain from doing harm to others. Living for others leads to giving up one’s own good, for “my good is no more important than anybody else’s”. In psychological terms, it is interesting to note the conclusion Przełęcki drew from this principle – “My good is just as unimportant as yours”. This makes us look at ourselves from a distance, accept our limitations; it teaches us to understand our own unimportance – which is to help us adopt the attitude of humility and acceptance of what happens to us.

The interpretation of the New Testament message presented by Przełęcki was different, however, from that adopted by some Christians. For Przełęcki, concern for the salvation of one’s soul, striving at one’s own perfection, a life devoted to contemplation of God are ideas which, while they can be found in the Holy Scripture, are alien to the moral ideal which he believed to be the essence of Christianity. Przełęcki was against perfectionist ethics – leading to a wrong hierarchy of values – which preferred one’s own good to that of one’s neighbours, and by focusing on the strive towards one’s own perfection, failed to see the needs of other people. He also opposed such reading of the Gospel which equipped the followers of Christ with arguments that could be used in making and enforcing claims – in being a prosecutor and a judge. Aware of the utopia of such understanding of the evangelical ideal, he did not give up on defending it. He believed the awareness of one’s own moral deficiency, resulting from the practical impossibility of realizing the postulate of “living for others”, was an advantage, and not a fault of adopting the evangelical attitude. Przełęcki asserted that the value of Christian ethics for an agnostic did not reside in offering consolation, but in showing the moral ideal whose implementation delivered man from a sense of meaninglessness and despair.

Another source of inspiration for the ethical solutions proposed by Przełęcki was the ethics of Gandhi. The most important postulate he borrowed from him was the postulate of non-violence. He believed it was connected to the evangelical call to “Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you and persecute you”. Just as he defended the radical interpretation of the call to love one’s neighbours – all the way through to self-perdition, he

also defended the literal understanding of non-violence, arguing that for a man today, extreme situations which cancel the universal applicability of the postulate of non-violence, such as war or armed combat, were situations one did not encounter every day, and that in actual situations in life that postulate could be applied.

The postulate of non-violence is a postulate of fighting without the use of violence, without resorting to actions which force the adversary to relent against their will. This goal may be achieved by following the dictate of showing kindness to everyone, both the wronged person and the wrongdoer. If we are committed to the good of both parties, we will not resort to violence, even for a cause we believe to be right. To defend that thesis, Przełęcki cited Socrates who said that he who does harm to another, does harm to himself. This applies to all harm, even done in defence of some good. If so, the only permissible reaction to being wronged is to try and morally “convert” the wrongdoer, and that through persuasion, without the use of force. There are many methods we can use to achieve that goal – a private conversation, a public discussion, and even *a certain non-verbal act*” (e.g. *an act of self-sacrifice which is to make the adversary realize the consequences of their reprehensible behaviour*)⁴³.

Przełęcki’s adoption of the principle of non-violence is founded on two philosophical assumptions. The first one concerns the human nature – it is not the case that some people are good and other are evil, but that some are less evil than others, to say the most: *every man is in their essence one who evokes pity, one for whom the heart breaks*⁴⁴. The second is related to the possibility of acting in accordance with the so-called free will: *There is in everyone of us the potential of all the evil in the world, and that which is actually realized from it is the outcome of ever so many circumstances we cannot control*⁴⁵. Przełęcki, as has already been mentioned, took the determinist stance: our actions are conditional upon a number of factors beyond our control – from our genetic equipment, through the circumstances of our environment, to historical and geographical factors. Consequently, we should always judge behaviour taking all of these factors into account, and once we do that, we discover that the only attitude we can take towards others is compassion.

⁴³ M. Przełęcki. (2005). *Intuicje moralne. Op. cit.*, p. 157.

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 158.

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*.

In order to assess the originality of Przełęcki's views against the background of the solutions presented by the School, we should compare them to that of its representatives who, as Przełęcki wrote himself, influenced his philosophical and ethical beliefs the most. In his text entitled "What I Owe to Tadeusz Kotarbiński"⁴⁶, Przełęcki lists, apart from the way Kotarbiński practiced philosophy and his scrupulous analysis of the meaning of all notions used, the very specific worldview – a materialist one, rejecting the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and free will. The rationalism proclaimed by Kotarbiński and accepted by Przełęcki only allowed assertions which were supported with sufficient arguments. And Przełęcki did not find such sufficient arguments in the substantiation of the theist thesis. And yet, he did not consider his materialism to be as categorical as the materialism of Kotarbiński. In his other texts, Przełęcki says that both the acceptance and rejection of certain metaphysical assertions about the world are a form of arrogance, and – unlike Kotarbiński – calls himself an agnostic (and not an atheist). In the area of ethical deliberations I am most interested in, Przełęcki referred to Kotarbiński's essay of 1914 entitled "Utilitarianism and the Ethics of Pity", in which Kotarbiński included all of the essential elements of his concept later developed into the idea of "reliable guardian". Comparing utilitarian ethics with the "ethics of pity", Kotarbiński pointed out the advantage of the latter, saying: *Let us imagine we need to choose one of two ways: either pain to one subject and joy to another, or lesser joy to both. Utilitarianism will start to weigh and add here. It will not be interested in the fact that it is weighing the pain of one against the joy of another [...]. The ethics of pity offers a solution that is as clear as daylight: it always chooses the solution in which there is no pain. Not even in order to allow John to live fully will it sanction making Peter suffer, and if it had power over fate, and stood at a crossroads: a world with great happiness for some and suffering for others, or a world without life, she would push the wheel of fortune down the latter road. Its scope is nihilist! What of it, it is supposedly true. Utilitarianism has traces of a conqueror, it wants the fullness of life – which matters not, for it is a doctrine of falsity*⁴⁷. Interestingly, Kotarbiński called the ethics of pity "Christianism", which resembles the name Przełęcki used to describe himself – "an unbelieving Christian". Kotarbiński considered the

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 115–120.

⁴⁷ T. Kotarbiński (1987). *Pisma etyczne*. Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, pp. 86–87.

ethics of pity a version of evangelical ethics, for both called for action to relieve the suffering of others. In 1937, Kotarbiński published another article, entitled “On the So-Called Love of One’s Neighbour”, in which he presents the main assumptions of “independent ethics” – the most recognizable element of his ethical concept, along with the idea of a “reliable guardian”. He discussed the development of his idea of independent ethics in the sketch “A Picture of My Thoughts”: *The system and style of ethics in which I was raised as a child was evangelical, understood as the ethics of mercy. When I was about 15 years old, I said farewell, sorrowfully, but radically, to the illusion of religious substantiations of morality. And since I had always been – and still am – attached to its motivational content I mentioned above, I was looking for a way to support it, considering the suggestions of Stoicism, Epicureanism, utilitarianism. In result of these investigations, after a long period of trial and error, I have outlined an ethical system which I refer to as independent ethics – an ethics of practical realism, an ethics of a reliable guardian. I call this ethics independent because in order to substantiate it, there is no need to resort to arguments from any sources other than emotional judgments arrived at in interpersonal relationships. We do not need any doctrines of life after death, or any theories about the relationship between the spirit and matter. [...] Philosophy is only of use to ethics as a criticism of knowledge, in order to show the illusion of ethics substantiated with arguments derived from philosophical doctrines based on worldviews*⁴⁸.

Przełęcki, just like his teacher, did not anchor his ethical views in any religious or metaphysical system, even though they were both inspired by ethics related to one of just such systems – the ethics of Christianity.

Despite this undeniable similarity between the sources of ethical inspirations in the views of both philosophers, the degree of radicality in their postulates founded on the commandment of the love of one’s neighbours was very different. While Kotarbiński is satisfied with Schopenhauer’s directive: “Do not hurt anyone, but support others as much as you can”, Przełęcki will go for a maximalist understanding of that commandment, calling for “self-perdition” in doing good, in reaching towards others. It appears that Przełęcki did not accept an important rule Kotarbiński adhered to – the principle of practical realism. The attitude of realism requires that reality is taken into account to the greatest extent possible, that we look at the world with sobriety, correctly choose the most important values, consider our own,

⁴⁸ M. Jaworski (1971). *Tadeusz Kotarbiński*. Warszawa: Interpress, p. 128.

human possibilities⁴⁹. „Self-perdition” is an attitude of sacrificing one’s own good for the good of another, disregarding one’s material and psychological circumstances, and is in fact the opposite of the realist attitude.

Talking about the love of one’s neighbours, both philosophers applied this term to every man, not only one’s near and dear ones. Interestingly, it is in Kotarbiński, and not in the more radical Przełęcki, that we find the postulate of including every living creature in our range of “neighbours” – including animals. While Kotarbiński believed that due to the non-equivalence of the needs of human beings and animals, with respect to the latter we were only bound by the prohibition of cruelty, he saw animals as creatures capable of suffering.⁵⁰ In his “Meditations on A Worthy Life”, he wrote: *A fisherman who kills a pike to feed his family is not a wrongdoer. But a hunter who looks with indifference, if not satisfaction, at the prolonged agony, full of pain and anguish, of a hare he has wounded, instead of killing it with a saving shot, is a villain*⁵¹. Unlike Przełęcki, Kotarbiński believed that our obligations towards different neighbours were different as well – we have different obligations towards those closest to us and to those who are far away. For Przełęcki, a different treatment of the good of different people (including ourselves) did not have any reasonable substantiation (he rejected any psychological substantiation in this regard). He thus broke Kotarbiński’s rule of the realism of our goals, and took the maximalist rather than the minimalist stance, characteristic of Kotarbiński’s views.

While Kotarbiński never referred to Gandhi, he opposed the use of force in interpersonal relationships, even though he allowed fight as a method of preventing even greater evil. Sometimes, fight is a necessity – which is what differs him from Przełęcki who practically excluded the need to fight – but only in defence of the highest values. *Fight, if it is necessary to fight in defence of the nearer of our neighbours against those more distant... Not hating anyone, sparing the adversary any suffering that is not necessary for victory, and immediately showing him the fullness of active kindness when fighting him is no longer necessary*⁵². And if one has to fight, they should always follow the rule “Not

⁴⁹ T. Kotarbiński (1987). *Pisma etyczne. Op. cit.*, pp. 126–129.

⁵⁰ I. Lazari-Pawłowska (1976). *Etyczne wskazania Tadeusza Kotarbińskiego. Studia Filozoficzne, No. 3 (124)*.

⁵¹ T. Kotarbiński (1966). *Medytacje o życiu godziwym*. Warszawa: Wiedza Powszechna, p. 121.

⁵² T. Kotarbiński (1987). *Pisma etyczne. Op. cit.*, p. 190.

one strike more than necessary". The efficiency of actions is not necessarily linked to the ruthlessness of means employed. Punishment, required to maintain social order, must not, Kotarbiński says, involve an element of revenge, and its administration should not be related to making the convict suffer. While not being against the death penalty itself, he wrote about the barbarian way in which it was administered⁵³. Kotarbiński was in favour of reparatory, and not compensatory justice – punishments were to be related to reparation of harm done, and not to getting equal with the wrongdoer.

What Przełęcki was attracted to in Kotarbiński's proposal, and what he will repeat in his essays on ethics, is, next to the postulate of actively fighting against the suffering of others, the idea of making the proposed solutions independent from any metaphysical/religious assumptions, and supporting them with our immediate experience of moral value. Kotarbiński, and then Przełęcki, accepts the moral value of "good deeds" while rejecting the moral order of existence. While admitting to having borrowed the ideas of metaphysics and ethics from Kotarbiński, Przełęcki also points to significant differences in his views. They were mostly concerned with the scope of moral obligations – Przełęcki radically asserted that it was not possible to delineate the borders of our moral duties. A clear conscience, which Kotarbiński considered to be the goal we should strive at, and which resulted from the sense of fulfilled obligation, was for Przełęcki a state it was not possible, but also not advisable to achieve. We can never say we have done all we should have done. Kotarbiński, quite on the contrary, believes that the fulfilment of a certain quantum of requirements guarantees us the status of a "venerable man", who cannot be accused of not having fulfilled his moral obligations. Przełęcki, reluctant towards any perfectionist ethics, could not accept the solution adopted by Kotarbiński.

Another important, if not the most important, difference was related to their judgment of motivation behind our behaviour. Kotarbiński believed morally right motivation was the will to avoid contempt on the part of venerable men, or a form of shame. Przełęcki was of the opinion that the right moral motivation was the will to reach out to those who suffer, out of compassion for their suffering. The motivation Kotarbiński refers to is external (the need for acceptance of one's behaviour by people who are held in esteem), with an undertone of the fear of condemnation: *He who violates moral princi-*

⁵³ *Ibidem*, p. 191.

*ples will suffer dire consequences: respected people will have reason to despise him. And in view of that danger, an honest man feels the necessity to follow ethical principles*⁵⁴.

Ija Lazari-Pawłowska believes that making the value of our actions dependent on the opinion of venerable people is similar to the behaviour of religious people who take into consideration the opinion of the almighty and perfect God. She also accused Kotarbiński that by giving venerable people the right to show contempt to those whose actions they do not approve of, he put into the hands of judges a dangerous weapon, because contempt is a form of hatred. Instead, she believes, we should assume that *no one deserves to be despised of, just like no one deserves to be hated*⁵⁵.

It appears that similar arguments may have motivated Przełęcki's adoption of a solution different from that chosen by his teacher. And even though the consequences of actions motivated by different reasons may be similar – protection of one's neighbours from suffering – the substantiation of these actions is different for the two philosophers.

Przełęcki disagrees with Kotarbiński about the role of courage in shaping the morally just attitude. He believes courage only plays an instrumental role, and is morally valuable only when it serves the fulfilment of commands motivated by compassion (a good heart). For Kotarbiński, courage is at the very head of the virtues of a reliable guardian's permanent disposition, before good heart, integrity, perseverance in difficulties and inner discipline. Writing about venerable people, he proposes the following alternative: *They approve of deeds which testify their doer was acting as a good guardian or a stout fighter*⁵⁶.

Both philosophers agree, and this is an assumption Przełęcki took from Kotarbiński, that every man is capable of good deeds and that in contact with one's neighbours it is right to assume their intentions are good, to threat them as people of good will. Like Kotarbiński, Przełęcki called this conviction the "Quaker principle", and was aware of its controversial nature. It presumes a certain view of the human nature, a view that it is hard to defend considering facts, such as Shoah, for example. In one of his texts, Przełęcki writes: *Even in such extreme situations as those witnessed in concen-*

⁵⁴ T. Kotarbiński (1957–1958). *Wybór pism*. Warszawa: PWN, p. 478.

⁵⁵ I. Lazari-Pawłowska (1976). *Etyczne wskazania Tadeusza Kotarbińskiego*. *Op. cit.*

⁵⁶ T. Kotarbiński (1957–1958). *Wybór pism*. *Op. cit.*, p. 480.

tration camps, the difference between a “good” and a bad trusty was felt by prisoners to be an important fact, also from the moral point of view⁵⁷.

This belief may be charged not only with disregard for facts, but also with a naïveté, similar to that which makes people believe a “moral conversion” may be achieved merely by making an erring man realize his error. Aware of the unrealistic nature of some of his own solutions, Przełęcki nevertheless defended them. That “utopian” nature of his postulates, as well as their radicalism and maximalism, will be the most important hallmarks of his views.

What, then, is the answer to the question asked in this article?

In the chapter on the ethics of the Lvov-Warsaw School, Jan Woleński pointed to a canon of moralist beliefs shared in the School. *This canon includes the following values: equality, freedom, justice, dignity, courage, truthfulness, kindness to others, respect for the material and moral goods of other people, solidarity in fulfilling obligations [...]*⁵⁸. And further on: „*The normative ethics of the Lvov-Warsaw School did not promote any special moral rigorism, or a martyred altruism; neither did it call for renouncement of the simple joys of life. Ordinarily understood success, if worthily achieved, was considered an element of personal happiness just as important as the fulfilment of elementary moral commandments. Happiness can be achieved, but it will only be true happiness if it is achieved worthily. This ethics is based on the optimistic view of human nature: man is able to figure out what moral values are, and do so without much effort [...]*”⁵⁹.

If we treat the sharing of the above views as a criterion of affiliation with the School, than Przełęcki cannot be counted as one of its philosophers. He differs from them not only in adopting certain metaphysical assumptions, but also in their content. The attitude of affirmation of the world was not rare among the School’s philosophers, it was also that of Kotarbiński; it was not common among its representatives, however, to believe in the profound, non-removable tragedy of human existence, the impossibility of eliminating evil from the world. The radicalism and maximalism of Przełęcki’s solutions is another point of difference between Przełęcki and Kotarbiński, as well as other representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School. If

⁵⁷ M. Przełęcki (2005). *Intuicje moralne*. *Op. cit.*, p. 144.

⁵⁸ J. Woleński (1985). *Filozoficzna szkoła lwowsko-warszawska*. *Op. cit.*, p. 294.

⁵⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 294.

the School's ethic is called an ethics of moderation, as the title of Anna Drabarek's book suggests⁶⁰, than it was certainly not the ethics of Przełęcki. The call to self-perdition, the postulate that one should disregard their own good, the willingness to forgive others, embracing mercy instead of justice – this is not a moderate program.

One more striking thing is that none of Przełęcki's ethical texts was devoted to his understanding of happiness – for Przełęcki, unlike Aristotle, shared the belief of Socrates and Plato that the highest value is goodness, not happiness. Many representatives were interested in this issue – the best-known of them was perhaps Władysław Tatarkiewicz, but Kotarbiński also wrote about happiness in his “Meditations on A Worthy Life”. He asserted that it is not possible to define happiness, one could only show the road leading to its achievement. *“Happy is he who has loved something that is not himself, who has taken someone else's need to heart, who has thrown himself into a captivating project”*⁶¹. Happiness is an added value, it happens when we act for the sake of others. The reasons for which Przełęcki did not take the subject up (the only exception are three historical and philosophical texts on Epicurean and Stoic ethics) are related, I think, to his conviction that happiness is not an ethical value, but a non-ethical one, belonging to the domain of felicitology rather than proper ethics. Analyzing Epicurean ethics, Przełęcki wrote: *Thus, if we identify the highest good with happiness, an that ultimately with pleasure, this broadly conceived “physics” of Epicurus will provide us with a substantiation of the thesis that such good is achievable. It does not – and cannot – however substantiate the ethical norm which says that we should strive towards happiness – that it is the highest good*⁶². Contrasting Epicurean ethics, one that was hedonistic and egotistic, with evangelical ethics of altruism and morality, Przełęcki was decidedly in favour of the latter.

In my opinion, differences between the ethical views of Przełęcki and those of other representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School, even Kotarbiński whose stance was so close to his, are sufficiently significant to call him an “individual philosopher”. Despite the similarities between their views on

⁶⁰ A. Drabarek (2004). *Etyka umiaru. Ideał człowieka i jego szczęście w poglądach filozofów ze szkoły lwowsko-warszawskiej*. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek.

⁶¹ T. Kotarbiński (1966). *Medytacje o życiu godziwym*. *Op. cit.*, p. 92.

⁶² M. Przełęcki (2005). *Intuicje moralne*. *Op. cit.*, p. 16.

some issues, Przełęcki presents an original concept which is not convergent with any of the proposals made by Twardowski's disciples. While making similar assumptions, he arrives at different solutions, explaining: „*I am not saying this attitude is right. I only hope it is acceptable – that it can be put into practice and does not deserve to be condemned*”⁶³.

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⁶³ A. Brożek, J. Jadacki, M. Przełęcki (2011). *W poszukiwaniu najwyższych wartości*. *Op. cit.*, p. 141.

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